Haiti: Briefing and Consultations*
Tomorrow morning (23 April), the Security Council will hold an open briefing and closed consultations on Haiti. Special Representative and Head of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) Carlos Ruiz Massieu and Special Representative for the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) Jack Christofides are expected to brief in the open chamber. Assistant Secretary-General and Head of the UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) Daniela Kroslak will brief in consultations.* Haiti is expected to participate under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, represented by Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé.
Ruiz Massieu will brief on recent developments in Haiti and the Secretary-General’s latest report on BINUH (S/2026/325), which was circulated to Council members on 14 April and covers developments since 15 January. Regarding the security situation, he might note that, despite localised and fragile improvements, armed gangs continue to carry out attacks and undermine state authority. Among other things, Ruiz Massieu might draw attention to the high incidence of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), child trafficking for recruitment and exploitation, kidnappings and other forms of violence perpetrated by gang members. He may stress that gang violence continues to restrict civic space, mobility, access to markets, and essential services.
The Secretary-General’s report notes that operations targeting the gangs intensified between December 2025 and February, with 1,343 suspected gang members killed during these operations and 140 firearms seized. At the same time, the report indicates that anti-gang operations caused casualties among residents, with 158 people not affiliated with gangs killed and 108 injured. Recent reports by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch have also highlighted the high incidence of casualties among people not associated with gangs during anti-gang operations carried out by private military company contractors hired by the Haitian government to combat gangs. (For background, see the brief on Haiti in our April 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
Tomorrow, Council members are expected to express concern about the security situation in the country and condemn gang violence, human rights violations, the widespread cases of SGBV, and the forced recruitment and use of children by gangs. Some members may also underscore the need for all security operations to comply with international human rights law and standards.
Ruiz Massieu is also expected to address the political situation in the country and provide an update on electoral preparations. Echoing the Secretary-General’s report, he may welcome the recent “peaceful handover of executive authority” from the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) to the Council of Ministers under the leadership of the prime minister. The TPC—the body created pursuant to a 2024 agreement facilitated by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the US after a dramatic surge in gang violence—dissolved on 7 February, upon the expiry of its mandate. Following the transfer of authority from the TPC, the Council of Ministers adopted a decree stating that it would exercise full executive authority pending the investiture of an elected president. (Haiti has been without a president for over four years, following the killing of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021, and has not held elections since 2016. Fils-Aimé was appointed by the TPC in 2024.)
Ruiz Massieu might refer to conditions necessary for the timely holding of elections, such as the stabilisation of the security situation and the effective coordination of international efforts to provide electoral assistance to Haiti. On 8 April, the Provisional Electoral Council announced the postponement of voter registration, originally scheduled to begin on 1 April, a development generally understood to imply a delay to the electoral calendar. Haitian authorities had previously indicated that elections were expected to begin in August.
Regarding the humanitarian situation, Ruiz Massieu might refer to the high levels of internal displacement in the country. In a 24 February update, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that, between 5 December 2025 and 6 January, over 1.45 million people were internally displaced in Haiti. Food insecurity also remains widespread.
Tomorrow will be Christofides’ first briefing to the Security Council in his capacity as GSF Special Representative. The Security Council authorised the transition from the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to the GSF in September 2025 through resolution 2793, which also created the position of the Special Representative for the GSF. Christofides was appointed to this role by the Standing Group of Partners for the GSF—comprising The Bahamas, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kenya, and the US—in December 2025. He arrived in Haiti on 1 April. (For background on the GSF’s mandate, see our 30 September 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
Council members may seek an update from Christofides on deployment levels and measures to mitigate any potential security gaps arising between the repatriation of Kenyan officers and the deployment of new troops. Kenyan personnel who formed the bulk of the MSS mission—including its force commander—remained in Haiti during the initial phase of the transition to the GSF, but they are currently in the final stages of repatriation. Chad, one of the countries that is expected to provide troops under the GSF’s mandate, began its deployment on 1 April. According to Reuters, 400 Chadian personnel are currently in Haiti, part of a larger expected deployment of 1,500 troops.
Some Council members may be interested in hearing from Christofides about measures to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and other violations by GSF personnel, in light of recent reports indicating that, in 2025, the UN received four allegations of SEA involving personnel from the MSS mission. All four allegations were found to be substantiated by investigations conducted by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Some members might also be interested in receiving information regarding the cooperation protocols being established between the GSF and national security forces.
Kroslak may provide an update on the establishment of UNSOH. This office was authorised under resolution 2793 to provide support to the GSF and BINUH, among other entities. According to the Secretary-General’s report, on 1 February UNSOH assumed full responsibility for providing the standard range of mission support services to BINUH, and, since 1 April, it has been ready to provide the GSF with full logistical and operational support, including related to medical evacuations and the provision of rations and fuel. Members may be interested in an assessment of challenges encountered in establishing UNSOH, as well as those anticipated going forward.
Council members have recently held several informal meetings on the situation in Haiti, including a 9 April briefing on child trafficking and child protection organised by Colombia and Denmark, and a 20 April briefing on the security transition organised by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Informed by these exchanges, Council members may stress at tomorrow’s meeting the importance of establishing clear pathways to ensure the safe exit of children recruited by gangs and to facilitate their reintegration, including in connection with the expected full deployment of the GSF. Several members may emphasise that sustainable stabilisation requires security operations to be complemented by longer‑term approaches to reduce violence and prevent recruitment into gangs, including through disarmament, dismantlement and reintegration (DDR); community violence reduction (CVR); and broader development initiatives. Some might welcome the reactivation in February of the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration and call for the prompt development and implementation of a national DDR strategy.
Some members might also stress the need to address the dire detention conditions, overcrowding, and high rates of prolonged pre-trial detention in Haiti. The Secretary-General’s report says that, as at 8 April, the national prison population stood at 7,551 inmates, including 261 children, with 6,262 people in pre-trial detention. The report adds that prisons are operating at 312 percent of their intended capacity, providing an average of 0.34 m² per detainee.
More broadly, some members may note that the Security Council has established a set of mechanisms on Haiti, including BINUH, the GSF, UNSOH, and the sanctions regime, and may emphasise the importance of coordination, complementarity, and information‑sharing among these components.
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Post-script (29 April): The story was amended to reflect that Assistant Secretary-General and Head of the UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) Daniela Kroslak only briefed in consultations.
