Yemen: Vote on a Draft Resolution Renewing the Sanctions Regime*
Tomorrow afternoon (14 November), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing the 2140 Yemen sanctions regime—comprising targeted financial and travel ban measures—for another year, until 14 November 2026. (The targeted arms embargo on the Houthi rebel group established through resolution 2216 in April 2015 is open-ended.) The draft text also extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) supporting the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee until 15 December 2026.
Background
The PoE’s latest report on Yemen, dated 15 October and covering the period from 1 August 2024 to 31 July, said that the sanctions regime has faced “persistent challenges” and “ineffective implementation”. The report noted that the Houthis use smuggling to generate finances and circumvent the arms embargo, which the PoE determined has been “totally ineffective” and has failed to impact the Houthis’ ability to procure weapons, military materiel, and dual-use items. The report further observed a lack of effective implementation by member states as a factor contributing to the ineffectiveness of the arms embargo. It also said that the assets freeze has had “limited effect”, while violations of it continue unabated. The PoE thus recommended, among other things, that the Council “expand the scope of the provisions of resolution 2216 to include inspections of cargo conducted in Government of Yemen-controlled areas and on the high seas”.
On 5 November, during a briefing to the Council by Chair of the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee Ambassador Sangjin Kim (Republic of Korea), the UK (the penholder on Yemen) expressed its intention to update the 2140 sanctions regime to reflect the observations made in the PoE’s report, with the aim of disrupting Houthi smuggling and financing activities. In its statement, the US similarly called on the Council to support efforts to address the Houthis’ activities during its negotiations on the sanctions regime’s renewal, and supported the PoE’s recommendation for expanded cargo inspections. In this regard, the US argued for a mechanism similar to Operation EUNAVFOR Med IRINI, a European Union (EU) naval force that inspects vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya that it has reasonable grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo on the country, under an authorisation initially granted by the Council in resolution 2292 of 14 June 2016.
Furthermore, the US said that the Panel’s report details the flow of dual-use components intended for military use by the Houthis, with several shipments originating from China, and urged the Council to take action against such dual-use transfers. In response, China stressed that it has “always taken a prudent and responsible approach to military exports, strictly controlling the exports of dual-use items, including drones”. It added that Chinese companies conduct themselves in accordance with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and market principles and that they should not be subject to such accusations. China further stressed that at no point does the PoE report allege that China has violated the Security Council’s resolutions or sanctions.
Negotiations on the Draft Resolution
During last year’s negotiations, Council members had opted for a straightforward renewal of the 2140 sanctions regime through resolution 2758 of 13 November 2024 due to increasingly complex dynamics on the file. This year, however, the UK attempted instead to strengthen the 2140 sanctions regime, which apparently made the negotiations challenging.
The UK shared an initial draft of the resolution on 6 November, inviting experts for an informal round of consultations on the draft on the next day and asking them to submit comments. On Monday (10 November), the penholder shared a first revised draft of the text, requesting comments by the afternoon of the following day. The UK then circulated a second revised draft, placing it under silence procedure yesterday (12 November) until this morning (13 November). China and Russia subsequently broke silence. The UK nonetheless proceeded with putting the text in blue, without making any further amendments.
The initial draft of the text apparently introduced several new elements under two separate sections. One included provisions prohibiting the sale, supply or transfer of dual-use components and precursor chemicals to the Houthis and requesting states to take measures to prevent such actions. The other section focused on maritime interdictions and contained provisions authorising member states—acting nationally or through multinational naval partnerships and in cooperation with the government of Yemen—to carry out inspections of vessels in the territorial waters of Yemen and on the high seas extending to the ea and the Persian Gulf, which are suspected of carrying sanctioned items to the Houthis in violation of the provisions of the draft and the arms embargo contained in resolution 2216.
Some Council members were apparently supportive of having new language aimed at ensuring better implementation of the arms embargo. These new provisions, however, apparently faced significant opposition from China and Russia, which both requested the deletion of the new language and conveyed a preference for a straightforward renewal of the sanctions regime. Conversely, the US apparently advocated the further strengthening of the draft, including by imposing an assets freeze on the Houthis as an entity. (Currently, the assets freeze imposed under resolution 2140 only applies to designated individuals, whereas the Houthis as an entity are only subject to an arms embargo.) It seems that this suggestion was not taken on board by the penholder.
The initial draft also contained a provision which expressed concern at increasing linkages between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab (a terrorist group affiliated with Al-Qaida which is based in Somalia) and armed groups in Sudan. This language was included based on findings presented in the PoE report, which noted that cooperation between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab “has intensified”, including through smuggling, training, and exchange of support, and that this cooperation is “part of a Houthi strategy to wield increasing influence in the region”. The PoE also reported that Somalia is “increasingly being used as a transit hub for weapons destined for the Houthis”. Another related provision in the initial draft text called upon the Yemen, Sudan, and Al-Shabaab sanctions committees to coordinate in monitoring cross-border activities between Yemen, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa. It seems that the “A3 Plus” grouping (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) had concerns regarding these two provisions and requested their deletion, arguing that issues concerning Al-Shabaab are already addressed through the Council’s 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime. China and Russia also supported the removal of this language.
The penholder also proposed some preambular language in the initial draft text to reflect recent developments in the country. In recent weeks, the Houthis conducted several raids on UN premises in Houthi-controlled territory, and they are currently holding at least 59 UN personnel in arbitrary detention. (For more information, see our 12 November What’s in Blue story.) The penholder therefore proposed new language condemning in the strongest terms the detentions of staff belonging to the UN, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society, and diplomatic missions, as well as the seizure of UN premises and assets. It further suggested text demanding the immediate and unconditional release of all detainees and highlighting the negative impact such detentions have on the humanitarian situation in Yemen. It seems that there was general agreement from Council members with these additions, and they were therefore included in the draft resolution in blue.
In the first revised draft, the penholder made some significant changes to address the concerns raised by Council members. The provisions related to sanctions on the sale, supply or transfer of dual-use components and precursor chemicals—as well as the ones authorising maritime interdictions—were replaced by language requesting the PoE to present two separate reports and advice on each of these issues to the Council by 15 April 2026. The penholder also removed the paragraphs which contained references to Al-Shabaab and coordination between the Yemen, Sudan, and Al-Shabaab sanctions committees. During the comment period on the first revised draft, however, China and Russia apparently reiterated their objection to the language on dual-use components and maritime interdictions.
In the second revised draft, which the penholder put under silence procedure, language requesting the dual-use components report remained mostly unchanged. The request included an assessment by the PoE of the impact and scope of the provision of dual-use components and precursor chemicals to the Houthis. The language requesting the second report on interdictions, however, was changed to remove any explicit reference to maritime interdictions, replacing it instead with a request for advice on improving information sharing and capacity of flag states to prevent vessels suspected of carrying arms and sanctioned items from entering Yemen, and an assessment of the impact and scope of such activities on the implementation of the arms embargo and the Yemen sanctions regime.
Despite the penholder’s attempts at reaching a compromise, China and Russia broke silence on the text, apparently reiterating the same positions they had conveyed since the start of the negotiations. Nonetheless, the penholder proceeded with putting the second revision of the text into blue, without making any further amendments.
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**Post-script: On 14 November, the Security Council adopted resolution 2801, renewing the 2140 Yemen sanctions regime—comprising targeted financial and travel ban measures—for another year, until 14 November 2026, and the mandate of the Panel of Experts supporting the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee until 15 December 2026. The resolution also requests the Panel of Experts to present two reports and advice to the Council by 15 April 2026: one on the flow of dual-use components and precursor chemicals to Yemen and another on improving information sharing and flag State capacity to prevent vessels suspected of violating the sanctions regime from entering Yemen. The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). In their explanation of vote, China and Russia expressed concern that the resolution facilitates the potential for expanding the Yemen sanctions regime and establishing maritime interdictions, arguing that this would escalate tensions and push the parties further away from a political settlement.
