Yemen: Vote on a Draft Resolution Extending the Monitoring Requirement on Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea and Monthly Briefing and Consultations*
Tomorrow morning (14 January), the Security Council is expected to hold a meeting under the “Maintenance of international peace and security” agenda item to vote on a draft resolution extending until 15 July the monthly reporting requirement for the Secretary-General on attacks by the Houthi rebel group in Yemen on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea.
Additionally, the Council will hold its monthly open briefing and closed consultations on Yemen. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg and Director of the Coordination Division at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Ramesh Rajasingham are expected to brief. The Officer-in-Charge of the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), Mari Yamashita, is scheduled to brief in the closed consultations.
Briefing and Consultations
A major focus of tomorrow’s open briefing will be the changes in the political and security situations in southern Yemen since early December 2025. An offensive launched on 2 December 2025 by the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—a separatist group from south Yemen which is reportedly backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—resulted in the group seizing Yemen’s southeastern governorates of Hadramout and Al-Mahra from forces aligned with other factions of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), the eight-member executive body of Yemen’s internationally recognised government. The STC is part of the PLC; its president and the leader of the December 2025 offensive, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, was one of the government body’s vice presidents. The group’s aspiration to create an independent state in south Yemen, however, differs from other members of the PLC, who favour a united republic. (For more information, see the brief on Yemen in our January 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
These developments have sparked tensions among regional actors. Saudi Arabia—the lead member of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen (the Coalition), which in 2022 supported the formation of the PLC—said in a 30 December 2025 statement that it views the STC’s offensive and the UAE’s support as a threat to its national security as well as to the security and stability of Yemen. That same day, Coalition forces conducted strikes on the Yemeni port of Mukalla in Hadramout, targeting what they said was a UAE-linked shipment of vehicles, weapons, and ammunition intended for the STC. The UAE—which is also a member of the Coalition—strongly rejected claims that it is fuelling the Yemeni conflict and denied that the shipment included weapons, while noting that the vehicles offloaded were not intended for “any Yemeni party”. It also restated that its presence in Yemen was within the framework of the Coalition. Earlier that day, PLC President Rashad al-Alimi issued a decree calling on the UAE to withdraw all its forces from Yemen within 24 hours, and the UAE Ministry of Defence later announced the withdrawal of its “counter-terrorism teams” from Yemen.
On 2 January, the STC announced the start of “a two-year transitional phase”, which would include a referendum for southern Yemenis to exercise their right to self-determination. That same day, Saudi-backed forces intensified military efforts to reclaim territory taken by the STC in the previous month.
On 3 January, Saudi Arabia called for a “comprehensive conference” in Riyadh to engage the Yemeni parties in discussions on “just solutions to the southern cause”. According to the Coalition, Zubaidi was expected to attend the Saudi-hosted talks between the STC and the PLC, but was not part of the STC delegation that travelled to Riyadh on 7 January. The Coalition later accused Zubaidi of fleeing to an unknown location via Somalia with the UAE’s support. Also on 7 January, the PLC said that Zubaidi was removed from the government for “committing high treason”. On 9 January, members of the STC attending the talks in Riyadh reportedly announced the dissolution of the group; however, STC spokesman Anwar al-Tamimi rejected the announcement, indicating a split within the group.
In a statement delivered on 10 January, Alimi said that the Yemeni government had regained full control of the governorates of Hadramout and Al-Mahra, as well as the interim capital Aden, which had been under STC control since at least 2019. He further announced that the “southern cause” will remain a priority for the PLC and called for the convening of a “comprehensive Southern Dialogue Conference”, which would be hosted by Saudi Arabia.
Grundberg is expected to brief Council members on his 8 January visit to Riyadh, where he met with Alimi and other senior Yemeni government officials to discuss recent developments. He is likely to emphasise that such escalations pose a risk to Yemen’s stability. At the same time, the Special Envoy may note that the southern dialogue could represent an opportunity for parties to discuss long-standing grievances regarding the aspirations of southern Yemenis and underline the need for the PLC to adopt an inclusive approach to the political process.
Rajasingham may describe how the hostilities in the southern governorates have impacted the civilian population, including the displacement of around 1,500 households from Hadramout to Marib. He may inform of measures taken by OCHA and partners through the Yemen Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) to provide support to those displaced by insecurity by providing essential supplies, such as food rations and hygiene kits.
Several Council members are expected to call for de-escalation of the situation in southern Yemen and for the parties to prioritise dialogue and PLC unity, highlighting that further fragmentation could pose a risk to the country’s security and the transitional political process. Council members may reiterate messages from their 23 December 2025 press statement, which reaffirmed their “strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen, and to the [PLC] and the Government of Yemen”. Some members may additionally welcome the PLC’s decision to hold a comprehensive conference on the southern issue and call for an inclusive Yemeni-owned, Yemeni-led political process.
At tomorrow’s meeting, speakers are also expected to focus on the continued threat posed by Houthi actions to Yemen’s security. The Houthis—an Iran-backed rebel group which opposes the Yemeni government and controls northern Yemen, including the capital Sana’a—have continued to arbitrarily detain personnel from the UN, non-governmental (NGO) and civil society organisations, and diplomatic missions. Grundberg and Rajasingham may confirm that the Houthis are currently detaining 73 UN personnel—three of whom have been referred to a Houthi special criminal court on charges related to their duties—and that efforts are underway to negotiate their release. Council members are expected to strongly condemn these ongoing detentions and call on the Houthis to immediately and unconditionally release the detainees.
Council members may also express concern that such developments have worsened the dire humanitarian conditions in Yemen. On 17 December 2025, Secretary-General António Guterres said that the operating environment in Houthi-controlled territory “has become untenable”. Rajasingham may underscore that the UN is reassessing its presence in north Yemen, balancing its intent to continue life-saving assistance on the ground with ensuring the safety and security of its staff. He is also likely to warn that unprecedented funding gaps have had a severe effect on the humanitarian situation in the country and the UN’s ability to respond to growing needs, highlighting adverse impacts on food security, health, and other sectors.
Furthermore, Grundberg is likely to refer to a 12-day meeting in Muscat, Oman, that concluded on 23 December 2025, in which the conflict parties agreed to a new phase of releasing conflict-related detainees from all sides, in line with a prisoner exchange mechanism agreed to by the parties in December 2018 as part of the Stockholm Agreement—a UN-brokered peace deal between the Yemeni government and Houthi rebels, which included agreement on a ceasefire in Hodeidah and the exchange of prisoners. He may welcome the outcome of the recent meeting, describing it as a positive development. Some speakers may additionally highlight the development as an example of an effective confidence-building measure that can be achieved through dialogue.
During the consultations, Yamashita is expected to brief members on UNMHA and its efforts to support the implementation of the Hodeidah Agreement, as set out in the Stockholm Agreement. In line with resolution 2674 of 13 July 2022, she will also report “on any obstructions to the effective operation of UNMHA caused by any party, any violations of the Hodeidah Agreement ceasefire” and any challenges faced by the mission.
The consultations may inform Council members’ upcoming negotiations on the renewal of UNMHA’s mandate, which expires on 28 January. Members are currently deliberating the future viability of the mission, following a review of UNMHA submitted by the Secretary-General on 25 November 2025 pursuant to resolution 2786 of 14 July 2025. (For more information, see the brief on Yemen in our January 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
Draft Resolution on Houthi Red Sea Attacks Reporting Requirement
The draft resolution in blue extends the Secretary-General’s monthly reporting requirement on Houthi attacks in the Red Sea for another six months, until 15 July. The reporting obligation was established by resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024 and last renewed through resolution 2787 of 15 July 2025. The draft text in blue is a short, straightforward renewal, with one preambular paragraph recalling all relevant previous resolutions and one operative paragraph extending the reporting requirement outlined in resolution 2722.
Greece and the US, the co-penholders on the Red Sea crisis, circulated the draft resolution to Council members on 8 January, with a short period for comments until the next day. No edits were proposed, and the co-penholders proceeded to put the text under silence procedure until this morning (13 January).
It seems that Russia broke silence on the draft text and reiterated its long-standing concerns regarding resolution 2722. China and Russia have abstained on all resolutions renewing the reporting requirement established by this resolution. They have expressed concern about language contained in resolution 2722 regarding states’ right to defend their merchant and naval vessels from attack and the apparent endorsement that this provides for attacks in Yemen carried out by member states such as the US and the UK. It seems that Russia also questioned the relevance of the resolution, considering recent positive developments in the region. There have been no further Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since the 8 October 2025 announcement of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. The Secretary-General’s latest report on the matter, circulated to Council members on 9 January, also confirmed that there were no new Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since the previous report, which was submitted on 9 December 2025.
Despite the silence break, several other Council members expressed support for the draft resolution, and the penholders proceeded to put the unamended draft text in blue.
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**Post-script: On 14 January, the Security Council adopted resolution 2812, extending until 15 July the monthly reporting requirement for the Secretary-General on attacks by the Houthi rebel group in Yemen on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, which was established by resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024. The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). In its explanation of vote, China indicated that its vote was consistent with its position that, following the adoption of resolution 2722, certain countries undertook military action in Yemen which undermined the peace process and heightened insecurity in the Red Sea. Russia, for its part, said that the resolution has no added value and that the situation in the Red Sea has stabilised in recent months. Both countries emphasised that the security of the Red Sea is linked to the conflict in Gaza.
