Myanmar: Private Meeting
Tomorrow morning (6 March), the Security Council will hold a private meeting on Myanmar. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar Julie Bishop is expected to brief via videoconference (VTC). Philippine Foreign Secretary Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro will brief in person in her capacity as the Special Envoy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Chair on Myanmar. The UK, the penholder on the file, requested the meeting to hear an update from the two Special Envoys on the situation in Myanmar.
Tomorrow’s meeting takes place after the fifth anniversary of the 1 February 2021 military coup that overthrew the democratically elected government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD). In a statement marking the occasion, Secretary-General António Guterres expressed deep concern about “the rapidly deteriorating situation in Myanmar and its serious regional ramifications”, citing escalating violence, rising transnational crime, mass displacement of civilians, and acute food insecurity. He further emphasised that the path back to civilian rule “must be founded on an immediate cessation of violence and a genuine commitment to inclusive dialogue with the full participation of civil society, including women, youth, ethnic and minority communities”. Bishop may reiterate some of these messages tomorrow.
Tomorrow’s meeting will also be the first Council session on Myanmar since the conclusion of elections organised by the military, which were held in three phases starting on 28 December 2025. Following the last round of polling on 25 January, state media announced that the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) had won a majority of seats in Myanmar’s two legislative chambers. The military has reportedly announced that the parliament is expected to convene to elect a president in March, with the new government expected to take power in April. Media outlets have reported that the leader of Myanmar’s military, Min Aung Hlaing, plans to assume the position of president, and may soon step down as army chief to comply with the country’s constitution, which prohibits anyone from holding both posts.
Many international interlocutors have criticised the conduct of the elections. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has said that the elections “took place in an environment of violence, repression and polarization”, noting that the NLD and at least two dozen other parties, including ethnic Rakhine parties, were banned from participating. It added that polls were held in only 263 of 330 townships, often exclusively in urban centres under military control, thus excluding large segments of the population—including the Rohingya, other minorities, and many displaced people—from the vote. OHCHR has also documented acts of voter repression carried out under the military’s “election protection law”, such as arbitrary arrests and long sentences for people who posted anti-election sentiments.
Thomas Andrews, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, has called the elections “fraudulent” and urged the international community to reject as illegitimate its results and any power arrangement that follows. Analysts and human rights organisations have also warned that the military aims to normalise its control of the country through the elections, noting that it can give political cover to foreign governments that wish to engage with Myanmar.
Council members are expected to express sharply diverging views about the elections at tomorrow’s meeting. During a 27 February interactive dialogue at the Human Rights Council (HRC) on the oral update of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar, several regional groupings, such as the European Union (EU) and the Nordic-Baltic countries, rejected the elections as neither free nor fair. The UK made similar comments, noting that the elections “do not present a solution to the crisis”. The Council’s European members and other like-minded members are expected to reiterate these positions at tomorrow’s meeting.
China and Russia, on the other hand, are likely to welcome the conclusion of the elections. They may also argue that members who criticise the way elections were held are infringing on Myanmar’s sovereignty. On 26 January, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun congratulated Myanmar on “a steady and orderly general election with active turnout”, adding that China stands ready to “work with the international community to respect the choice of the people of Myanmar”. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu was the first foreign high-level official to visit Myanmar following the elections, arriving in Naypyitaw on 2 February to sign a five-year military cooperation agreement with the Myanmar military. During the visit, Shoigu reportedly claimed that “the elections are recognized as having taken place in accordance with international law” and said that Myanmar can “count on Moscow’s comprehensive support, including in the international arena”.
China and Russia sent representatives to observe the elections in Myanmar, alongside other member states such as India. ASEAN did not send election observers, although three of its members—Cambodia, Indonesia, and Viet Nam—reportedly did. On 30 January, Lazaro was cited by media reports as saying that ASEAN “has not endorsed the three phases of the elections that were held” in Myanmar.
Tomorrow’s meeting will allow Lazaro to update Council members about ASEAN’s engagement on Myanmar. The Philippines assumed the annual rotating ASEAN chairmanship on 1 January 2026. During a 29 January ASEAN foreign ministers’ retreat held in Cebu City, Philippines, representatives of the regional organisation discussed possible modifications to ASEAN’s approach, including the appointment of a long-term ASEAN Special Envoy on Myanmar.
According to media reports, some member states raised the possibility of reviewing the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) at the retreat. (Agreed in April 2021, the 5PC called for the immediate cessation of violence, constructive dialogue, a special envoy of the ASEAN chair to facilitate mediation of the dialogue process, humanitarian assistance, and a visit to Myanmar by the ASEAN Special Envoy to meet with all parties concerned.) Lazaro highlighted to the press that the 5PC will still continue to guide ASEAN’s engagement on Myanmar, adding that the two benchmarks that remain central in this regard are the cessation of hostilities and effective humanitarian access.
Several speakers at tomorrow’s meeting are expected to express concern about the ongoing hostilities’ deleterious effects on civilians. According to a 26 February OHCHR report, in 2025, civilian deaths due to airstrikes rose to the highest levels verified since 2021, with 982 people killed, including 368 women and 232 children. The report stressed that 2025 was “the deadliest year for children” since the 2021 coup, noting that the impact of violence on girls is increasing. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Pramila Patten has also voiced alarm about reports of “the Myanmar military and its affiliates’ large-scale and systematic use of sexual violence, including rape and gang rape, against women, girls, men, boys and LGBTQI+ persons, of all ethnicities and religions, during village raids, at checkpoints, in fields, homes and detention settings and online”.
Several speakers are also likely to raise the situation of the Rohingya. OHCHR has reported that both the military and the Arakan Army, an armed group based in Rakhine state, are “systematically targeting Rohingya”, with the military subjecting the Rohingya to widespread arbitrary arrests, forced labour and recruitment, as well as ill-treatment.
In discussing these issues, several Council members are likely to condemn attacks against civilians and highlight the importance of accountability for violations of international law. Some may reference in this regard the proceedings at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Gambia v. Myanmar, a case alleging Myanmar’s failure to fulfil its obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention to prevent and punish acts of genocide committed against the Rohingya in 2017. In January, the ICJ heard oral arguments on the case during a three-week hearing, which also featured testimonies by Rohingya survivors.
While the overall situation in Myanmar has continued to deteriorate, the Council has not been particularly active on this issue. Since the adoption of resolution 2669 in December 2022, Council members have only been able to agree on one product, a 4 April 2025 press statement relating to the earthquake that struck Myanmar. While the UK introduced a draft resolution on Myanmar in August 2024, this was ultimately withdrawn after China and Russia expressed opposition and refused to engage in negotiations on the text involving all Council members. Late last year, the UK proposed a draft press statement on the 10 December 2025 airstrike that struck a hospital in Rakhine state, killing at least 34 people and injuring dozens more, but members were unable to reach a consensus due to apparent opposition from China and Russia.
Given these difficulties, Council members who favour greater engagement on Myanmar may use the upcoming meeting as an opportunity to urge the Council to be more active, including by holding more regular meetings in an open format. China and Russia, on the other hand, may counter that the situation in Myanmar is an internal issue that does not pose a threat to international peace and security and should not be addressed by the Council.
