Colombia: Quarterly Meeting
Tomorrow morning (21 April), the Security Council will hold its quarterly briefing on Colombia. Special Representative and Head of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia Miroslav Jenča will brief on recent developments and the Secretary-General’s latest 90-day report on the mission, which was issued on 26 March and covers developments since 27 December 2025. A woman civil society representative is also expected to brief. Closed consultations are scheduled to follow the open briefing.
Implementation of the 2016 Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace between the government of Colombia and the former rebel group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) in the past quarter took place in the context of an electoral period in Colombia. Tomorrow’s meeting takes place in the middle of the electoral cycle; the country held legislative elections on 8 March, while presidential elections are scheduled for 31 May. If no candidate wins over 50 percent of the votes in the first round, a second round will be held on 21 June. (For background and more information, see the brief on Colombia in our April 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
The Secretary-General’s report noted that the 8 March elections were largely peaceful. The run-up to the elections, however, saw several significant instances of violence against candidates from across the political spectrum, including the assassination of Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay, a presidential hopeful who was shot on 7 June 2025. Several speakers at tomorrow’s meeting are expected to welcome the “Commitment to a Free and Peaceful Electoral Process”, a pact launched after Uribe’s assassination that includes pledges of non-violence, rejection of hateful rhetoric and disinformation, and commitment to respecting the legal order. According to the Secretary-General’s report, the pact has received over 130 endorsements, including from 20 political parties and movements, eight out of 14 candidates for the presidency, high-level state institutions, and media outlets.
There may be expressions of concern about recent death threats made against the three presidential candidates that are leading the polls—Iván Cepeda of the ruling left-wing “Pacto Histórico” party, Paloma Valencia of the conservative opposition party “Centro Democrático”, and a far-right independent candidate named Abelardo de la Espriella. Several interlocutors have strongly denounced these threats, including Jenča, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and US officials.
Speakers are likely to welcome the government’s efforts to facilitate the peaceful conduct of the legislative elections and urge the authorities to ensure the security of candidates and voters in the upcoming presidential elections. In this regard, they may emphasise the need to utilise mechanisms contained in the 2016 peace agreement, such as the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics (SISEP). (The SISEP aims to promote a holistic approach to security, including regarding prevention and protection mechanisms for elected officials, opposition members, and community leaders.)
Beyond the context of the elections, many speakers are likely to stress the need to address insecurity affecting numerous parts of the country. The Secretary-General’s report says that violence continued to affect former combatants, communities, and political and social leaders, amid clashes among illegal armed groups. Illicit economies, such as the drug trade and illegal mining, remain primary drivers of violence. During the period covered by the Secretary-General’s report, the mission verified the killing of four former combatants, bringing the number of ex-FARC killed since the signing of the peace agreement to 491. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) documented the forced mass displacement of 8,404 people and the confinement of 23,039 others across 26 municipalities, with 11 percent of those affected belonging to Afro-Colombian communities. Several speakers are also likely to express concern about the ongoing recruitment of children by armed groups, including through social media platforms.
The civil society representative is expected to focus on the situation in the north-eastern region of Catatumbo in the Norte de Santander department, which is emblematic of such conflict dynamics. In January 2025, a severe escalation of violence occurred in the region due to fighting between the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the 33rd Front, a branch of the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frentes (EMBF), over control of coca crops and drug trafficking corridors. More than one year on, insecurity persists in the area; during the period covered by the Secretary-General’s report, clashes between the ELN and the EMBF caused the displacement of 1,700 people and the confinement of approximately 2,400 individuals. In this context, the civil society representative may describe efforts by the government and civil society to protect the rights of peasants, Indigenous communities, women, and children in the region. She might emphasise the importance of supporting projects to eradicate the socioeconomic factors that give rise to coca cultivation and of developing a legal rural economy.
Speakers at tomorrow’s meeting may note, as the Secretary-General’s report did, that the 2016 peace agreement offers a roadmap for addressing structural causes of conflict witnessed in Catatumbo and in other conflict-affected regions, including by reducing historical inequalities in land distribution, extending state presence in conflict-affected areas, and providing economic alternatives to illegal activities. Some Council members might say that this further underscores the importance for any incoming presidential administration to commit to the comprehensive implementation of the 2016 peace agreement.
In a similar vein, speakers might also encourage the current government to continue prioritising implementation of the peace agreement in the remainder of its term, which ends in August. They may highlight the need to ensure greater coordination among relevant state entities and to put in place structures that can help preserve the architecture of the implementation of the peace agreement. Colombia, a non-permanent Council member, expressed its intention to do so during the Council’s 23 January meeting on the file, including by elevating the entity in charge of implementation to a Presidential Advisory Office, in line with the September 2025 ruling by Colombia’s Constitutional Court.
At tomorrow’s meeting, several Council members may call for increased dialogue between various parties, especially considering the uncertainties that may arise after the inauguration of a new administration. The importance of the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI)—the main forum for dialogue between the parties on the implementation of the 2016 agreement—may be highlighted in this regard. Some members may welcome the 24 March meeting of the CSIVI, during which Jenča highlighted that ensuring the continuity of the body “is essential to bring the parties together, protect what has been built, and sustain peace”.
Among other issues, the 24 March CSIVI meeting discussed the establishment of a new mechanism to verify implementation of the ethnic chapter of the 2016 agreement and compliance with sentences handed down by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP), the judicial component of the transitional justice system established by the accord. Both these tasks were removed from the verification mission’s mandate through resolution 2798 of 31 October 2025. (The US insisted that these tasks be removed, while most other Council members strongly advocated for their retention.) Approval from both signatory parties (the government and the former FARC) is required in order to give other entities these tasks, making the CSIVI a crucial forum for decision-making in this process. Initial indications point to a potential role for OHCHR and the Mission to Support the Peace Process of the Organization of American States (MAPP/OAS), although further discussions are required on the modalities for the verification mechanism and its financing.
Several Council members are likely to express continued support for the SJP and highlight the need to advance implementation of the ethnic chapter, which has been slow. Colombia may also reiterate its commitment to promote these two issues as part of the comprehensive implementation of the 2016 peace agreement.
Some speakers may reference recent progress related to the SJP’s work. For instance, in March, six former senior commanders of the FARC-EP acknowledged their responsibility in the SJP’s indictment, issued in November 2024, within Case 07 on the recruitment and use of children during the conflict in Colombia.
Members may also be interested in hearing Jenča’s assessment of the implications of a 9 April ruling by Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which declared that several jurisprudential rules developed by the SJP are unenforceable. Among other issues, the Court determined unconstitutional the SJP’s decision to prosecute middle-ranking former guerrillas instead of only top commanders deemed to be the most responsible for crimes committed during the conflict. Ex-FARC members have frequently raised this issue as a matter of concern.
