The Middle East, including the Palestinian Question: Quarterly Open Debate
Tomorrow (28 January), the Security Council will hold its quarterly open debate on “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”. The anticipated briefer is Ramiz Alakbarov, the Deputy Special Coordinator and Resident Coordinator at the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO).
Efforts to advance the Gaza peace plan are expected to be the major focus of tomorrow’s meeting. In October 2025, Israel and Hamas agreed to the first stage of the US-proposed peace framework known as the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict”. This stage established the current ceasefire and called for Hamas to release the remaining hostages that it was holding in exchange for the release of Palestinian detainees, a partial withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from Gaza, and an increase in humanitarian aid into the territory, which would be partly facilitated by the reopening of the Rafah border crossing to Egypt. While Hamas released all living hostages within days of the agreement, the return of deceased hostages was slower and took place over several months, as the group claimed that it did not know the location of all remains and had to search for them through rubble amid poor weather conditions. For its part, Israel released Palestinian detainees at the agreed ratio and redeployed to an initial withdrawal boundary known as the “yellow line”, retaining control of approximately half of Gaza’s territory. Israeli authorities declined to reopen the Rafah crossing, however, insisting that it would remain closed until all hostages had been returned.
In a statement issued on 25 January, Israeli authorities announced that they had agreed to a “limited” reopening of the Rafah crossing, for pedestrian traffic only, which would take place after the completion of an IDF intelligence operation to locate the body of the last deceased hostage. Yesterday (26 January), the IDF announced that it had retrieved the body and that no hostages remained in Gaza. At tomorrow’s Council meeting, many speakers are likely to welcome these announcements as critical steps to fulfil the final terms of the Comprehensive Plan’s first stage.
Efforts to advance the peace plan had already proceeded prior to those developments. On 14 January, US Special Presidential Envoy for Peace Missions Steve Witkoff announced the launch of the second phase of the Comprehensive Plan. This stage—which the Security Council endorsed through the adoption of resolution 2803 of 17 November 2025—calls for the decommissioning of Hamas’ weapons; the further withdrawal of the IDF, which will progressively hand over security responsibility for Gaza to an International Stabilization Force (ISF); and the establishment of an interim technocratic government in Gaza comprising Palestinian experts under the oversight of an international Board of Peace (BoP). This body is to eventually cede control of Gaza to a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA), at which point the plan says that “the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood”.
On the same day as Witkoff’s statement, Egypt, Qatar, and Türkiye—which have contributed to mediation efforts alongside the US—issued a joint statement announcing the formation of the Palestinian technocratic committee. Known as the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), the body reportedly consists of 15 members headed by Ali Abdel Hamid Shaath, a former PA deputy minister. In an interview following his appointment, Shaath discussed Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction needs and stated that his immediate priority would be to provide housing for the territory’s displaced population.
On 22 January, US President Donald Trump convened a formal signing ceremony on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos to ratify the BoP. Although initially expected to oversee the NCAG and the implementation of the Gaza peace agreement, the BoP’s charter does not mention that conflict specifically and appears to grant the Board a more expansive global remit as a body that “seeks to promote stability, restore dependable and lawful governance, and secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict”. The charter appoints Trump as permanent chairman with veto power over decision-making and states that he can be replaced only through “voluntary resignation or as a result of incapacity, as determined by a unanimous vote”. Invited member states will serve three-year terms, subject to renewal by the chairman, but can pay $1 billion to secure a permanent seat.
The US has also announced the establishment of two bodies that will operate under the BoP. One is a seven-member “founding executive board”—comprising Witkoff, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, among others—which will be mandated to “operationalize the Board of Peace’s vision”. The other body is an 11-member “Gaza Executive Board” that will help support “effective governance” and the “delivery of best-in-class services” in Gaza specifically. This entity will be comprised of some of the same members as the founding board, as well as other officials such as Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Minister at the Qatari Prime Minister’s Office for Strategic Affairs Ali Al-Thawadi, and former UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process ad interim Sigrid Kaag. It also includes Nickolay Mladenov, another former UN Special Coordinator, who has been selected as the BoP’s High Representative for Gaza and liaison to the NCAG.
While the BoP as outlined in resolution 2803 was broadly welcomed by the international community, the response to its charter has been mixed. According to media reports, the White House had invited approximately 60 countries to join the Board, but at the time of writing just over 25 countries had responded favourably. Several US allies—including permanent Council members France and the UK, as well as Germany and Italy—have declined to join at this stage, variously citing constitutional constraints, reservations about other countries that have been invited to join, and concerns about the Board’s mandate encroaching on established multilateral frameworks. At tomorrow’s meeting, several Council members are likely to welcome progress in operationalising the transitional governance framework envisioned in the Comprehensive Plan and endorsed by resolution 2803, but some might stress that the resolution authorised the establishment of the BoP specifically within the context of Gaza and only until 31 December 2027, subject to further action by the Council.
Members are also likely to discuss Gaza’s humanitarian situation. According to the latest update issued by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), as at 14 January, the volume of humanitarian aid entering Gaza has nearly tripled since the ceasefire came into effect, and January marked the first month since October 2023 in which food stocks were sufficient to provide monthly food rations covering 100 percent of a household’s minimum caloric needs. OCHA cautioned, however, that damaged roads, limited storage capacity, and restricted materials continue to impede effective aid delivery and longer-term response, while more than one million people are estimated to require emergency shelter assistance amid continued winter storm conditions, which have destroyed thousands of housing tents. Intermittent violence has also continued: citing numbers from local health authorities, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported on 23 January that 477 Palestinians have been killed in Israeli attacks in Gaza since the ceasefire went into effect, most of whom “appear to be civilian”.
Recent developments concerning the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) are another expected topic of tomorrow’s meeting. On 20 January, Israeli authorities began demolishing UNRWA’s headquarters in East Jerusalem in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), and the compound was subsequently set on fire on 25 January. The incidents occurred after domestic Israeli legislation restricting UNRWA’s operations in the OPT entered into force last year, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) subsequently issued an advisory opinion in October 2025 which found that Israel, as an occupying power, is obligated to allow UN agencies, including UNRWA, to provide humanitarian aid in Gaza. In a 20 January statement, Secretary-General António Guterres condemned Israel’s actions against the UNRWA headquarters “in the strongest terms”, stating that the compound remains UN premises and immune from any form of interference, and urging Israel to restore and return it to the UN without delay. At tomorrow’s Council meeting, Alakbarov and several Council members are likely to echo these messages and may additionally call on Israel to abide by the ICJ’s advisory opinion.
Tomorrow’s speakers are also likely to express concern about developments in the occupied West Bank. In a publication dated 21 January reviewing developments in 2025, OCHA reported that the territory saw record levels of displacement and settler violence last year. More than 37,000 Palestinians were displaced during 2025, mostly due to operations carried out in refugee camps across the northern governorates, while demolitions of Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem reached the highest level that the UN has recorded in almost two decades. OCHA also documented over 1,800 attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinians, which is the highest annual figure recorded and marks the ninth consecutive annual increase.
