South Sudan: Briefing and Consultations
Tomorrow morning (10 February), the Security Council will hold an open briefing and closed consultations on the situation in South Sudan and the work of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix is expected to brief on the Secretary-General’s latest 90-day report (S/2026/58), which was circulated to Council members on 2 February and covers developments from 16 October 2025 to 15 January. The Interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), Major General (retired) George Aggrey Owinow, and a civil society representative are also expected to brief.
The Secretary-General’s report states that the political situation in South Sudan has continued to deteriorate during the reporting period, citing the erosion of power-sharing arrangements, inconsistent implementation of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), unilateral proposals to amend the agreement, continued ceasefire violations, and escalating military operations. On 17 December 2025, amid minimal progress on electoral preparations and the drafting of a new constitution, President Salva Kiir Mayardit approved a series of amendments to the R-ARCSS, removing provisions that linked elections to the completion of a permanent constitution.
The trial of First Vice-President Riek Machar and seven co-defendants accused of treason also continued during the reporting period, while major unilateral political changes by the government resulted in the systematic removal of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) officials from ministerial and parliamentary positions. On 20 January, Kiir reshuffled several key leadership posts, including Interior Minister Angelina Teny, who had been the last remaining senior SPLM/A-IO representative in the transitional government. Against this backdrop, the SPLM/A-IO continued efforts to establish parallel governance structures in areas under its control. (For background and more information, see the brief on South Sudan in our February 2026 Monthly Forecast and our 18 January What’s in Blue story.)
On 30 January, Kiir established a leadership body comprising representatives of political parties, signatories and non-signatories to the R-ARCSS, and other national stakeholders to conduct dialogue on election-related issues. SPLM/A-IO was excluded from the body, while members of the SPLM/A-IO splinter faction led by Peacebuilding Minister Stephen Par Kuol were included. Concurrently, Kenya sought to revive the Tumaini Initiative aimed at facilitating dialogue between the transitional government and non-signatories to the R-ARCSS. The initiative was launched in Nairobi in December 2023 but was suspended in early 2025 without tangible outcomes.
Meanwhile, the security situation in the country has continued to deteriorate markedly, reaching levels not seen since the signing of the revitalised agreement. According to the Secretary-General’s report, the situation worsened in the Greater Equatoria and Greater Upper Nile regions, particularly in Eastern Equatoria, Central Equatoria, Unity, and northern Jonglei. The reporting period was marked by aerial bombardments and clashes between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the SPLM/A-IO, as well as allied factions, including the National Salvation Front (NAS), which resulted in large-scale displacement and exacerbated humanitarian concerns.
In northern Jonglei, hostilities intensified in late December 2025 as the SSPDF and the SPLM/A-IO, along with allied forces, mobilised for a major confrontation. Opposition forces aligned with the SPLM/A-IO capitalised on the renewed fighting to seize strategic positions in northern Jonglei, including Pajut, and overran SSPDF garrisons in Yuai and Waat. In response, the SSPDF launched a counter-offensive and issued a directive ordering the evacuation of civilians and all UN and humanitarian personnel from Nyirol, Uror, and Akobo counties, including the UNMISS base in Akobo. Media reports citing SSPDF sources indicated that government forces subsequently retook several locations, including Pieri Payam in Uror county. The frontlines remain fluid with continued reports of fighting in recent days across several locations, including Nyirol, Duk, Uror, and Akobo counties.
Meanwhile, fighting was also reported yesterday (8 February) in the Upper Nile state as SPLM/A-IO and allied fighters from the White Army—comprised of armed youth from the Nuer community—launched an assault on the town of Baliet, held by the SSPDF.
At tomorrow’s meeting, the briefers and Council members are likely to call for a cessation of hostilities, urge restraint, and press leaders to recommit to the R-ARCSS through inclusive, consensus-based decision-making and direct dialogue. Council members continue to hold differing views on the situation, however: the US has been more critical of the transitional authorities, describing the current crisis as “man-made” and citing a lack of political will, while China and Russia have called for patience, support for regional mediation, and restraint in applying pressure on the government. These diverging positions may also be reflected in tomorrow’s statements.
Speakers are also expected to discuss the country’s humanitarian situation, which continues to decline amid renewed violence, civilian displacement, and access constraints. The UN’s 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for South Sudan estimates that ten million people—more than two thirds of the population—will require assistance in 2026. Since late December 2025, fighting and airstrikes in Jonglei have displaced an estimated 280,000 people, while ongoing clashes and insecurity continue to restrict humanitarian agencies’ ability to deliver life-saving assistance. UNICEF has warned that more than 450,000 children are at risk of acute malnutrition, with hostilities disrupting health and nutrition services. The crisis has been compounded by a rapidly spreading cholera outbreak.
Meanwhile, deadly attacks against critical civilian infrastructure and humanitarian personnel have continued. Since late December 2025, at least 11 attacks on healthcare have been documented across Jonglei. According to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), its hospital in Lankien, Jonglei state, was struck by an airstrike attributed to South Sudanese government forces, destroying the facility’s main warehouse and critical medical supplies. In a separate incident later the same day, MSF’s health facility in Pieri was looted by unknown assailants, forcing staff in both Lankien and Pieri to flee alongside the local population.
On 4 February, the World Food Programme (WFP) suspended all activities in Baliet county following repeated attacks on a river convoy carrying humanitarian assistance. The next day, Save the Children reported that armed men looted and burned its office and destroyed a healthcare centre in Akobo county, cutting off essential services for hundreds of children and families.
Tomorrow, the briefers and several Council members are likely to stress the parties’ international legal obligation to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including healthcare facilities and medical and humanitarian personnel, and condemn the deliberate targeting of these individuals and facilities. They may underline the importance of ensuring accountability for such acts.
Regional and international stakeholders have intensified efforts to address the evolving political and security crisis. On 23 January, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) held a meeting on the situation in South Sudan. In a communiqué adopted following the meeting, the AUPSC expressed deep concern over reported violations of human rights and international humanitarian law—including sexual violence, arbitrary detentions, and extrajudicial killings—warned that perpetrators would be held accountable, and demanded that the parties guarantee unfettered humanitarian access to affected populations. It further reaffirmed that the R-ARCSS remains the only viable framework for sustainable peace, stability, and development, and underscored the need to prioritise the organisation of elections by December 2026. At tomorrow’s meeting, the “A3” members of the Security Council—the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Somalia—may echo these messages.
Speakers may also discuss UNMISS’ contingency plan, which is being implemented in response to the UN-wide financial crisis and the Secretary-General’s austerity measures requiring all peacekeeping missions to reduce their expenditures by 15 percent. The Council was most recently briefed on this issue by Lacroix on 20 January, after which the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) circulated a white note to Council members outlining recent developments in South Sudan, including regional political engagement and the status of the contingency plan. The note indicated that UNMISS continues to implement its mandate despite a deteriorating security environment and liquidity constraints, and that the mission maintains its presence in Jonglei State, including at the Akobo base—earmarked for closure in March—which has been temporarily reinforced to respond to potential violence and protect civilians.
The note further stated that the contingency plan remained on track. As at 29 January, reductions in infantry and enabling personnel had reached 99 percent of the approved target, while reductions in military observers and military staff officers had been completed. Repatriation of departing contingents was nearly finalised, with only two contingent rear parties remaining. The note further indicated that earlier government requests concerning UNMISS bases in Wau, Bentiu, and Tomping had not resurfaced.
Council members continue to deliberate on a draft press statement on South Sudan, authored by the US (the penholder on the file) and circulated to Council members on 22 January, in response to the country’s evolving political and security situation. A second revised draft was put under silence procedure by the US until 5 February, which was subsequently broken by the “A3” members. At the time of writing, the US had not yet circulated a third revised draft.
