Yemen: Briefing and Consultations
Tomorrow morning (14 April), the Security Council will hold a briefing on Yemen. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg and Director of the Crisis Response Division at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Edem Wosornu are expected to brief. Closed consultations are scheduled to follow the open briefing.
Yemen continues to be affected by spillover from the regional crisis that began with US‑Israeli strikes against Iran on 28 February. The Houthis–a Yemeni rebel group holding de facto control over northern Yemen that is part of an Iran-backed coalition of armed groups known as the “axis of resistance”—had paused their attacks on Israel and on Red Sea shipping following the Gaza ceasefire agreement in October 2025. However, on 28 March, the group resumed strikes on Israel in response to the widening regional escalation, including Israeli military expansion into Lebanon and strikes targeting Hezbollah.
Following the 7 April announcement of a two-week ceasefire between Iran and the US, differences emerged between the conflict parties on whether the truce framework included Lebanon, which Israel continued to bomb heavily. In a 9 April speech, Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi described the ceasefire announcement as a “great victory” for Iran, while stressing that de-escalation efforts will not be successful unless Israel ceases its attacks on Lebanon and on any member of the “axis of resistance”. He also signalled the group’s readiness to prepare for “inevitable coming rounds” of conflict.
Prior to the Houthis’ resumption of attacks against Israel, Grundberg expressed concern regarding Yemen being dragged into the wider regional escalation, emphasising the need to pursue a comprehensive intra-Yemeni political process instead. On 29 March, the day after the group launched strikes in support of Iran, he called for a stop to military actions and said that he is urging the Houthis, as well as other parties and stakeholders, to avoid further spillover and to engage in diplomatic dialogue.
In his briefing tomorrow, Grundberg is likely to reiterate these messages, while also stressing the risks posed to Yemen by further involvement in the Middle East crisis, including to Yemeni civilians and the country’s economy. On 9 April, the Special Envoy concluded a three-day visit to Aden—the temporary capital of the internationally recognised Yemeni government—during which he held several meetings, including with senior members of the government, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), and the governor of Yemen’s Central Bank. The meetings focused on, among other things, financial stability and on how the regional crisis is affecting global supply chains, the costs of shipping, energy, and commodities in Yemen. Many Council members are expected to echo these concerns, condemn the Houthis’ missile strikes targeting Israel, and call on the group to cease actions that risk undermining the fragile 7 April ceasefire agreed by the US and Iran.
Some members may further warn against a resumption of Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait (which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean)—a threat reportedly made by Iran—which could cause another commercial shipping chokehold similar to that imposed by Iran on the Strait of Hormuz. On 7 April, a Bahraini-proposed draft Security Council resolution on maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz, which included language on the Council’s readiness to consider measures against those undermining freedom of navigation in both straits, received 11 votes in favour but was vetoed by China and Russia. (For more information, see our 6 April What’s in Blue story.) Tomorrow, several members are likely to stress that maritime security must not be impeded and call on the Houthis to fully adhere to resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024, which demanded that the group cease attacks on merchant vessels and further noted the right of states to defend their vessels from attacks.
Grundberg may also address the closure of the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), which ceased operations on 31 March in line with resolution 2813 of 27 January. The mission was established in 2019 to support the implementation of the Hodeidah Agreement, as set out in the Stockholm Agreement that was signed between the Yemeni government and the Houthis on 13 December 2018. UNMHA’s residual tasks—including engaging with the Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) and facilitating communication between the parties—have been transferred to the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Yemen. At tomorrow’s meeting, Grundberg may reaffirm his office’s commitment to facilitating implementation of the 2018 Agreement and emphasise the importance of Hodeidah’s stability. China and Russia, who abstained on resolution 2813, may reiterate concerns that UNMHA’s withdrawal risks negative security and humanitarian implications for Hodeidah.
Tomorrow’s meeting is also likely to feature discussion on unresolved tensions in southern Yemen and the challenges that the Yemeni government faces in consolidating authority over territory previously held by the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) faction. In February, government-aligned forces reportedly opened fire on pro-STC protestors in two separate incidents, killing and wounding several people. (For background and more information, see the brief on Yemen in our April 2026 Monthly Forecast.) A 17 March Human Rights Watch report found that “government forces used excessive force against protestors and arbitrarily detained protestors in Aden”. More recently, on 4 April, three people were killed and several others injured when government-affiliated forces reportedly opened fire while dispersing a pro-STC demonstration in the southern port city of Mukalla, prompting PLC Chairman Rashad al-Alimi to order an immediate investigation into the incident.
On 9 April, the STC sent a letter to the Security Council, requesting it to condemn the incidents and to call for an independent human rights investigation. The letter also criticised a lack of progress on the “Southern Dialogue Conference” initiative—announced by Yemen and Saudi Arabia in January to address southern grievances and build intra-Yemeni consensus—noting that no timeline or further details have been communicated. It additionally called for a “UN-supervised mechanism” through which southern Yemenis can “democratically determine [their] political future”.
Tomorrow, several speakers may express concern at continued tensions and clashes in southern Yemen and call on all parties to exercise restraint, while some speakers may also stress the need to respect the rights to freedom of expression and of peaceful assembly. Council members are likely to emphasise their support for the unity and territorial integrity of Yemen and for the PLC, while some may highlight their support for the Southern Dialogue initiative and for the convening of the conference as soon as possible.
An expected related focus of tomorrow’s meeting is the need to advance efforts towards the long-stalled comprehensive peace process in Yemen. Grundberg may brief on his efforts to restart an inclusive political process—one that appropriately reflects current realities and challenges—including through his visits to Moscow on 17 February, Washington on 26 March, and most recently to Riyadh on 10 April, during which he held discussions with senior officials and stakeholders on prospects for peace in Yemen.
Grundberg may also note that negotiations between the parties related to conflict-related detainees—which take place under the framework of the Stockholm Agreement and had resumed in December 2025—have continued in Amman. Council members are likely to express support for a Yemeni-owned and Yemeni-led political process under UN auspices, and some may note that the exchange of detainees could serve as a confidence-building measure between the parties.
The deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Yemen is another expected focus of tomorrow’s meeting. Members may be interested to hear from Wosornu on whether the Middle East crisis has substantively impacted the already grave humanitarian situation in the country, where 22.3 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance and protection. She is likely to highlight alarming figures from OCHA’s 2026 Yemen Humanitarian and Response Plan (HNRP), published on 18 March, which notes that 18.3 million people are facing acute levels of food insecurity and 19.3 million require access to critical health services. The report also notes that only 59.3 percent of health facilities are fully functional amid significant funding cuts. Wosornu might warn that without a substantial increase in funding and improved access, Yemen is at risk of a further deterioration of humanitarian conditions.
Council members are expected to raise concerns regarding the figures reported in the HNRP, while stressing the importance that humanitarian personnel be allowed to operate without restrictions, particularly in Houthi-controlled territory. Most members are likely to reiterate their strong condemnation of the Houthis’ continued detention of aid workers and their forced entry into UN premises, which repeatedly took place during 2025, and call on the group to immediately release the 73 UN personnel it is currently arbitrarily detaining.
