Al-Shabaab Sanctions: Vote on a Draft Resolution Renewing the Sanctions Regime*
This afternoon (12 December), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee until 31 December 2026 and to review the mandate of the Panel by 30 November 2026. The draft text, which was authored by the UK (the penholder on Somalia), also renews until 30 November 2026 the authorisation for maritime interdiction to enforce the embargo on illicit arms imports, the charcoal exports ban, and the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) components ban. (Other measures of the regime—including general and targeted arms embargo measures, travel ban, and assets freeze—are open-ended.)
The negotiations on the draft text were apparently arduous. The UK circulated an initial draft of the resolution to all Council members on 3 December and convened in-person negotiations on 4 and 8 December. The penholder shared a revised draft on 10 December and placed it under silence procedure until 6 pm the same day. However, China and Russia broke silence. Subsequently, the penholder placed a revised text under another silence procedure until the morning of 11 December; however, this time the A3+ grouping (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) broke silence. Following bilateral consultations, the penholder put a revised text directly in blue late yesterday.
It appears that the position of the A3 Plus grouping (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) was strongly influenced by Somalia’s strong desire for the Council to recalibrate the sanctions regime to enhance its effectiveness while granting the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) greater authority over weapons entering the country. In essence, Somalia seeks to narrow the regime’s application exclusively to Al-Shabaab as an entity. This approach was reportedly supported by China, Pakistan, and Russia.
One key issue in the negotiations concerned the penholder’s proposed language on modifying the additional controls aimed at preventing Al-Shabaab from obtaining weapons, ammunition, and military equipment, as well as provisions relating to Somalia’s federal member states. The initial draft indicated the Council’s intention to lift these measures, as appropriate, on the basis of a technical assessment of the arms embargo and upon confirmation that the necessary laws, regulations, and administrative procedures have been established.
Several members, including France, Greece, Slovenia, Denmark, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), emphasised that the Council must retain the central role in determining whether conditions for lifting or revising the regime have been met, underscoring the importance of a technical assessment in informing such decisions. Some members, such as France and the US, proposed adding the term “revise” alongside “lift” to reflect the full range of potential adjustments to the sanctions. Russia apparently also suggested the use of the word “revise” while removing the conditionalities, shortening the paragraph.
The A3 Plus opposed the requirement for a technical assessment, along with China, and instead advocated for confirmation solely by the FGS regarding the establishment of the relevant laws and regulations.
To address the concerns raised by respective members, the penholder revised the language in the text in blue to state that the Council intends to “review” these measures, informed by reporting requested in the resolution, which includes a technical assessment on the arms embargo, and upon its assessment that the necessary laws and procedures have been established, to lift them as appropriate. Some members, including the US and Slovenia, supported by others (such as Denmark and France), sought to add the term “implemented” alongside “established”. However, opposition from the A3 Plus led to this language being removed.
Another notable issue in the negotiations concerned the provisions relating to exemptions for private security companies (PSCs) importing weapons. Somalia, supported by the other A3 Plus members, sought greater national authority over the flow of arms into the country and maintained that PSCs should not merely notify the FGS but be required to obtain prior approval from the FGS before importing weapons. This position reflected Mogadishu’s broader effort to consolidate oversight of arms management, with all weapons entering the country falling under federal regulatory control. It appears that some members expressed some reservations, citing security considerations for diplomatic missions and PSCs contracted for such purposes.
The A3 Plus also apparently proposed replacing references to deliveries made “in coordination with” the federal government with language requiring such deliveries to be made “on approval” of the FGS for weapons destined for federal member states or licensed PSCs.
To address these concerns, the penholder revised the text to include language encouraging the FGS to ensure that PSCs operating in the country obtain the requisite approval before importing weapons, ammunition, and military equipment. The penholder also adjusted the provisions on member state notifications to the FGS regarding deliveries to federal member states or licensed PSCs, clarifying that this is intended to “allow for appropriate review and consideration”.
During the negotiations, the A3 Plus proposed introducing a sunset clause for the provisions relating to the arms embargo and the ban on IEDs, suggesting that these measures be renewed until 30 November 2026, with the Council determining any further renewal by that date. They argued that these elements of the regime, which have thus far remained open-ended, should be time-bound in a manner consistent with several other Council sanctions regimes. This proposal was reportedly supported by China, Russia, and Pakistan. However, the suggestion was not incorporated into the draft at any stage during the negotiations.
In the section on maritime interdiction, the penholder’s initial draft noted that the maritime interdiction and maritime domain awareness measures would not hinder Somalia’s sovereign right to enter into bilateral maritime security cooperation agreements with member states, as appropriate. This provision was included in the draft in blue, except for the qualifier “as appropriate” which was removed at the request of Somalia, which otherwise supported the language.
It appears that the initial draft proposed by the penholder revised and streamlined the mandate of the Panel of Experts supporting the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee, marking a departure from previous resolutions. The draft also adjusted the composition of the Panel, setting the number of experts at five, whereas earlier panels had comprised six members. Additionally, the text clarified that Panel members should be appropriately located, with due consideration given to mandate implementation needs and administrative requirements. These proposals were incorporated in the draft in blue.
One provision in the proposed mandate requested the Panel to cooperate actively with other relevant sanctions committees’ panels of experts, particularly those mandated to investigate listed groups operating in the region. Several Council members—including the A3 Plus members, China, Russia, and Pakistan—sought the deletion of this provision, arguing that the Panel’s mandate should remain focused exclusively on Al-Shabaab and not be broadened to include cooperation with other sanctions panels. As a result, this language was omitted by the penholder during the course of the negotiations.
On the basis of similar arguments, these members also sought to delete the preambular reference expressing concern about the flow of weapons and ammunition from Yemen to Somalia in violation of the arms embargo—a formulation already included in resolution 2776, which most recently renewed the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime. Some members, including the US, favoured strengthening this language to condemn more explicitly the training of Al-Shabaab fighters in Yemen. Ultimately, the language from resolution 2776 was retained in the draft in blue.
During the negotiations, France apparently also sought to explicitly reference the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia (ISIL-Somalia) in the draft text; however, the A3 Plus, China, Pakistan, and Russia argued in favour of limiting the scope of the text to focus narrowly on Al-Shabaab, and this proposal was not incorporated in the draft resolution.
The language on thematic reporting by the Panel of Experts also generated discussion. The A3 Plus maintained that thematic reports were unnecessary, given the Panel’s existing midterm and final reports. However, the UK and other members underscored the value of such reporting in informing the Council’s decision-making. To accommodate these differing views, the penholder revised the draft to request one thematic report—rather than a minimum of two, as has been called for in the original draft resolution—to be submitted by 30 June 2026.
References to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in the original draft were also a source of disagreement. The US, consistent with its established position since the Trump administration assumed office again in January 2025, sought to remove the term “gender”, while Russia proposed deleting language requesting the Panel to treat gender as a cross-cutting issue in its investigations and reporting. By contrast, other members, including Denmark and Slovenia, supported retaining SGBV references in the text. Ultimately, the draft text was revised to request the Secretary-General to include relevant dedicated expertise on the panel in line with paragraph 11 of resolution 2467 of 23 April 2019 and further requests the panel to apply this expertise across all aspects of its investigations and reporting.
China suggested deleting a reference in the initial draft calling on the Panel to make recommendations to the Sanctions Committee on how to support the Somali government in addressing violations against children. It maintained that this falls under the mandate of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC). Some members, such as Greece and Slovenia, strongly requested that the draft maintain this CAAC language, which was retained in the draft text in blue.
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**Post-script: On 12 December, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2806, extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee until 31 December 2026 and expressing its intention to review the PoE’s mandate by 30 November 2026. The resolution also renewed until 30 November 2026 the authorisation for maritime interdiction to enforce the embargo on illicit arms imports, the charcoal exports ban, and the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) components ban. (Other measures of the regime—including general and targeted arms embargo measures, travel ban, and assets freeze—are open-ended.)
