South Sudan Sanctions: Vote on a Draft Resolution*
Tomorrow morning (29 May), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing sanctions measures on South Sudan—including targeted sanctions (assets freezes and travel bans) and an arms embargo—until 31 May 2027 and the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee until 1 July 2027.
The draft resolution in blue is a straightforward renewal that extends the measures contained in resolution 2781 of 30 May 2025, which most recently renewed the South Sudan sanctions regime and the PoE’s mandate, without introducing substantive changes.
Background
On 16 March, the PoE assisting the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee circulated its final report to Committee members. The Committee subsequently held informal consultations on 27 March to discuss the report and to consider the Panel’s recommendations. At the time of writing, the report had not been made public.
It seems that the report highlighted that armed confrontations between signatories to the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) and affiliated militias have continued across much of the country, particularly in areas where opposition forces maintain a significant presence. It also apparently stated that military operations conducted by the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) continued to be supported by an armed deployment of the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) in South Sudan, as well as by helicopters and surveillance aircraft used in bombardments of opposition-held areas. According to the Panel, subsequent ground offensives made substantial use of armoured personnel carriers previously procured in violation of the arms embargo. The Panel further apparently assessed that the SSPDF procured additional small arms in early 2025 in support of ongoing military operations.
On 16 April, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council an assessment report on the implementation of the benchmarks outlined in resolution 2577 of 28 May 2021 for modifying, suspending, or progressively lifting the arms embargo. (The five benchmarks are: completion of the Strategic Defence and Security Review process contained in the R-ARCSS; formation of the Necessary Unified Forces [NUF]; progress in establishing and implementing the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process; progress in the proper management of existing arms and ammunition stockpiles; and implementation of the Joint Action Plan for the Armed Forces on addressing conflict-related sexual violence.)
According to the Secretary-General’s report, in 2025-2026, South Sudan faced its most difficult period since the signing of the revitalised agreement. In addition to a lack of progress on the five key benchmarks, there were also deeply concerning reversals in the achievements made to date. While some limited initiatives continued, largely supported by the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and other partners, these efforts were insufficient to offset the broader stagnation across the benchmarks. The report suggests that, in light of the evolving political and security developments on the ground, and the lack of progress across the benchmarks, the Security Council “may wish to consider revisiting the existing benchmarks, with a view to ensuring that they remain aligned with the current context and effectively support efforts to advance the implementation of the revitalised agreement and restore stability”. (For more information, see the brief on South Sudan in our May 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
The sanctions imposed on South Sudan have long been a divisive issue in the Security Council. When the Council last renewed the sanctions regime in May 2025 through resolution 2781, six Council members—China, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, and then-Council members Algeria and Sierra Leone—chose to abstain. (For more information, see our 29 May 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
China and Russia have long opposed the South Sudan sanctions regime. These members argue that sanctions imposed on the South Sudanese government have hindered its ability to build and consolidate its security institutions and that they should be lifted or adjusted to support the country’s peace efforts. African Council members over the years have also expressed concerns about the continued sanctions on South Sudan. These members maintain that the current measures could undermine progress in the political and security spheres.
On the other hand, several Council members—including France, the UK, and the US—continue to view sanctions as an essential tool for maintaining pressure on parties in South Sudan to advance the peace process. They have expressed concern that lifting the embargo could worsen the security situation by enabling greater access to arms in an already volatile environment.
Draft Resolution
The US, the penholder on South Sudan, circulated an initial draft of the text to all Council members on 15 May after discussing the draft with the other permanent members. The only round of negotiations involving all Council members was held on 19 May. The penholder subsequently placed the unchanged draft text under silence procedure on 20 May until the following day (21 May). The draft passed silence and was subsequently put in blue on 22 May, to be voted on tomorrow.
It appears that the draft text circulated by the US did not introduce any substantive changes to resolution 2781 but proposed a straightforward renewal, which diplomats have been referring to as a technical rollover. (The term “technical rollover” is used to describe a concise resolution extending a peace operation’s mandate without altering its core mandate or tasks. It traditionally denotes an extension for a shorter period than is customary, but members increasingly use the term to describe routine mandate extensions in which the content is unchanged.)
The US proposed only two changes, which relate to the Secretary-General’s 16 April benchmarks assessment report. In the preambular section, language was added taking note of the Secretary-General’s recommendation that the benchmarks may require revision to reflect current realities on the ground. In the operative paragraphs, the draft requests the Secretary-General to include recommendations regarding possible updates to the benchmarks in his future assessment reports of progress on the key benchmarks. It seems that other Council members did not oppose these references and they therefore were retained in the text in blue.
During the only round of negotiations, the penholder’s proposal for a straightforward renewal of the South Sudan sanctions regime apparently received broad support from Council members, leading the US to proceed with an unchanged draft text that subsequently passed the silence procedure. Although several members—including China, Russia, and the “A3” members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Liberia, and Somalia)—apparently reiterated their longstanding positions regarding the sanctions regime during the negotiations, they did not advocate for lifting or substantially modifying the sanctions measures.
On the other hand, it seems that some members favoured strengthening some aspects of the sanctions regime. The UK apparently proposed several additions to the operative paragraphs. One proposed amendment apparently sought to request the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee to include in its monitoring of the implementation of resolution 2664 of 9 December 2022—which established a cross-cutting humanitarian exception to the asset freeze measures imposed by UN sanctions regimes—an analysis relating to arms embargo violations, illicit financial flows, and the links between natural resource exploitation and conflict dynamics. It seems that another proposal would have encouraged member states, as well as international, regional, and sub-regional organisations cooperating with the PoE, to provide information concerning natural resource-related revenues, arms supply chains, procurement networks, and the diversion of public resources. These proposals apparently received support from some other European Council members.
However, it seems that some members, including China and Russia, viewed these additions as substantive changes that would open up the text for discussion. More generally, Council members did not appear inclined to engage in a wider discussion on the sanctions regime at this stage. Consequently, the UK’s proposed additions were not incorporated into the draft text in blue.
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**Post-script: On 29 May, the Security Council adopted resolution 2821, renewing sanctions measures on South Sudan—including targeted sanctions (assets freezes and travel bans) and an arms embargo—until 31 May 2027 and the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee until 1 July 2027. The resolution requested the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the PoE, to conduct an assessment of progress achieved on the key benchmarks established pursuant to resolution 2577 of 28 May 2021, including recommendations on appropriate updates to the benchmarks and to submit the same by 15 April 2027.
The resolution was adopted with nine votes in favour and six abstentions (China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Pakistan, Russia, and Somalia).
