Sudan: Closed Consultations
This afternoon (17 April), Security Council members are expected to hold closed consultations on Sudan, at the request of Denmark and the UK (the penholder on the file). Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Pekka Haavisto is expected to brief Council members for the first time since his appointment on 24 February. The UK may propose press elements on the meeting.
The consultations take place as the conflict in Sudan, which erupted on 15 April 2023, enters its fourth year. The violence has evolved into a protracted armed conflict marked by widespread civilian casualties, mass displacement, and food insecurity with famine conditions in some areas. It has also resulted in the destruction of critical infrastructure and serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights abuses, including conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV).
The conflict increasingly resembles a war of attrition, with external actors providing support to the parties and arms continuing to flow from multiple sources, contributing to regional spillover and proxy dynamics. Hostilities have intensified, with the growing use of sophisticated weaponry and shifting front lines across multiple regions. The fighting has further fragmented the country and weakened already fragile governance structures. As both sides continue to prioritise military strategies, mediation efforts have stalled, narrowing prospects for political dialogue. (For more information, see our 26 March What’s in Blue story.)
In a 13 April press briefing, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan Denise Brown said that Sudan remains trapped in a vicious cycle of violations, including killings and displacement. She highlighted reports pointing to patterns of sexual violence and their consequences, as well as atrocities in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state, which the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seized in October 2025. She also referred to the 19 February report of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, which identified “hallmarks of genocide” in El Fasher, and underscored the urgent need to prevent further atrocities.
Today’s meeting provides an opportunity for Haavisto to brief Council members on his recent engagements with Sudanese actors, as well as regional and international interlocutors. Following his appointment, Haavisto travelled to Khartoum in late March, where he met with a range of Sudanese stakeholders, including Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, senior officials such as Foreign Minister Mohieldin Salim Ahmed, and other political, military, and civilian actors. He also visited Port Sudan, where he engaged with civil society representatives and members of the diplomatic corps.
Haavisto subsequently visited Addis Ababa, where he met with senior African Union (AU) officials, including AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf. He then travelled to Cairo for engagements with Egyptian officials, including Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, as well as representatives of the League of Arab States (LAS) and members of the Sudanese diaspora. In Nairobi, he met with RSF leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, as well as with civilian political actors, civil society representatives, members of the diplomatic community, and Kenyan authorities. At today’s meeting, Council members might be interested in Haavisto’s assessment of these engagements, including their impact on prospects for de-escalation and renewed dialogue, the parties’ current positions, and possible next steps in advancing mediation efforts.
On 2 April, media reports indicated that the UN had reopened its headquarters in the capital, Khartoum, alongside the resumption of activities by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in the country. In a 9 April press release, the World Food Programme (WFP) announced plans to return its country office to the capital after nearly three years, describing the move as part of broader UN efforts to “move back to the capital”. The press release also noted signs of increased activity in parts of the city, including the resumption of UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) flights in February and the return of some residents.
On 15 April, Germany hosted the third International Sudan Conference in Berlin, together with France, the UK, the US, the AU, and the European Union (EU), to mark the third anniversary of the conflict. The conference brought together ministers and representatives from 55 states, including neighbouring and regional countries and donors, as well as representatives of regional organisations, the UN and its entities, and 38 international and Sudanese non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Participants emphasised shared priorities, including calling on the parties to end hostilities, comply with IHL, ensure full, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access across Sudan, remove bureaucratic impediments to aid delivery, and commit to the protection of civilians. Participants also announced pledges of over €1.5 billion (approximately $1.77 billion) in humanitarian assistance. Neither of the Sudanese warring parties were invited to participate in the conference, prompting Sudanese Prime Minister Kamil Idris to protest the government’s exclusion from the meeting.
At the invitation of the Quintet group—comprising the AU, the EU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the LAS, and the UN—a range of Sudanese civilian actors also met in Berlin on 15 April to discuss the launch of an intra-Sudanese political dialogue aimed at paving the way for a civilian-led transition. The participants signed a joint document presenting a unified position and outlining a comprehensive political process to address the root causes of the crisis, including issues of governance, justice, and marginalisation. The document also called for a comprehensive transitional justice process to ensure accountability, redress for victims, and national reconciliation, while prioritising the protection of civilians and the preservation of infrastructure.
In parallel to diplomatic efforts, international interlocutors have been using additional tools to exert pressure on the parties. On 24 February, the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee designated four RSF commanders, including the group’s deputy commander Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo. The designations were proposed to the Committee by France, the UK, and the US, collectively known as the Council’s P3 members. These members have proposed four additional designations over recent weeks; however, at the time of writing, Russia has apparently placed a technical hold on the designations, which is expected to expire by the end of this month. (For background, see our 18 February What’s in Blue story.)
On 26 March, Council members discussed the situation in Sudan under “any other business”. The meeting was requested by Denmark and the UK, supported by the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Liberia, and Somalia), after a 20 March strike on El Daein Teaching Hospital in East Darfur state reportedly killed around 70 people. Following that meeting, the UK apparently circulated draft press elements referencing the 20 March attack on the hospital. The draft did not attribute responsibility for the attack, prompting some members, particularly France, to call for the press elements to include clearer attribution and to request an independent investigation. Some international interlocutors, such as the US, have attributed the strike to the SAF. A 24 March report by the Humanitarian Research Lab at the Yale School of Public Health similarly assessed that the attack was likely conducted by the SAF, noting that the RSF controls the city of El Daein and maintains military and logistics capabilities in the area. The SAF has rejected allegations that it had carried out the attack.
More generally, the P3 members consider both the RSF and SAF to be responsible for the ongoing atrocities in Sudan and view them as unfit to govern the country. Reflecting this position, some of these members have also emphasised the need for the Council to call out the actions of both sides. Ultimately, Council members could not agree on the language providing attribution for the strike and on accountability and did not issue press elements following the 26 March meeting. (For background on Council dynamics, see the brief on Sudan in our February 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
