Yemen: Vote on Final Mandate Renewal of UNMHA*
On Tuesday afternoon (27 January), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution extending the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) for a final two-month period, until 31 March. The UK, the penholder on Yemen, authored the text.
Background
Since UNMHA was established through the unanimous adoption of resolution 2452 of 16 January 2019, the aim of the mission has been to support the implementation of the Agreement on the City of Hodeidah and the Ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa (the Hodeidah Agreement)—as set out in the Stockholm Agreement that was signed between the government of Yemen and the Houthi rebel group on 13 December 2018. The Council also tasked UNMHA with leading the Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) to oversee the ceasefire and the mutual redeployment of forces. Among the mission’s tasks are working with the conflict parties to assure the security of Hodeidah city and the three ports, while also facilitating UN support and coordination for the parties to fully implement the Hodeidah Agreement. In line with this, UNMHA has a military component which conducts patrols across the ports and in areas of interest to monitor the ceasefire, analyse violations, and mediate between the parties.
The mission’s presence may also have implications for the humanitarian situation in Yemen. The Secretary-General’s 10 June 2025 review of UNMHA, covering developments since 11 June 2024, notes that the port of Hodeidah alone facilitates around 70 percent of commercial imports and 80 percent of humanitarian assistance into Yemen. The review also says that ensuring that all three ports currently monitored by the mission “remain open and fully operational is critical in order to prevent further deterioration of an already dire humanitarian situation across Yemen”.
In November 2021, forces from the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen that were supporting the Yemeni government withdrew from Hodeidah, allowing the Houthis to retake the city and its port. Hodeidah has been under Houthi control since then.
The Hodeidah Agreement has never been fully implemented and UNMHA has found it increasingly difficult to carry out its mandate in recent years. The Secretary-General’s 10 June 2025 review of UNMHA says that, despite frequent engagements by the RCC with the Yemeni government and the Houthis, UNMHA patrols were conducted in an “extremely restrictive environment” due to the Houthis’ denial of requests for greater access and more frequent patrolling.
During a Council briefing on 9 July 2025, the US said that UNMHA has “outlived its usefulness” and argued that “it is time to sunset” the mission. It further maintained that the RCC is a “non-functioning committee tasked with overseeing activities that have long been superseded by circumstances”. Conversely, other Council members, including China and Russia, have argued that the mission still has a valuable role as a stabilising actor that helps to prevent the further deterioration of the situation and as a facilitator of dialogue between the conflict parties. (For more information, see our 12 July 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
On 14 July 2025, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2786, renewing the mission’s mandate for six months, until 28 January, a shorter than customary timeframe. (Since July 2020 and up until then, the Council had extended UNMHA’s mandate on an annual basis.) The resolution expressed the Council’s intention to review options for the further renewal of UNMHA’s mandate, including assessing its future viability and sunsetting of the mission. Pursuant to the resolution, on 25 November 2025, the Secretary-General presented to the Council a further review of UNMHA aimed at delivering efficiencies, structural coherence, and coordination across UN missions in Yemen, while bearing in mind challenges that have directly impeded the mission’s ability to deliver its mandate.
The latest review noted that the mission has been operating in a “largely non-permissive” security environment, which has continued to evolve in recent months. It also refers to the Houthis’ continued involvement in regional hostilities through attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and on Israel, which have in turn triggered retaliatory strikes by Israel, including on Hodeidah city.
Furthermore, the Houthis have arbitrarily detained dozens of UN staff, accusing them of espionage—claims that the UN has firmly rejected. The review says that these detentions have significantly restricted UN operations in Houthi-controlled areas. Although UNMHA staff have not been detained, heightened security risks have forced the UN to narrow its operating environment, creating new challenges for the mission. As a result, UNMHA has had to adapt its mandate implementation, prioritising core tasks that remain achievable amid severe political and security constraints.
The review presented three options for the Council to consider. Option 1 would be to retain the mission’s political presence but streamline it by removing its physical patrolling capacity. The two other options would involve shutting down the mission completely and augmenting the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Yemen to take on relevant core tasks previously covered by the mission in support of the Hodeidah Agreement, either by maintaining a small presence in Hodeidah focused on these tasks (Option 2), or by withdrawing any full-time UN political presence in Hodeidah and making use of the existing locations of the Office of the Special Envoy in Sana’a and Aden in Yemen as well as Amman in Jordan (Option 3).
The review noted that the Houthis have indicated that a withdrawal of the UN political presence from Hodeidah would be considered a formal declaration of the cancellation of the Hodeidah Agreement.
Negotiations on the Draft Resolution
The draft resolution in blue decides to shut down UNMHA, thus ending the UN’s physical presence in Hodeidah. It extends UNMHA’s mandate for a final two-month period, during which the mission will draw down its operations and physical presence while preparing for “transition of any residual functions to the Office of the Special Envoy”, in line with Option 3 from the Secretary-General’s 25 November 2025 review. It also decides that UNMHA will “commence a liquidation process” on 1 April.
The UK circulated the initial draft of the resolution to Council members on 14 January. It convened in-person consultations on the text on 19 January, setting a deadline for initial comments for the same day. On 20 January, the penholder shared the revised text, incorporating two changes requested by some Council members. No further edits were proposed to the text; on the next day, the draft was put under silence procedure until 22 January. The silence procedure was not broken, and the penholder proceeded to put the draft resolution in blue on 23 January.
The negotiations were apparently straightforward, and the in-person consultations were relatively brief. Following the circulation of the Secretary-General’s review outlining the three options for UNMHA’s future, the UK apparently laid the groundwork for the negotiations by conducting extensive consultations with relevant UN entities and regional stakeholders, including with the Yemeni government. Based on these consultations, Option 3 was chosen as the most viable way forward. Several Council members found the option agreeable, as it takes into consideration the security and operational challenges detailed in the Secretary-General’s most recent reviews, while also integrating into the Special Envoy’s office core functions regarding the Hodeidah Agreement that remain relevant. For its part, the US also supported Option 3, as it was in line with its position that the mission has failed to fulfil its mandate and should be closed down, while also achieving improved efficiencies and cost-cutting across the UN’s missions in Yemen.
China and Russia, however, had reservations about shuttering UNMHA. Russia apparently voiced support for a straightforward renewal of the mission—leaving the mandate untouched—which was not one of the options identified by the Secretary-General’s 25 November 2025 review. During the negotiations, both members reiterated their arguments that UNMHA serves as a stabilising actor on the ground and that the Council needs to carefully consider the potential implications and consequences of withdrawing the mission on the political, security, and humanitarian situations in Yemen.
Some members apparently questioned the short timeframe provided for the mission to draw down. The penholder clarified, however, that the draft text opted for a two-month period as it was deemed appropriate following consultations with relevant UN entities.
The changes included in the revised draft focused on strengthening two provisions. The first change concerned an operational paragraph which authorised the retention of assets and capabilities necessary for continued structural coherence and coordination across UN missions in Yemen “for a period to be determined based on administrative procedures subject to the UN Financial Rules and Regulations”. The edit to the paragraph specified that the period should be “adequate to ensure an orderly and safe transition”.
The second change stemmed from edits submitted by Bahrain and Colombia to an operative paragraph calling on the Houthis to enable a safe and secure operating environment. At these members’ request, the paragraph was strengthened by adding language calling on the “immediate and unconditional release of all those detained”—a reference to the ongoing detentions by the Houthis of personnel from the UN, national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations, and diplomatic missions.
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**Post-script: On 27 January, the Security Council adopted resolution 2813, renewing the mandate of the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) for a final two-month period, until 31 March. The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). In their explanation of vote, China and Russia said that UNMHA continues to play an important, stabilising role and that its closure could have political and security implications in Hodeidah and the surrounding region.
