Libya: Vote to Renew Sanctions Measures*
Tomorrow morning (14 April), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution reauthorising measures contained in resolution 2146 of 19 March 2014 related to the illicit export of petroleum from Libya. The draft text, which was authored by the UK (the penholder on Libya), also renews the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee.
Background
Through resolution 2146, the Council authorised member states to inspect on the high seas vessels designated by the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee for facilitating the illicit export of petroleum from Libya. Most recently, resolution 2769 of 16 January 2025 renewed the authorisation related to the illicit export of petroleum until 1 May and extended the PoE’s mandate until 15 May.
Resolution 2769 represented a significant evolution of the Libya sanctions regime with respect to frozen Libyan state assets. In this resolution, the Council acted on recommendations by the Panel and authorised limited, tightly controlled measures to preserve the value of frozen Libyan state assets, particularly those of the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), the country’s sovereign wealth fund. It permitted the narrowly defined and restricted reinvestment of certain frozen LIA cash reserves, subject to notification to and approval by the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee and continued monitoring by the PoE. At the same time, the resolution maintained the asset freeze in full, including the prohibition on access to or use of the assets, framing these measures as aimed at preserving their value for the benefit of the Libyan people at a later stage.
On 24 March, the Committee met to discuss the PoE’s final report, submitted in line with resolution 2769. At the time of writing, the report has yet to be made public. According to some media outlets citing access to the PoE’s final report, the Panel highlighted unprecedented levels of corruption in Libya’s energy sector, which it assessed as contributing to the country’s deteriorating economic conditions. Media outlets also cited the PoE’s findings on the misuse of the budget of Libya’s National Oil Corporation to channel funds to networks linked to armed groups, implicating political and military figures from both eastern and western parts of the country.
Negotiations on the Draft Resolution
The UK circulated the initial draft of the text on 26 March and convened the first round of expert-level negotiations on 31 March. After receiving comments from Council members, the penholder circulated a first and second revised draft on 2 and 7 April, respectively. The second round of negotiations was held on 8 April. The following day, the UK circulated a third revised draft, which was placed under silence procedure. On 10 April, the draft passed silence and the UK placed the text in blue for a vote tomorrow (14 April).
The draft text in blue renews the PoE’s mandate until 15 August 2027 and extends the authorisation of measures related to the illicit export of petroleum from Libya until 1 August 2027. It also refines the implementation of asset freeze measures introduced in resolution 2769, while otherwise maintaining the existing Libya sanctions framework.
The negotiations appear to indicate that Council members remain broadly aligned on the framework of the Libya sanctions regime. It seems that more substantive discussions and some points of contention focused on a limited number of issues. Among these, the most prominent were the implementation of asset freeze measures following the changes introduced in resolution 2769, as well as on the penholder’s initial proposals to expand the role of regional organisations in enforcing measures related to the illicit export of petroleum.
Implementation of Asset Freeze Measures
In the initial draft, the penholder proposed a set of measures aimed at addressing outstanding implementation issues related to the asset freeze framework introduced in resolution 2769. The proposals sought to support the effective preservation of frozen Libyan state assets, particularly those held by the LIA, by clarifying reinvestment procedures, addressing custodial continuity, and specifying the treatment of certain limited compliance‑related expenses, while maintaining the asset freeze and the authority of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee.
The most substantive change in this regard was the inclusion of a new operative paragraph allowing, under strict conditions, the transfer of frozen LIA assets between custodial financial institutions within the same jurisdiction for the sole purpose of changing the global custodian to that custodial bank or financial institution. During the negotiations, some members, including France and the US, apparently emphasised the need for tight safeguards and strict Committee control, with a view to ensuring that the provision would be applied narrowly and would not be interpreted beyond its intended scope.
On the other hand, it seems that the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Liberia, and Somalia), supported by China and Bahrain, requested language acknowledging the LIA’s practical role in triggering requests and for clarifications aimed at reducing procedural bottlenecks resulting from the asset preservation measures outlined in resolution 2769.
In later revisions, the penholder tightened the provision by making clear that any transfer would only be allowed if the Committee considered it unavoidable, and by confirming that requests would be submitted by the relevant member state, where appropriate, at the request of the LIA. This compromise reflected a view shared by some Council members, including Pakistan and Russia, that requests should continue to be submitted through member states, while also taking into account the LIA’s practical role. Other revisions clarified that technical rollovers within approved reinvestment arrangements would not require repeated notifications and noted—based on suggestions by the A3, Bahrain, and China—that certain salaries and audit‑related costs may fall within existing basic‑expense exemptions under resolution 1970 of 26 February 2011, which imposed the arms embargo and asset freeze measures. Overall, these changes were intended to make the asset freeze measures agreed in resolution 2769 workable in practice, rather than to introduce new substantive changes to the regime.
Role of Regional Organisations in Oil Smuggling Enforcement
Another substantive proposal advanced by the penholder in early drafts concerned the role of regional organisations in enforcing measures related to the illicit export of petroleum from Libya. Under the existing framework, the authorisations set out in resolution 2146 apply to member states and do not explicitly extend enforcement authority to regional organisations. The UK sought to extend these authorisations to member states acting through regional organisations, with the aim of aligning the oil smuggling enforcement framework more closely with existing maritime provisions applicable to the Libya arms embargo.
The proposal proved contentious during the negotiations. Russia, supported by some other members, raised concerns about the scope and oversight of the proposed enforcement role for the regional organisations and suggested alternative approaches, including a limited pilot phase combined with enhanced reporting to the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee. China, for its part, questioned the appropriateness of considering the issue in the context of the sanctions renewal and suggested instead that the text express a willingness to revisit the matter at a later stage following further consultations. The A3 members also expressed reservations, including regarding oversight arrangements and coordination with Libyan authorities, and proposed time‑bound or conditional approaches. Despite these discussions, views remained divided on whether such a change should be addressed within the sanctions framework.
In the absence of consensus, the penholder ultimately reverted to the language of resolution 2769, which does not extend oil smuggling enforcement authority to regional organisations. This outcome reflected differing Council views on the delegation of enforcement authority and a preference among several members to retain the existing member state‑based framework pending further consideration.
The Security Council might address this issue in a different context in the future. Next month, the Council is expected to consider the renewal of the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya suspected of violating the arms embargo. While that authorisation is limited to arms embargo enforcement, the upcoming negotiations may prompt further discussion among Council members on the role of regional organisations in sanctions enforcement more broadly, including whether similar approaches could be contemplated in relation to measures addressing the illicit export of petroleum.
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**Post-script: On 14 April, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2819, extending the authorisation of measures related to the illicit export of petroleum from Libya until 1 August 2027. The resolution also renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee until 15 August 2027.
