Haiti: Vote on BINUH Mandate Renewal*
Tomorrow afternoon (29 January), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing the mandate of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) for another year, until 31 January 2027. Panama and the US, the co-penholders on Haiti, authored the text.
The Security Council last renewed BINUH for six and a half months through resolution 2785 of 15 July 2025, which extended the mission’s mandate until 31 January and maintained its core tasks. This was largely due to Council members’ intention to revisit the mission’s mandate once greater clarity emerged on such issues as UN support options to Haiti, the future of the mandate of the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, and the US approach to addressing the situation in Haiti. (For background, see our 11 July 2025 What’s in Blue story and the brief on Haiti in our January Monthly Forecast.)
Panama and the US circulated the first draft of the resolution to Council members on 8 January and convened a reading of the text on the same day. Council members held negotiations on 14 January. The co-penholders circulated a revised draft on 21 January and convened another negotiation meeting the following day. A second revised draft was circulated on 26 January and put under silence procedure until yesterday (27 January). Silence was subsequently broken by the five European members—Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia, and the UK—followed by Colombia, China, and Russia. Today (28 January), the co-penholders circulated a third revised draft, placing it directly in blue without an additional silence procedure.
The draft resolution in blue tasks the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Haiti with playing “a good offices and coordinating role, including in promoting accountability as well as respect for human rights, the political process, and the rule of law”. The draft text revises BINUH’s mandate to cover six key tasks in an “integrated manner” with UN entities in the country. The tasks focus on electoral assistance and facilitating “inter-Haitian national dialogue” in support of political and constitutional processes in Haiti; support in the areas of community violence reduction and disarmament, dismantlement, and reintegration of armed gangs; assistance to the Haitian authorities on justice sector issues; as well as monitoring and reporting on “cases of gang violence, criminal activities, and human rights abuses and violations, including sexual violence”. The fact that the draft text in blue does not recall any of the previous Security Council resolutions that established and developed BINUH’s mandate has been interpreted by some observers as a further indication of the intention of the penholders to reshape BINUH’s mandate.
Although the negotiations were relatively smooth, a point of friction was the exclusion from earlier versions of the draft of some tasks that many members deemed important. This was particularly the case regarding support to Haitian authorities in strengthening several aspects of the justice and corrections system. For instance, it seems that, following a request from Denmark, language was included expressing concern at the high number of pre-trial detainees in Haiti and tasking BINUH with assisting the Haitian authorities in addressing prolonged pre-trial detention through support to relevant institutions.
At the same time, it seems that other suggestions on these issues were not fully reflected in the draft that was put under silence on 26 January. For instance, it appears that language proposed by Russia requesting BINUH to provide strategic and technical advice to the Haitian National Police (HNP) was not included. While the co-penholders added a reference to BINUH supporting the judiciary “in its regular monitoring” of the functioning of Haitian courts, proposals to include specific language on the handling by the justice sector of “high-risk individuals” advanced by France and the other European members were not reflected in that draft, leading these members to break silence. It seems that, in light of the expected full deployment of the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) and potential arrests of gang leaders, these members were concerned about the Haitian corrections and justice system lacking the capacity to handle such high-profile cases. In an apparent compromise, a reference to BINUH providing “advisory support” for the Haitian judiciary’s handling of high-risk individuals “as appropriate”, was included in the draft in blue.
Although references to human rights also proved contentious, it appears that the European members were successful in reinforcing language on this issue, particularly regarding BINUH’s monitoring and reporting on human rights violations and abuses, and on ensuring that the mission’s human rights unit has dedicated capacity to assist Haitian authorities in “strengthening respect for human rights”. Nevertheless, references to the role of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) that had also been requested and appeared in previous resolutions renewing BINUH’s mandate were not included in the draft resolution in blue, with the US apparently citing its withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) among the reasons for such denial. The addition of the usual qualifiers “free and fair” to language on elections in Haiti (which are currently scheduled for August 2026) proposed by members including China, Colombia, Denmark, Greece, Russia, and the UK was also not included.
Language on women, peace and security (WPS) was another significant friction point. It appears that, unlike previous resolutions on BINUH’s mandate, the first draft of the resolution did not contain any language on women or gender. During the negotiations, members such as Colombia, Denmark, and Greece advanced several proposals on these issues, including requesting references to gender-based violence (GBV) and women’s participation in electoral and political processes. It seems, however, that despite support for these additions from many Council members, the US remained reluctant to include these references. While the second revised draft added references to the participation of “all Haitians” and sexual violence against “women, men and children”, the continued exclusion of substantive WPS language was apparently another key reason for the silence break by the five European members and Colombia.
In their silence break, the European members also apparently raised the lack of references to the role of UN protection advisors in Haiti. This followed requests during the negotiations by members such as Latvia and the UK to include in the draft text references to women protection advisers and child protection advisers. In an apparent compromise, the draft in blue features a reference to “maintaining dedicated capacity for protection advisors”. Language on women’s participation in political processes and GBV was not included, however.
Child protection language was strengthened during the negotiations following proposals by members such as Denmark, Greece, Latvia, and the UK. It seems, for instance, that requests to add a reference to a 2024 Handover Protocol agreement between the UN and the government of Haiti were only accepted by the US after it checked that UNICEF—which is not among the UN bodies from which it announced its withdrawal earlier this month—is the UN entity that deals with this agreement.
Language expressing concern about the continued flow of illicit arms and ammunition into Haiti and reiterating the need to prohibit such transfers to non-state actors involved in gang violence was added to the draft resolution in blue following China’s silence break over the omission of this reference from previous iterations of the text.
The draft resolution in blue introduces some changes to the UN’s reporting requirements on Haiti. While the 90-day reporting cycle for the Secretary-General to report on BINUH remains unchanged, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is now requested to report to the Council on transnational organised crime every six months—as opposed to quarterly. The draft text in blue also requests the Secretary-General to submit a report within 90 days outlining “a full range of options and their costs for UN and international support, for the implementation of a Haitian-led Disarmament, Dismantlement, and Reintegration program as well as support to implement justice reform, strengthen internal oversight, and foster accountability”.
The negotiations on BINUH’s mandate renewal took place against the backdrop of rising political turmoil in Haiti, as a majority of members of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) moved to dismiss Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé on 21 January, a step that the US, other international interlocutors, and national stakeholders criticised for potentially undermining stability and efforts to tackle gang violence. According to Haitian media reports, Laurent Saint-Cyr, who currently holds the TPC rotating presidency, opposed the move. The attempt to oust Fils-Aimé took place as 7 February—the date on which the TPC’s non-renewable mandate expires—approaches. (The TPC was created to exercise presidential powers pursuant to a March 2024 agreement facilitated by the Caribbean Community [CARICOM] and the US following a dramatic surge in gang violence in February 2024. As established by a May 2024 Decree, the TPC’s mandate cannot be extended beyond 7 February.)
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**Post-script: On 29 January, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2814, renewing the mandate of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) for another year, until 31 January 2027.
