Haiti: Briefing and Consultations
This afternoon (21 January), the Security Council will hold an open briefing on Haiti. Special Representative and Head of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) Carlos Ruiz Massieu will brief on recent developments in the country and the Secretary-General’s latest report on BINUH, which was circulated to Council members on 15 January and covers developments since 21 October 2025 (S/2026/31). Acting Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) John Brandolino is also expected to brief. Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico might participate under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. Closed consultations are scheduled to follow the open briefing.
Ruiz Massieu is expected to address the political situation in the country. He is likely to note that the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) has been unable to organise elections to complete the political transition before 7 February—the date on which, according to a May 2024 decree, the TPC’s non-renewable mandate expires. At the same time, Ruiz Massieu might acknowledge steps taken by the Haitian authorities to advance this process, such as the TPC’s approval on 1 December 2025 of an electoral decree establishing the rules for the general elections and the 23 December 2025 publication of the electoral calendar by the Provisional Electoral Council, which sets the first round of presidential and legislative elections for 30 August.
According to the Secretary-General’s report, however, Haitian stakeholders “remain divided over the transitional governance architecture that is to lead the country to elections”. Today, Ruiz Massieu might warn about the risks associated with a political and institutional vacuum and call on all stakeholders to work constructively on this issue.
Ruiz Massieu is also expected to brief on the security and human rights situations in Haiti. Among other things, the Secretary-General’s report notes the expansion in 2025 of the areas affected by gang violence beyond the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and the use by gangs of heavy-calibre weapons. The report says that, between 1 September and 30 November 2025, BINUH recorded 1,991 victims of intentional homicide, including 142 women, 12 girls, and 44 boys. It also describes the continued use of sexual violence as a punitive tactic by gangs, as well as of kidnapping, extortion, destruction of property, and obstruction of essential services such as health and education. Additionally, it notes the reported increase in trafficking of children and the ongoing use of children by gangs in multiple roles, including in violent attacks.
The Secretary-General’s report also notes that police operations conducted mainly in the Port-au-Prince area between October and November 2025, which involved “a private military contractor in some instances”, resulted in at least 199 deaths, including gang members as well as 12 children recruited by gangs. The report also provides casualty figures related to “drone strikes by a private military contractor” in the country, saying that, between 1 March and 30 December 2025, these resulted in at least 973 people killed, of whom 934 were suspected gang members and 39 residents, including 16 children.
Today, Council members may seek an update from Ruiz Massieu regarding the operationalisation of the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) and the UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH). On 30 September 2025, the Security Council adopted resolution 2793, which authorised UN member states to transition the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti into the GSF and requested the Secretary-General to establish UNSOH. (For background, see our 30 September 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
The Secretary-General’s report describes several steps taken by the UN to establish UNSOH by 31 March—the timeframe mandated by resolution 2793. These include the identification of locations, procurement activities, establishment of key host country agreements, and confirmation of the GSF’s operational requirements for the provision of logistical support by UNSOH.
Regarding the GSF, the report notes the appointment in December 2025 of Jack Christofides, who has held several leadership roles in the UN, as GSF Special Representative. It also mentions the delivery of equipment that enabled the GSF to dispatch additional supplies and reinforce patrols. Council members might be interested in receiving more information from Ruiz Massieu about the Standard Operating Procedure that the Secretary-General’s report says is being developed to guide cooperation across mandates in Haiti, including regarding policing, human rights, and weapons trafficking. Some members might also be interested in hearing more about the findings of the monitoring of GSF operations carried out by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) referenced in the report.
At today’s meeting, Ruiz Massieu is likely to encourage UN member states to support the GSF through personnel, equipment, and financial contributions. He may also highlight BINUH’s role in supporting the long-term capacity and institutional development of the Haitian National Police (HNP) as complementary to the GSF’s role, to help build a police force able to progressively assume responsibility for internal security and reduce reliance on international assistance.
An annex to the Secretary-General’s report includes, for the first time, a benchmark framework pursuant to resolution 2793, which requested reporting on benchmarks, indicators, and timelines to be met by the Haitian authorities to strengthen their security forces’ capacities and enhance management and control of borders and ports to combat the trafficking of arms, ammunition, and narcotics, with a view to preparing the transition of tasks and responsibilities to the Haitian government. The framework identifies several objectives, such as capacity-building of the HNP and the Armed Forces of Haiti, Disarmament, Dismantling, and Reintegration (DDR), Community Violence Reduction (CVR), and weapons and ammunition management.
Brandolino is expected to brief on the latest UNODC quarterly report on sources and routes of illicit arms and financial flows in Haiti, which covers the period from October to December 2025. In addition, this report apparently analyses cumulative trends over the past three years (2022-2025) to identify key characteristics of the emerging criminal ecosystem and their implications for peace and security, human rights, and development in Haiti. Among other things, Brandolino might describe the evolution of criminal networks from opportunistic gangs into more structured, federated forms of territorial control that are increasingly integrated into transnational illicit markets and are engaging in such activities as arms and drug trafficking, fuel smuggling, exploitation of migrants, and extortion. He might stress the role of arms trafficking, illicit financial flows, and weak oversight of private security actors among the factors sustaining this system of control. Brandolino may also highlight the entry points for response identified in the UNODC report, such as the implementation of the arms embargo on Haiti, the strengthening of state institutions, and enhanced protection for populations affected by gang violence.
At today’s meeting, Council members are likely to express deep concern at the security and human rights situation in the country, including the forced recruitment and use of children by gangs and the high incidence of sexual and gender-based violence. Several speakers may call for enhanced interventions to prevent the recruitment and use of children and to facilitate their release and reintegration. Some might also call for reforming the judicial and correctional systems to address dire detention conditions, overcrowding, and high rates of prolonged pre-trial detention.
Several members may call for the timely implementation of resolution 2793, with some also stressing the need for the GSF to observe the highest standards of conduct and discipline and to comply with international human rights law. Several Council members are also likely to emphasise the importance of strengthening enforcement of the arms embargo to stem the flow of arms into Haiti.
Members may also stress the importance of a Haitian-led and Haitian-owned response to the country’s crisis, including regarding the political transition after 7 February. The need to stabilise the security situation may also be referenced in the context of facilitating free and fair elections, with some members likely underscoring the importance of guaranteeing women’s full participation in political, governance, and electoral processes.
Some speakers may express concern at the humanitarian situation, which remains dire, with the Secretary-General’s report highlighting soaring humanitarian needs, including in the aftermath of Hurricane Melissa in October 2025, rising numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing gang violence, and cholera remaining a public health concern.
Council members are currently negotiating BINUH’s mandate renewal ahead of its 31 January expiry. In this context, several members are likely to stress the important role played by the mission and to express the hope that its mandate will be renewed.
