Great Lakes Region: Briefing and Consultations
Tomorrow morning (15 April), the Security Council will hold an open briefing on the Great Lakes region. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region Huang Xia will brief on the Secretary-General’s latest biannual report on the implementation of the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSC-F) for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the region, which was circulated to Council members on 30 March and covers the period between 16 September 2025 and 15 March (S/2026/256). UN Women Executive Director Sima Sami Bahous is also expected to brief. Several regional countries may participate in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. Closed consultations are scheduled to follow the open briefing.
Xia is expected to focus on the security situation in eastern DRC, which has significantly deteriorated since his last briefing to the Security Council in October 2025. Council members last discussed developments in the area on 26 March during their regular briefing and consultations on the DRC, including the work of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). At that meeting, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Protection and Operations in MONUSCO Vivian van de Perre, then the mission’s Officer-in-Charge, highlighted MONUSCO’s efforts in support of a permanent ceasefire, including through the operationalisation of the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (COVM) agreed in November 2025 under the Doha process. This is a Qatari-led mediation effort that has been facilitating negotiations between the Congolese government and the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group.
Council members also held closed consultations on 17 March to discuss the escalation of fighting in eastern DRC, particularly in light of the 11 March drone attack in Goma, the capital of North Kivu province, which killed one UNICEF staff member and two other civilians. France (the penholder on the DRC) requested the meeting.
At tomorrow’s briefing, Xia may also provide a broader regional perspective by addressing the activities of other armed groups operating in eastern DRC, including the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan-originated group affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh). The ADF has been implicated in numerous attacks in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, resulting in significant civilian casualties. The Secretary-General’s report noted that the group was responsible for the killing of at least 431 civilians during the reporting period, including 72 women and three children.
There may also be reference to the increased military activity of the Convention pour la révolution populaire (CRP) in Ituri, including clashes with the Congolese armed forces (Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo [FARDC]) along the border with Uganda. The CRP is a newly formed armed group led by Thomas Lubanga, a former rebel leader who founded and formerly led the militia group Union des Patriotes congolais (UPC). He was convicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and later released after serving a 14-year sentence for war crimes, including the recruitment of children. Lubanga remains listed under the 1533 DRC sanctions regime.
Additionally, Xia may mention ongoing clashes in South Kivu province between the Burundian armed forces (Force de Défense Nationale du Burundi [FDNB]) and the Résistance pour un État de Droit au Burundi (RED Tabara), a Burundian armed group active in eastern DRC. The FDNB operates in the DRC under a bilateral agreement with the Congolese government and, in addition to targeting Burundian armed groups, has supported the FARDC in its fight against the M23. The Secretary-General’s report references a December 2025 meeting between representatives of RED Tabara and the AFC/M23 in South Kivu province, suggesting a potential strengthening of ties between the two groups.
The escalating security situation in eastern DRC has been fuelling ongoing tensions among countries in the Great Lakes region. In this regard, Xia may point to persisting tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, despite the signing of the US-mediated Washington Accords by the two countries in December 2025. He may also highlight the deterioration of the relationship between Burundi and Rwanda following the M23’s capture, in December 2025, of Uvira—a strategic city in South Kivu on the northern shore of Lake Tanganyika, close to the Burundian border. Although the group has since withdrawn from the city, the incident appears to have exacerbated regional mistrust. In addition, Xia might cover the strained relations between the DRC and Kenya, particularly in the wake of an October 2025 meeting convened in Nairobi by former DRC President Joseph Kabila, which was aimed at unifying elements of the Congolese opposition.
Council members have consistently underscored the need for a political solution to the crisis in eastern DRC through dialogue and negotiations and remain concerned that the various agreements concluded last year have yet to translate into reduced hostilities on the ground or eased regional tensions. At tomorrow’s meeting, members are likely to seek updates on progress in the various peace processes, and Xia may highlight diplomatic initiatives undertaken in this regard during the reporting period. Against the backdrop of the escalation in the Middle East, talks between the Congolese government and the M23 have apparently relocated to Geneva this month. Of the eight protocols outlined in the Doha Framework for Peace, agreed in November 2025, only two—the COVM and provisions on the exchange of prisoners—have been signed by the parties. Progress on the remaining six protocols is still needed in order to advance the peace process, with the next round of talks expected to focus on the issue of humanitarian access.
Xia may also refer to a March meeting hosted by the US to facilitate discussion between representatives of the DRC and Rwanda on the implementation of the Washington Accords. According to an 18 March joint statement, the two sides agreed to a series of coordinated steps to de-escalate tensions and advance progress on the ground. These steps include the lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda in designated areas in DRC territory, as well as time-bound and intensified efforts by the DRC to neutralise the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), an ethnic Hutu armed group active in eastern DRC and implicated in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.
Xia may elaborate on the African-led peace process under the leadership of Togolese President Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé, the mediator of the African Union (AU). In this regard, he may refer to the high-level meeting Gnassingbé convened in Lomé, Togo, aimed at strengthening coordination and coherence among the various peace processes. Xia may also mention Angola’s renewed efforts to support a national dialogue in the DRC as well as the implementation of a ceasefire. He could further underscore the role of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and its Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM), which are expected to be instrumental in the operationalisation of the COVM agreed in Doha. Furthermore, he may provide information about a regional summit hosted in December 2025 by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, in his capacity as Chair of the Regional Oversight Mechanism (ROM) of the PSC-F, in Entebbe, Uganda, to address the deteriorating security situation in eastern DRC.
The promotion of sustainable and transparent natural resource management has remained a central priority under the UN Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region, developed by the Office of the Special Envoy, in addressing the root causes of conflict in the DRC and the broader Great Lakes region. In this context, Xia may refer to a high-level workshop organised by his office in Gaborone, Botswana, on 7 and 8 October 2025, in cooperation with the ICGLR and the Kimberley Process, a multilateral trade regime established in 2003 to prevent the flow of conflict diamonds. The workshop explored ways to curb the illicit exploitation of natural resources, including through improved traceability, strengthened compliance mechanisms, and enhanced governance frameworks. The recommendations from this workshop were subsequently endorsed at the ICGLR summit held in Kinshasa, the DRC, on 15 November 2025, during which DRC President Félix Tshisekedi assumed the organisation’s rotating chairmanship. The summit addressed the situation in eastern DRC, among other issues; Rwanda did not participate in the meeting and rejected its outcome.
Following the 17 March closed consultations on the situation in eastern DRC, Council members began negotiations on a draft presidential statement proposed by France. The draft text aimed to address recent developments in eastern DRC and to respond to the Secretary-General’s 27 February letter, submitted pursuant to resolution 2808 of 19 December 2025, which outlined the potential scope of MONUSCO’s role in supporting the implementation of a permanent ceasefire in eastern DRC. It seems that Council members have been unable to reach agreement on the draft text, however. In particular, China and Russia apparently argued that the necessary conditions for MONUSCO to assume a ceasefire monitoring role are not yet in place, maintaining that the parties must meet these conditions before the Council can consider reviewing and adjusting the mission’s posture and footprint.
