Bosnia and Herzegovina: Debate
Tomorrow morning (12 May), the Security Council will hold its semi-annual debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). High Representative for BiH Christian Schmidt is scheduled to brief on the latest report of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which was circulated to Council members on 11 May and covers the period from 16 October 2025 to 15 April (S/2026/405). Denis Bećirović, the Bosniak member of the rotating tripartite inter-ethnic Presidency of BiH and the incumbent Chairperson of the Presidency, is expected to participate under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. Croatia and Serbia are also expected to participate under rule 37, while the European Union (EU) will take part under rule 39.
Tomorrow’s debate takes place shortly after Schmidt announced that he is stepping down from his role.
Background
The 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), also known as the Dayton Agreement, created two entities within BiH: the predominantly Bosniak and Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the predominantly Serb Republika Srpska (RS). The two entities are linked by a rotating tripartite inter-ethnic presidency and a two-chamber legislative branch with equal representation by the three major ethnic groups. Both entities also have their own executive and legislative branches.
Tomorrow’s Debate
Schmidt is expected to present the key findings of the latest OHR report, which describes the overall security situation in BiH as “stable but fragile” and warns of a “creeping deconstruction” of state-level institutions. He is also expected to underscore the main challenges to implementing the civilian provisions of the Dayton Agreement, as well as the 5+2 Agenda—a set of five objectives and two conditions defined by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) as prerequisites for the closure of the OHR.
The OHR report notes that the reporting period was marked by “an apparent de-escalation by the [RS] authorities”. There had been an increase in tensions since the BiH State Court sentenced former RS President Milorad Dodik on 26 February 2025 to one year in prison and banned him from holding political office for six years for defying the decisions of the High Representative.
In October 2025, RS authorities took steps to reduce immediate tensions. On 18 October 2025, the RS National Assembly (RSNA) appointed Ana Trišić-Babić as Acting President of RS and repealed a series of laws that had been annulled by BiH’s Constitutional Court, including legislation on the non-application of the Court’s decisions. The latest OHR report notes that while these steps broke the political deadlock and enabled RS to re-engage with the international community, RS authorities continued to challenge the Dayton Agreement, including by “signing a lobbying contract indicating the independence of the [RS] as the ultimate goal”.
This development was discussed by Council members during a meeting held under “any other business” on 25 February. The UK requested the meeting following an 11 February letter submitted to the Council by BiH Foreign Minister Elmedin Konaković, in which he highlighted a lobbying contract filed with the US Department of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act between RS authorities and the Canadian firm Dickens & Madson. Konaković argued that the filing constituted the clearest formal articulation to date of the secessionist objectives pursued by Dodik and his party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), and warned that it represented an attempt to “internationalise and legitimise” actions undermining BiH’s constitutional order and the Dayton Agreement.
The steps taken by RS authorities in October 2025 coincided with—and, according to Washington’s own account, were influenced by—a notable shift in US policy on BiH. On 17 October 2025, the US Treasury Department lifted sanctions on four associates of Dodik; and on 29 October 2025, it lifted sanctions on Dodik himself, along with his allies, family members, and companies associated with them. At the Council’s 31 October 2025 debate on BiH, the US described the lifting of sanctions as a response to the “significant steps” taken by the RSNA and a measure aimed at setting BiH on a “more stable footing”. It further acknowledged that, in the months preceding the October 2025 developments, the US had led discreet diplomatic efforts to defuse the crisis in BiH.
RS leaders have increasingly sought to strengthen ties with the US administration. For instance, on 6 February, Dodik travelled to Washington, alongside Trišić-Babić and Željka Cvijanović, the Serb member of the rotating tripartite inter-ethnic presidency of BiH, to ask for the US’ support in defining RS’ status.
On 23 November 2025, RS Interior Minister Siniša Karan, nominated by Dodik’s SNSD party, narrowly won the snap presidential elections in RS. On 24 December 2025, BiH’s Central Election Commission (CEC) annulled the results in 136 polling stations across 17 constituencies, reportedly citing “numerous irregularities”. Karan again won in the repeat of the vote in these polling stations, held on 8 February, and is expected to serve out the remainder of Dodik’s mandate until the general elections scheduled for October. (For background and more information, see the brief on BiH in our May 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
In the days following the election, Dodik, who continues to lead the SNSD, said that he would propose to the RSNA to return competencies which he argues were originally vested in RS under the Dayton Agreement, including those relating to the army, border police, intelligence services, and the fiscal system. The OHR report notes that recent rhetoric from Dodik has signalled a “return to more explicit secessionist narratives”, which may be a sign that the SNSD’s “ideological campaign is returning to a more aggressive secessionist footing to mobilize the electorate for the October 2026 General Elections”. In this regard, at tomorrow’s meeting, Schmidt may address concerns about election integrity ahead of the October general elections, including efforts to introduce voter identification and vote counting technologies.
During tomorrow’s debate, several Council members are expected to call on all political actors in BiH to refrain from provocative and divisive rhetoric and actions, to respect BiH’s constitutional order, and to advance the reforms required for the country’s EU accession process. The October general elections, and the importance of holding them in a free, fair, and transparent manner, are likely to feature prominently, as is the need to ensure election integrity.
Some members, including Russia, are expected to draw attention to a report submitted by RS authorities to the Security Council on 1 May. The report argues that RS remains committed to the Dayton Agreement, BiH’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. It also accuses the OHR, and Schmidt in particular, of undermining the Dayton constitutional order through the allegedly unlawful use of the “Bonn Powers” and the centralisation of state competences. (The Bonn Powers, which the PIC granted to the High Representative in 1997, include the ability to make binding decisions and unseat elected officials who are found to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Dayton Agreement.) The report also calls on Council members to support what it describes as BiH’s “democratic self-government and federal constitutional structure”, a position that Russia may invoke in support of its longstanding calls for curtailing or closing the OHR.
Tomorrow’s meeting will be the first opportunity for Council members to react publicly to Schmidt’s announcement. While members share concerns about BiH’s entrenched ethnic divisions and ongoing political polarisation, they remain divided over the role and future of the OHR.
The OHR’s 11 May statement announcing Schmidt’s decision to step down from his position said that Schmidt has called on the PIC Steering Board to begin the process of identifying a successor and confirmed that he will continue to serve as High Representative as the search takes place.
Tomorrow, most Council members are expected to reaffirm their support for the OHR, with some specifying that fulfilment of the 5+2 Agenda is a prerequisite for the OHR’s closure. These members may call for continuity in the role of the High Representative and to underscore the importance of identifying a successor capable of carrying out the office’s mandated functions, including the use of the Bonn Powers where necessary.
China and Russia are expected to reiterate that they had never recognised Schmidt’s authority as the High Representative for BiH and to renew their calls for the OHR’s closure. Both have long disputed the legitimacy of Schmidt’s appointment, arguing that it required formal Security Council endorsement. At the 31 October 2025 debate, Russia described the OHR as “incompatible with the sovereignty of [BiH]” and accused Western countries of eroding the Dayton system, while China reiterated that the OHR and the Bonn Powers should not become long-term, let alone permanent, arrangements.
Council members are also likely to express their views on the procedure for the designation of a successor. China and Russia have argued that the appointment of a High Representative requires Council endorsement. In July 2021, they tabled a draft resolution that would have supported Schmidt’s appointment only until 31 July 2022 and provided for the closure of the OHR thereafter. The draft resolution failed to be adopted as it received only two votes in favour (China and Russia) and 13 abstentions. It remains to be seen whether either member will press for a Security Council resolution concerning the next High Representative’s appointment.
The European Council members are expected to maintain that the appointment is made by the PIC Steering Board and that a Security Council expression of support is not legally necessary for the appointment to take effect.
The US’ position will be closely watched. The US has consistently maintained that Schmidt’s appointment complied with the procedure laid out in Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement and that Council endorsement was not legally required. However, its posture under the Trump administration has shifted, as reflected in the lifting of sanctions on Dodik and its statement at the October 2025 debate. Council members will be watching for indications of whether the US intends to support a successor with the same mandate and authorities as Schmidt or a more limited role for the office. While the OHR has framed the announcement as a personal decision, several media reports have suggested that the US had been pressuring Schmidt to step down.
