Democratic Republic of the Congo: Closed Consultations
Tomorrow afternoon (17 March), Security Council members will hold closed consultations on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). France, the penholder on the file, requested the meeting to discuss the escalation of fighting in eastern DRC, particularly in light of the 11 March drone attack in Goma, the capital of North Kivu province, which killed one UNICEF staff member and two other civilians. No briefer is expected.
Additionally, it seems that France wants to discuss ongoing efforts to achieve a permanent ceasefire. Resolution 2808 of 19 December 2025, which last renewed the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) for another year, demanded that “all parties materialize without delay their previous commitments to establish a permanent, effective and verifiable ceasefire”. France apparently wants to focus at tomorrow’s meeting on the Secretary-General’s 27 February letter, submitted to the Council pursuant to resolution 2808, which describes progress towards the establishment and operationalisation of the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (COVM) agreed under the Doha process, a Qatari mediation initiative aimed at facilitating talks between the Congolese government and the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group.
At tomorrow’s consultations, many Council members are expected to condemn the drone strike in Goma and stress the need to protect civilians and humanitarian workers. Some may echo MONUSCO’s 11 March press release on the incident, which noted that attacks against UN personnel could amount to war crimes under the Rome Statute and called on the parties to cease hostilities, to prioritise dialogue, and to capitalise on the gains achieved within recent peace efforts. The African Union (AU) Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf also condemned the attack in a 12 March statement, underscoring the need to clarify the circumstances surrounding this incident through an impartial investigation—a call that was also made by the European Union (EU). The Congolese government announced the opening of such an investigation in a 13 March communiqué.
On 12 March, the UN Secretariat circulated a white note on the incident in Goma, which apparently says that MONUSCO has conducted an initial assessment of the strike, but it does not attribute responsibility for the incident.
The 11 March attack occurred against the backdrop of intensified armed drone activity in eastern DRC amid the Congolese government’s offensive to counter the M23 in the area. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), a non-profit research organisation which gathers and assesses data on political violence globally, has documented more than 60 drone strikes by the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) since January, representing a marked increase compared to the last quarter of 2025. It has noted that the circumstances surrounding the 11 March attack remain unclear but that several indicators point to the likely involvement of the FARDC. ACLED has attributed less than five percent of drone strikes in 2025-2026 to the M23, allied armed groups operating under the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)—a political coalition of which M23 is a major component—or the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), which have been accused of supporting the M23/AFC.
The drone strikes by the FARDC have apparently targeted M23 leadership and the group’s key positions in North Kivu and South Kivu. On 24 February, a drone strike around Rubaya, a mining site in North Kivu, reportedly killed M23 spokesperson Willy Ngoma and seven M23 members. Drone strikes by the M23 appear to target launch sites used for FARDC aerial operations, particularly the Bangoka International Airport in Kisangani, the capital of the Tshopo province in north-central DRC. On 2 February, the Congolese authorities accused the M23 of launching a drone attack against the airport. The group claimed responsibility for the attack, alleging that the Congolese government had been using the airport as a staging ground for aerial operations against its positions.
The security situation in eastern DRC has escalated over the past couple of months despite the ceasefire agreed under the Doha process. The Congolese government and the M23 have continued to trade accusations of ceasefire violations. Nonetheless, MONUSCO is supporting the establishment of the COVM that was agreed in Doha, in line with its mandate. In this regard, between 24 and 27 February, MONUSCO deployed an exploratory and preliminary assessment mission to the city of Uvira in South Kivu, together with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). According to the Secretary-General’s 27 February letter, the aim of the mission was to assess the political, security, logistical, and socio-environmental conditions in and around the city. The M23 had captured the city, which is located on the northern shore of Lake Tanganyika, in December 2025 but has since withdrawn.
Resolution 2808 requested the Secretary-General to provide an assessment of progress towards the establishment of the COVM and proposals on the scope of MONUSCO’s engagement to support the implementation of a permanent ceasefire, with a particular focus on hotspot areas in North Kivu and South Kivu. Furthermore, the resolution expressed the Council’s intention to consider further adjustments to MONUSCO’s mandate, taking into account the Secretary-General’s proposals and the evolving security situation on the ground.
Accordingly, the Secretary-General’s 27 February letter recommended a “phased, adaptive, scalable, and conditions-based approach” to support the ceasefire. In this regard, he requested the deployment of two light infantry battalions, a rapid deployment battalion, and an advanced medical evacuation team. Implementing this approach would require the deployment of between 1,500 and 2,500 additional troops to provide support in both North Kivu and South Kivu. The Secretary-General also requested uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) with the necessary capabilities, as well as timely access to satellite imagery. The letter notes that strengthening the mission’s military capabilities could be accommodated within the current authorised troop ceiling. At present, the mission has 8,131 military personnel, out of an authorised strength of 11,500. However, the letter emphasises that the deployment of these additional capabilities will depend on the availability of adequate financial resources.
Tomorrow afternoon, France may wish to consult Council members on how best to respond to the Secretary-General’s recommendations. It has apparently been consulting Council members bilaterally, and tomorrow’s meeting would provide an opportunity for all Council members to provide their views on the recommendations. Although the Council had been expected to adjust MONUSCO’s mandate in light of these recommendations through the adoption of a resolution, some members now appear less inclined to do so, given that the ceasefire has not been implemented. However, the host country—which now sits on the Council and will attend a meeting on its own situation as a Council member for the first time—was apparently supportive of a resolution. Instead, the penholder may propose a different product which could allow Council members to react to the evolving security situation on the ground, express their views on the Secretary-General’s letter, and reiterate their call on the parties to reach a permanent ceasefire.
It seems that the DRC has been increasing the pressure on the M23 militarily and diplomatically. Aside from its intensified drone strikes, it has also been pushing for punitive measures against the M23 and Rwanda. In a 4 February letter to the Security Council, the DRC called for such measures, accusing Rwanda, among other things, of violating the Washington Accords that the two countries signed on 4 December 2025 under US auspices. In this regard, the letter cited remarks made by Ambassador Mathilde Mukantabana, Rwanda’s ambassador to the US, before the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on 22 January, in which she noted that “Rwanda does engage in security coordination with AFC/M23”. Rwanda’s support for the M23 and the DRC’s support to the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)—an ethnic Hutu armed group active in eastern DRC and implicated in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda—has been corroborated by past reports of the Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee.
On 2 March, the US imposed sanctions on four Rwandan senior military officials and on the RDF as an entity, citing the violation of the Washington Accords by the “Rwanda-backed M23” when it captured the city of Uvira just days after the signing of the agreement. The DRC welcomed the US decision, while Rwanda criticised the move, describing it as one-sided.
