Colombia: Quarterly Meeting
Tomorrow morning (23 January), the Security Council will hold its quarterly briefing on Colombia. Special Representative and Head of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia Miroslav Jenča will brief on recent developments and the Secretary-General’s latest 90-day report on the mission, which was issued on 26 December 2025 and covers the period from 27 September to 26 December 2025. Closed consultations are scheduled to follow the open briefing.
Tomorrow’s meeting comes at a complex time for the implementation of the 2016 Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace between the government of Colombia and the former rebel group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) and the UN’s ability to support the process.
It will be the first meeting on the file since the Security Council renewed the verification mission’s mandate for one year through resolution 2798 of 31 October 2025. The resolution removed two tasks related to the implementation of the peace agreement that had been previously assigned to the mission: verifying compliance with the restorative sentences handed down by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP)—the judicial component of the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition established by the 2016 agreement—and monitoring implementation of the agreement’s ethnic chapter. The US insisted that these tasks be removed, while most other Council members strongly advocated for their retention.
The negotiations on resolution 2798—which were the most difficult since the verification mission was established in 2017—reflected the challenging Council dynamics created by the strains in the bilateral relationship between Colombia and the US since President Donald Trump returned to office in January 2025.
Tomorrow’s meeting also comes on the heels of the US’ 3 January military operation in Venezuela to remove President Nicolás Maduro Moros from the country. Soon after, Trump issued warnings to other countries in the region, including by suggesting that he may consider military action against Colombia. In doing so, Trump reiterated accusations that he has levelled against Colombian President Gustavo Petro Urrego in the past year of mismanaging his country’s drug control policy. This has sparked concern, as the US cited the need to curtail the flow of drugs into its territory as part of its motivation to remove Maduro and for its attacks since September 2025 against boats in the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean. (For more information, see our 5 January What’s in Blue story.)
Despite the heated rhetoric in the immediate aftermath of the US operation in Venezuela, Petro and Trump held a telephone call on 8 January that appears to have defused tensions. The call, which was the first direct interaction between the two leaders, was reportedly a culmination of months-long attempts by Colombian officials to secure an audience with Trump. It resulted in an invitation for Petro to meet Trump at the White House on 3 February.
Tomorrow’s meeting may witness a softening in the tone of the US, which had used previous quarterly Council meetings on Colombia to personally criticise Petro. Colombia will also make its first intervention on the file as a non-permanent Council member. It will be represented at the meeting by Colombian Deputy Minister of Multilateral Affairs Mauricio Jaramillo Jassir.
As with its statement after the adoption of resolution 2798, at tomorrow’s meeting Colombia is likely to welcome the renewal of the verification mission’s mandate to carry out the three remaining tasks, namely monitoring implementation of the rural reform chapter, the reincorporation of former FARC-EP combatants, and personal and collective security guarantees. After the resolution’s adoption, Colombia noted that it would have liked to see the tasks related to transitional justice and the ethnic chapter retained in the mission’s mandate, while emphasising the government’s commitment to continue working on these two issues as part of the full implementation of the peace agreement.
Other Council members, including European and African members, are likely to express continued support for the SJP’s work and highlight the need to advance implementation of the ethnic chapter, which has been slow. Several members may urge the Colombian government to continue prioritising implementation of the peace agreement in the remainder of its term, which ends in August, including by putting in place structures that can facilitate continuity in the next administration. In this regard, some may encourage the government to uphold its November 2025 decision to elevate the Peace Implementation Unit to the category of a Presidential Advisory Office. This followed a September 2025 ruling by Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which determined that the entity “lacks the independence, resources, and political clout necessary to fulfil its mission”.
Signatories to the peace agreement have long emphasised the importance of preserving the architecture of the accord, including by increasing coordination among state institutions. They most recently reiterated this call during a 10 January meeting hosted by the verification mission in Bogotá to discuss the Secretary-General’s latest report, which was also attended by government officials and representatives of several member states serving on the Security Council, including China, France, and Russia. Among other issues, signatories to the peace agreement raised alarm about the lack of security guarantees for participation in the upcoming congressional and presidential elections, while highlighting the need to adequately implement and finance mechanisms outlined in the peace agreement, such as the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics (SISEP). They also expressed concern about challenges to the reintegration of former combatants, including the continued killing of ex-FARC members, the high levels of impunity for such acts, displacement due to insecurity, and insufficient access to housing and land.
Several Council members are likely to echo some of these points at tomorrow’s meeting. They may urge the government to facilitate the secure conduct of elections, including the safe participation of women. Many speakers are likely to express concern about the persistent violence in numerous regions across the country. During the period covered by the Secretary-General’s report, the mission verified the killing of three former combatants, bringing to 487 the number of ex-FARC killed since the signing of the peace agreement. Several speakers are likely to echo the Secretary-General’s report, which emphasised that “[g]uaranteeing security for vulnerable communities, including social leaders and former combatants, is a pressing priority that should not be deferred”. In this regard, they may urge implementation of the public policy to dismantle illegal armed groups and criminal organisations, which was presented by the National Commission on Security Guarantees (NCSG), a body established by the peace agreement.
Several speakers are likely to express concern about the ongoing forced recruitment and use of children by armed groups, particularly from indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. In a recent incident, a 10 November 2025 government airstrike targeting an armed group in the southern department of Guaviare resulted in the killing of at least 19 members of the group, including seven children. In a 16 November 2025 statement, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) condemned armed groups for recruiting children and using them as human shields, while urging military forces to prevent harm to children who have been victims of recruitment. Some speakers may echo such messages tomorrow.
Analysts have warned that the Colombian guerrilla group the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which also operates in Venezuela, has since mid-December 2025 increased its activities in the north-eastern region of Catatumbo in order to consolidate control in the borderlands in anticipation of US military action against Venezuela. According to media reports, this has displaced thousands of civilians and has led to an increase in measures by the ELN such as the establishment of checkpoints that hinder access to basic services. Some analysts have said that pressure from Trump to address the activities of armed groups allegedly involved in drug trafficking has led Petro to take a tougher stance on the ELN. On 12 January, Petro rejected a proposal from the group to establish a “national agreement” that would address structural issues that give rise to conflict. He stressed that an agreement cannot be reached until the ELN ceases illicit economic activity and the recruitment of children, while threatening joint military action with Venezuela against the group.
The potential spillover effects of the developments in Venezuela on neighbouring Colombia are not likely to be discussed directly at tomorrow’s meeting, however. Council members traditionally seek to separate discussions on Venezuela, a sensitive topic, from their engagement of Colombia, a file that had until recently enjoyed consensus.
Instead, at tomorrow’s meeting, Council members may note more broadly that one year has passed since a severe escalation of violence occurred in the Catatumbo region due to a dispute between the ELN and another armed group. Some might express concern that the situation there is still precarious and call on the government to increase its presence in the region and address structural issues such as the eradication of coca crops.
