DPRK (North Korea): Open Briefing
Tomorrow morning (30 April), the Security Council will convene for an open briefing under the agenda item “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)”. The meeting was requested by Council members Bahrain, Denmark, France, Latvia, the UK, and the US, as well as non-Council members Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), to discuss the DPRK’s “continued violations of multiple Security Council resolutions” two years after the disbandment of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. A briefing is expected from Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo. James Byrne, the Chief Executive Officer of the Open Source Centre (OSC)—a UK-based non-profit organisation that uses publicly accessible information to produce open-source research products on security issues—is also expected to brief.
Tomorrow’s meeting is likely to reflect longstanding divisions among Council members on the DPRK file. The mandate of the PoE assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee—which monitored and submitted biannual reports on sanctions implementation—expired on 30 April 2024 after Russia vetoed a draft resolution that would have extended it. In its statement delivered before the vote held on 28 March 2024, Russia claimed that the PoE had ceased to carry out its obligations and said that the sanctions regime no longer reflected realities on the ground, imposed a heavy burden on the population of the DPRK, and had failed to achieve the international community’s stated aims. It further argued that a provision requiring an annual review of the regime was needed to address these issues. China expressed support for an annual review of the regime and called on the Council to consider the draft resolution it circulated in October 2021 on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK, which would provide sanctions relief to the DPRK if adopted.
Other Council members strongly criticised Russia’s veto, arguing that it undermined the global non-proliferation regime and emboldened the DPRK in its attempts to evade sanctions. Several members—including permanent members France, the UK, and the US (known as the P3), as well as then-elected members Japan and the ROK—linked the veto to Russia’s alleged purchase of arms from the DPRK. They also emphasised that the 1718 regime remained in place even after the PoE’s mandate expired. At tomorrow’s briefing, Council members are likely to reiterate these positions.
In October 2024, 11 countries—including the P3, Japan, and the ROK—established the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) to “monitor and report violations and evasions of sanctions measures” stipulated in relevant Security Council resolutions on the DPRK. Since then, the MSMT has published two reports: one dated 29 May 2025 on alleged unlawful military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia following the latter’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and another dated 22 October 2025 on the DPRK’s alleged violations and evasion of UN sanctions through cyber and information technology (IT) activities. On 12 January, the participating member states of the MSMT held an open briefing on its second report at UN Headquarters. On 19 February, the participating countries held the inaugural meeting of the MSMT Steering Committee in Washington, DC. Tomorrow, the P3 and like-minded Council members may take note of these developments and express support for the MSMT as a tool for enhancing implementation of UN sanctions on the DPRK in the absence of the PoE.
Between 19 and 25 February, the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK)—the DPRK’s ruling party—held its ninth congress, during which the party leadership reportedly reaffirmed the country’s status as a nuclear-armed state. (The WPK convenes for a congress every five years, with the last one taking place in 2021.) On 15 April, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said that the country had made “very serious” advances in its nuclear weapons programme, including the likely construction of a new uranium enrichment facility and increased activity at other nuclear sites. He assessed the DPRK’s current nuclear arsenal at “a few dozen” warheads.
Many Council members are expected to condemn the DPRK’s nuclear activities as well as its recent missile tests. On 19 April, the country reportedly fired short-range ballistic missiles with cluster munitions at an island target in the Sea of Japan. Earlier this month, it conducted a three-day weapons test, which included missile-carried cluster bombs, electromagnetic weapon systems, and anti-aircraft missile systems. In March, the country reportedly tested an upgraded solid-fuel engine for missiles capable of reaching the US mainland.
Continued military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia is another area of concern for many members, which consider it a violation of the 1718 sanctions regime. According to a report published last month by the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), a public research institute funded by the ROK government, the DPRK had sent four troop deployments to Russia as at December 2025, comprising a total of 21,000 personnel. Another report published in March by the OSC found that sanctioned Russian vessels had transferred between eight and 11 million rounds of ammunition from the DPRK to Russia since mid-2023. Byrne—who previously addressed the Security Council at a May 2025 meeting held one year after the disbandment of the 1718 PoE—might brief members on these findings tomorrow.
By contrast, China and Russia are likely to reiterate their view that the US and its allies are responsible for heightening tensions on the Korean Peninsula and that the US has not done enough to incentivise the DPRK to participate in denuclearisation talks. They may also repeat their position that sanctions should be eased because of their impact on the humanitarian situation in the country. Reflecting their political support for the DPRK, both China and Russia sent letters of congratulations to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in connection with the WPK congress, emphasising their countries’ strong ties and strategic partnerships. On 26 April, Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov reportedly travelled to Pyongyang to negotiate an agreement on military cooperation for the 2027-2031 period. The countries previously signed a mutual defence treaty in June 2024.
