UN Peacekeeping Operations: Closed Consultations
Tomorrow afternoon (29 April), Security Council members will hold closed consultations on UN peacekeeping operations. Denmark and Pakistan, two elected Council members who are promoting peacekeeping as a key priority, requested the meeting. Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix will brief on the contingency measures implemented by UN peacekeeping operations to address the UN’s liquidity crisis, resulting from member states’ failure to pay their assessed contributions to the peacekeeping budget in full and on time.
On 30 June 2025, the General Assembly approved a $5.38 billion budget for UN peacekeeping operations for the 2025–2026 fiscal year. However, the discrepancy between the approved budget and the availability of cash continues to pose significant challenges, exacerbating the ongoing liquidity crisis and forcing the UN to reduce expenditures. The UN may run out of cash as early as July if member states fail to pay their dues in full and on time. This risk has prompted Secretary-General António Guterres to warn of the world body’s “imminent financial collapse”, a situation that could have significant implications for peacekeeping operations. The General Assembly’s Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee), which held its first resumed session between 23 February and 27 March, concluded its work by deferring discussions on the liquidity crisis to its next resumed session in May or June, when it will review and approve the peacekeeping budget for the following fiscal year (from 1 July to 30 June 2027).
The US, a major financial contributor who covers roughly 27 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget, has accumulated around $4 billion in arrears to the UN’s regular and peacekeeping budgets. Since President Donald Trump returned to office in January 2025, the US has sought to overhaul UN peacekeeping operations as part of a “back to basics” strategy designed to cut costs and to focus the UN on what Washington believes is the body’s core peace and security mandate. It has argued that some missions have been ineffective in fulfilling their mandates and pushed for their closure. Since last year, the US has called for strategic reviews and benchmarks to assess mission progress and performance, as well as for the Secretary-General to present options regarding the future of specific missions. This position has influenced Council decisions adopted on several missions in 2025, and the trend appears to have continued this year. (For background and more information, see the In Hindsight titled “UN Peace Operations at a Crossroads” in our March 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
In line with its new policy, the US seems to have adopted a selective approach to disbursing funds to peacekeeping operations, rather than paying its full annual assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget. In February, the US paid $160 million towards its outstanding contributions to the regular budget. However, at the time of writing, there is no indication that the US has paid its contributions to the peacekeeping budget for the 2025-2026 fiscal year.
The liquidity crisis has forced the UN to implement contingency measures across its peacekeeping missions, including a 15 percent reduction in expenditures and the repatriation of 25 percent of uniformed personnel. Several missions have already reported to the Security Council that they have completed the implementation of these measures. Tomorrow’s meeting will therefore provide an opportunity for Council members to receive a comprehensive briefing on the implementation of these measures and their impact on missions’ capacity and effectiveness in carrying out their mandates. This builds on a similar briefing in consultations held in November 2025. (For more information, see our 17 November 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
At tomorrow’s meeting, Lacroix may highlight the significant challenges facing peacekeeping operations, which are striving to continue fulfilling their mandated tasks in an increasingly resource-constrained environment. Several missions have reported that reduced funding is forcing them to scale back patrols, thereby limiting their ability to respond effectively to threats and protect civilians. This may create security vacuums that spoilers could exploit, undermining hard-won gains.
In a March interview, Lacroix drew attention to the impact of the liquidity crisis on troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs). One of the major challenges these countries face is delays in reimbursement for both personnel and contingent-owned equipment. In this connection, he raised concerns about fairness, noting that many T/PCCs are from the Global South and have limited financial resources, but due to the liquidity crisis, these countries have effectively become the ultimate financiers of UN peacekeeping operations.
On 15 April, Lacroix briefed the Security Council during its annual meeting with heads of military components of UN peace operations. While noting that it is too early to assess the full impact of the contingency measures, he said that its effects will be nonetheless felt over an extended period, citing constraints faced by missions in implementing their political and protection of civilians (PoC) mandates as well as in ensuring the safety and security of their personnel. At tomorrow’s consultations, he may highlight examples of specific missions to illustrate the prevailing challenges in this regard.
The Secretary-General’s most recent report on the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), dated 13 February, noted that the liquidity crisis has significantly constrained the mission’s operations and effectiveness, forcing it to prioritise only the most critical tasks, reducing its flexibility and forcing the scaling back, postponement, or suspension of a wide range of its mandated activities. The report also described the impact of the contingency measures in weakening the mission’s ability to protect civilians, creating response gaps and increasing the risk of insecurity in conflict-affected areas.
Similarly, the Secretary-General’s 19 March report on the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) described the mission’s reduced operational capacity due to the contingency measures, which limited its mobility, narrowed its geographic coverage, and weakened its deterrence and sustained presence in high-threat areas. The mission also noted that these constraints have undermined its ability to implement its PoC mandate, with cuts to intelligence, surveillance, and early warning capabilities reducing situational awareness and coordination in volatile environments, thereby increasing operational risks.
The impact of these contingency measures has also raised significant concerns in South Sudan, particularly amid the country’s deteriorating security situation. According to the Secretary-General’s most recent report (S/2026/316) on the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which was circulated to Council members on 10 April, the mission’s reduced footprint has constrained its geographical reach, as well as its early warning and rapid response capacities. It has also significantly curtailed human rights monitoring, community and political engagement, and support for humanitarian protection. These constraints may affect the current discussions on UNMISS’ mandate renewal, given their serious implications for the mission’s ability to effectively carry out its responsibilities. The US, the penholder on the file, had apparently introduced significant changes to the mandate (which expires on 30 April), including reducing the mission’s authorised strength, while other Council members apparently opposed these changes.
In light of these and other challenges facing UN peacekeeping operations, Lacroix once again highlighted the gravity of the situation in a 23 April press briefing, warning that these missions could reach a point where they are no longer able to carry out some of their mandated tasks. He may convey a similar message in his briefing tomorrow afternoon and reiterate calls for member states to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time, to ensure that UN peacekeeping operations have the resources needed to fulfil their mandates.
Council members are expected to express differing views on the liquidity crisis during tomorrow’s consultations. The US may reiterate its position that the status quo is untenable and that UN peacekeeping must reform and adapt. It may emphasise the need to continue cutting costs, highlighting the need to link peacekeeping mandate renewals to political progress and the performance of missions. China has consistently criticised the US, attributing the liquidity crisis to Washington’s failure to meet financial obligations to the UN. However, China has also faced criticism for delays in its own payments as the second-largest financial contributor to the UN. It paid its 2025 regular budget contributions in full by the end of October 2025 and tends to similarly disburse its peacekeeping contribution late in the fiscal year.
Russia has been critical of the contingency measures, arguing that they were implemented without adequate consultation with member states. It may reiterate this position tomorrow afternoon, stressing that such measures should not affect the implementation of mandated tasks. Other Council members are likely to underscore the implications of the contingency measures for PoC, particularly in light of the operational challenges reported by several missions. European members may continue to highlight their commitment to meeting their financial obligations, while underscoring the need for all other member states—especially major financial contributors—to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time in order to address the liquidity crisis. Major T/PCCs like Pakistan may focus on the additional burden on these countries and stress the need to address their concerns.
