UN Interim Security Force for Abyei: Vote on Mandate Renewal Resolution*
This afternoon at 5 pm (14 November)*, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) for another year, until 15 November 2026. (Abyei is a disputed area along the Sudan-South Sudan border.) The draft text in blue also extends until 15 November 2026 the mission’s support for the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), established in 2011 to conduct monitoring and verification activities along the Sudan-South Sudan border.
The US, the penholder on Abyei, circulated an initial draft of the text on 3 November and convened one round of negotiations on 5 November. After receiving comments, the US circulated a first revised draft on Monday (10 November) and placed it under silence until Tuesday afternoon (11 November). China and Russia broke silence, after which several members submitted additional comments. The penholder made further revisions to the draft resolution and put it directly in blue on Wedensday evening (12 November) without an additional silence procedure, to be voted on Thursday afternoon (13 November). Shortly before the vote on Thursday, Algeria on behalf of the “A3 Plus” grouping (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) requested informal consultations to further discuss the text. The vote was subsequently rescheduled for Friday afternoon (14 November) to allow more time for deliberations among Council members. Later on Thursday, the penholder circulated a third revised text and put it in blue. That text apparently addressed some, but not all, of the comments made by Council members during the consultations.
The draft text in blue extends UNISFA’s mandate for one year and expresses the Council’s intention to “consider further renewal of the mission based on demonstrable progress by Sudan and South Sudan” on a proposed set of benchmarks. These benchmarks will be evaluated against the following efforts within the respective purviews of the two countries, including:
- to “urge all unauthorised armed forces and armed elements to withdraw from the Abyei area and take all necessary steps to achieve its full demilitarisation;
- to resume and document meetings of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM), a body employed by Sudan and South Sudan to discuss security matters of mutual concern; and
- to establish the Abyei Joint Security Police, including recruitment, training, and deployment numbers”.
At the same time, the draft text in blue reaffirms that any decision regarding the mission’s future will remain subject to the Council’s determination. It further requests that the Secretary-General provide biannual updates to the Council on progress against these benchmarks and signals the Council’s intention to “withdraw or reconfigure the mission should [the] involved actors make no substantial progress”.
The draft resolution in blue makes significant substantive changes to UNISFA’s mandate, compared with its last mandate renewal through resolution 2760 of 14 November 2024. Similar to last year’s negotiations, it appears that the US sought this year to update the mandate renewal text to reflect recent political and security developments in the region, given the severe escalation of violence in Sudan and the increasing fragility of South Sudan’s political situation. For that reason, the penholder apparently modified the language throughout the text to reflect the latest findings of the strategic review of UNISFA, which the Secretary-General submitted on 18 August following a request by the Council in resolution 2760.
At the same time, it appears that the US took a different approach to this year’s negotiations on the mission’s mandate renewal. In the past, the US, as the penholder, traditionally emphasised UNISFA’s role in protecting civilians and called for adequate resourcing of the mission, stressing the importance of ensuring freedom of movement and removing obstacles to mandate implementation. However, the current US administration under President Donald Trump has undertaken efforts to reduce its financial support to the UN, particularly to UN peace operations. It therefore seems that the penholder’s approach to UNISFA’s mandate renewal is part of Washington’s efforts to scale back its support to the mission, employing benchmarks to evaluate UNISFA’s impact in fulfilling its mandate which will inform the Council’s decisions on the mission’s future.
The negotiations were apparently challenging, as positions diverged among Council members on many issues in the initial draft of the text. It seems that the primary source of contention concerned operative language outlining the benchmarks and making the mission’s renewal contingent upon their completion. It appears that the A3 Plus members, China, and Russia were strongly opposed to the idea of using benchmarks for deciding the mission’s future mandate renewal. Some Council members, such as the UK, apparently were not entirely against the idea of using benchmarks as a means of holding the parties accountable and assessing their progress towards Abyei’s stabilisation and demilitarisation. At the same time, these Council members were apparently not in favour of using benchmarks as a means for conditioning the renewal of UNISFA’s mandate, as proposed by the penholder. Amid the fragile security and political situations in Sudan and South Sudan, several Council members emphasised the importance of UNISFA’s role in supporting peace and stability in Abyei and the broader region, with many opposing the idea of the mission’s automatic withdrawal next year. As such, many Council members proposed modifications or the softening of this language.
In the first revised draft, apparently at the UK’s request, the US rephrased and softened the language of the relevant operative paragraph and replaced it with text expressing the Council’s intention “to consider further renewal of the mission”. The UK also apparently proposed language during negotiations, which the other European Council members (Denmark, France, Greece, and Slovenia) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) were in favour of, that requested the Secretary-General to conduct an assessment of what a potential drawdown might look like or the implications it could have. This language was eventually incorporated into the draft resolution in blue.
China and Russia apparently broke silence due to concerns regarding the direct connection that the text made between the mandate renewal and the implementation of the proposed benchmarks. It also seems that several other Council members—including the A3 Plus, European Council members, the ROK, and Pakistan—submitted additional comments conveying similar concerns. Some Council members also apparently requested a rephrasing of the paragraph’s language to remove the linkage between the proposed benchmarks and UNISFA’s future automatic withdrawal.
Given several Council members’ reservations over this operative language, the penholder made some modifications to the second revised draft. For instance, the penholder added language that “reaffirms that any decision regarding the mission’s future will remain subject to the Council’s determination”.
Several Council members nonetheless remained concerned about some of the provisions in the text, which prompted Algeria to request closed consultations before the vote on Thursday. It seems that during the consultations, the A3 Plus members, China, Russia, and Pakistan requested to weaken the linkage between the proposed benchmarks and UNISFA’s mandate, as well as to eliminate the term “authorities” following a reference to Sudan and South Sudan in relation to their role in implementing the benchmarks.
Later on Thursday, the penholder circulated a third revised text and put it in blue. While the text did not change the language linking UNISFA’s mandate to the proposed benchmarks, it referenced the need for Sudan and South Sudan to make demonstrable progress against the benchmarks, without using the term “authorities”. The penholder also made amendments to language on the freedom of movement for UNISFA and JBVMM patrols. While the second revised draft called for the removal of the South Sudan National Police checkpoint at Panakuac, the draft text in blue calls more broadly for preventing restrictions on JBVMM movements beyond the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) without referencing the police checkpoint.
It appears that another key point of contention during the negotiations concerned the deletion of previously included language on certain thematic areas, such as women, peace and security (WPS) and climate change. Regarding WPS elements, it seems that the US removed references, that were present in resolution 2760, to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and replaced them with text on “violence against women and girls” in the initial draft of the resolution. Similarly, the penholder in certain parts of the text deleted or changed references to gender, removing the phrases “gender responsive” and “gender sensitive” in some instances. In other cases, it seems that the penholder changed this language and instead used references to “women and girls”, replacing “gender” in “gender advisor” and “gender considerations” with “women and girls advisor” and “considerations of all women and girls”, among other revisions. The penholder also proposed the deletion of operative language concerning the “provision of gender and child protection advisors” to Abyei as well as critical support services to women, including “medical, sexual and reproductive health, psychosocial support”, among other services.
It also appears that the qualifier “as applicable” was added by the penholder in preambular references concerning respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) and violations of international law, particularly IHL and international human rights law, which apparently raised concerns among some Council members about inserting language implying potential limitations on the applicability of IHL.
It seems that the European Council members as well as like-minded members such as Panama and the ROK strongly opposed these suggested revisions and coordinated efforts to stress the importance of fully retaining previously agreed-upon thematic language on WPS. In particular, the deletion of language regarding the provision of gender and child protection advisors apparently raised considerable concern, with many stressing the negative implications that this would have on the ground.
Additionally, in the initial draft text, the penholder either deleted references to climate change in one instance or revised it to “environmental and seasonal factors” in another, accompanied by the proposed addition of “during the rainy season”. Several Council members also apparently opposed these proposed revisions, noting the adverse effects of severe flooding on the stability of Abyei and the broader region. It appears that the A3 Plus members strongly supported the retention of language related climate change, as well as to WPS.
In the first revised text, the penholder did not address the concerns raised by some Council members about the proposed deletion and revisions of previously agreed-upon thematic language. As such, the first revised text apparently contained the same language found in the initial draft related to WPS and climate change, as well as the addition of the qualifier “as applicable” concerning IHL.
Many Council members expressed discontent with the revised text and reiterated their request for the retention of the thematic language on WPS, climate change, and IHL. It appears that a compromise has been reached between the penholder and Council members regarding the language related to IHL. However, language concerning WPS and climate change was not fully restored in certain areas of the draft text in the blue. For instance, while the reference to “the provision of gender and child protection advisers to Abyei where their expertise is urgently needed” was maintained in the draft resolution in blue, the phrases “gender responsive” and “gender sensitive” were not included. Text on the provision of critical support services to women was also not retained.
________________________________________________________________
*Post-script (13 November, 5:50 PM): Before the vote on the draft resolution, Algeria on behalf of the “A3 Plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) requested to hold informal consultations to further discuss the text. In light of issues raised by Council members during the consultations, the penholder decided to postpone the vote to the following day (14 November) to allow more time for deliberations among Council members.
**Post-script (14 November, 12:30 PM): After the story’s publication, the vote on the draft resolution was postponed and the draft in blue was amended. The original story was revised to reflect these developments.
***Post-script (17 November): On 14 November, the Security Council adopted resolution 2802, renewing the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) for another year, until 15 November 2026. The text received 12 votes in favour and three abstentions (China, Pakistan, and Russia).
In their explanations of vote, China, Pakistan, and Russia emphasised UNISFA’s positive contribution to promoting stability in Abyei and reiterated their concern over the linking of the mission’s renewal to the implementation of the benchmarks outlined in the resolution. In particular, Pakistan and Russia stressed that conditioning UNISFA’s renewal on such objectives is unrealistic as the fate of the mission is being made contingent not on its performance, but on external factors beyond mission’s control.
Guyana, on behalf of the A3 Plus grouping (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana), expressed serious concerns over “unrealistic benchmarks that could question the future renewal of UNISFA’s mandate”. It maintained that the A3 Plus members only voted in favour to ensure the mission’s preservation, especially amid the current situations in Abyei and the broader region.
