Syria: Briefing and Consultations
On Wednesday afternoon (22 April), the Security Council will hold a briefing on Syria. Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Claudio Cordone, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher, and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict Vanessa Frazier are the anticipated briefers. Closed consultations are scheduled to follow the open briefing.
The Middle East crisis triggered on 28 February by Israeli and US military strikes on Iran has also impacted Syria. Falling debris from Iranian missiles and drones intercepted while transiting over the country’s territory has caused civilian casualties, and over 250,000 people have crossed into Syria in search of safety amid intensified hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Additionally, throughout March and early April, pro-Iranian militias operating in Iraq reportedly launched multiple cross-border missile and drone attacks at military bases in northeastern and southeastern Syria, ostensibly to target US forces based there. No casualties were reported in the strikes. On 16 April, the US reportedly finalised the redeployment of its forces out of Syria and the handing over of bases to the interim government—a process which started in 2025.
Following the 7 April announcement of a two-week ceasefire between Iran and the US, spillover risks from the conflict subsided and Syria reopened its airspace. At Wednesday’s meeting, speakers are likely to call on all parties to the regional conflict to prioritise diplomacy in light of the impending expiration of the two-week truce, while several speakers are likely to commend and express support for the Syrian authorities’ efforts to insulate the country—which is currently undergoing a fragile transition—from becoming embroiled in a wider regional escalation.
Another likely focus of Wednesday’s meeting is Israel’s intensified military activity in southern Syria—particularly in the governorates of Daraa, Quneitra, and Suweida—since the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. These operations—including incursions, arrests, and road closures—are framed by Israel as necessary for its national security. On 3 April, the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) reported that an Israeli tank fired across the ceasefire line established by the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria. The mission has launched an investigation into the incident, which coincided with reports of a civilian death in the village of al-Rafid in Quneitra governorate.
Additionally, on 20 March, Israel conducted air strikes on Syrian military infrastructure in southern Syria following renewed clashes between government forces and Druze factions in Suweida. Israel has described such strikes as protecting the Druze community amid recurring tensions—particularly since the July 2025 fighting involving Syrian forces, Bedouin tribes, and Druze groups in the governorate. Syria has condemned the strikes, saying that they constitute an interference in the country’s internal affairs and a destabilising factor in the region. Although a ceasefire was reached among the Syrian parties following the July 2025 clashes, tensions persist amid Druze protests and calls for accountability for violence committed in July 2025 and self-determination.
On Wednesday, Cordone and many Council members are likely to express concern at the continued Israeli military intervention in Syria, while stressing that such actions complicate transitional efforts, as Damascus grapples with fragile social and territorial cohesion in the south. Speakers are expected to call on Israel to cease such actions and to respect Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to uphold the terms of the 1974 Agreement. Some may further call on the two countries to pursue diplomatic dialogue through the recently established US-mediated joint mechanism.
Other security issues are also likely to be discussed during Wednesday’s meeting. Council members may seek an update from Cordone on the continued implementation of the 29 January agreement to integrate areas formerly held by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeast Syria, against the backdrop of reported tensions in late March. He may also reference attacks in late March by individuals from the Sunni-majority town Qalaat al-Madiq in the neighbouring Christian town of Suqaylabiyah. Some members might warn of possible escalations into broader intercommunal violence—similar to the deadly incidents involving Druze and Alawite communities in 2025—if sectarian incitement is not addressed, while reiterating that Syria’s political transition should remain Syrian-owned, Syrian-led, and inclusive of all components of Syria’s society.
Council members may also stress the need for nationwide accountability and reconciliation efforts for atrocities committed both before and after Assad’s ouster. Some may cite a 27 March report by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Syria regarding the July 2025 Suweida clashes, which said that more than 1,700 people were killed and over 200,000 displaced amid widespread human rights abuses. The report recommended that the Syrian government “urgently strengthen accountability” and engagement with the Druze community. This followed a 17 March report by the Syrian National Investigation Committee—a body established by the Ministry of Justice to investigate the same events—which characterised the violations as individual rather than systematic and announced related detentions. This report drew criticism from some human rights observers, who argued that it does not hold the leadership accountable and lacks independence.
Fletcher is expected to brief Council members on the 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) for Syria, which he co-launched with UN Development Programme (UNDP) Administrator Alexander De Croo during a visit to Damascus on 2 April. The plan identifies three strategic objectives: saving lives and alleviating suffering; protecting safety and rights; and restoring life-saving services and livelihoods in support of national recovery priorities. It is seeking $2.92 billion to assist 8.6 million of the 15.6 million people in need across all sectors. Fletcher is likely to underscore that this prioritised approach reflects severe resource constraints at a moment when humanitarian funding is under acute pressure globally and to urge increased donor support for the plan.
Fletcher is also expected to share findings from his visit to Syria, during which he met President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani. In his 2 April press statement, he described progress made in the 15 months since the change of authorities—characterising Syria’s growing potential as a “success story”—and framed the visit as centred on the need to accelerate the transition away from a purely humanitarian response and towards a development, resilience, and long-term recovery phase. On Wednesday, he is likely to call on Council members to support the conditions that would make this transition possible.
Another focus of the meeting will be the protection needs of Syrian children. In her first formal briefing to the Council since she was appointed as Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict on 3 October 2025, Frazier is expected to describe her three-day visit to Syria, which concluded on 19 February. She is likely to note Damascus’ stated commitment to child protection, including its reaffirmation of international obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the introduction of protocols to prevent the recruitment and use of children by the government’s armed and security forces. At the same time, Frazier is expected to highlight the severe challenges that persist, including the disproportionate threat posed by explosive ordnance (EO) to children, the reintegration of displaced children and families returning to their communities, and the widening education crisis. According to the 2026 Syria HNRP, children account for nearly a third of EO casualties since December 2024. Additionally, around 32 percent of children are out of school and nearly 8,000 schools are not functioning. Frazier is likely to call on the international community to scale up support to tackle these issues.
Considering these humanitarian and socioeconomic challenges, several Council members are expected to stress the need for the international community to provide Syria with full support towards reconstruction and economic rehabilitation, to ensure the success of the ongoing political transition. Several countries have taken measures towards bolstering such support. The European Union (EU)—which includes Council members France, Denmark, Greece, and Latvia—reportedly plans to fully resume its 1978 cooperation agreement with Syria and begin formal talks on strengthening economic and security ties on 11 May. In a similar vein, the UK may refer to a 31 March meeting between Sharaa and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, during which the two discussed opportunities for British business to contribute to the restoration of Syria’s infrastructure.