The Middle East, including the Palestinian Question: Vote on a Draft Resolution to Authorise an International Stabilization Force in Gaza*
Tomorrow afternoon (17 November) at 5 pm, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution authored by the US that welcomes the establishment of a Board of Peace (BoP) as a “transitional governance administration” in Gaza and authorises the BoP to establish a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in the enclave. The draft text in blue authorises both entities until 31 December 2027, “subject to further action by the Council”.
Background
The BoP and the ISF were first outlined in the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict” (also known as the “20-point plan”) that US President Donald Trump announced in late September. The first phase of the plan, which Israel and Hamas agreed to on 8 October, established the current ceasefire in Gaza and called for Hamas to release the remaining hostages that it was holding in exchange for the release of Palestinian detainees, a partial withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from Gaza, and an increase in humanitarian aid into the territory. At the time of writing, Hamas had released all living hostages and the remains of most deceased ones, while Israel had released Palestinian detainees at an agreed ratio and re-deployed to an initial withdrawal line. The ceasefire remains fragile, however, as both sides have accused the other of violating the terms of the agreement and humanitarian aid delivery, while increasing, is still subject to Israeli restrictions.
Under the Comprehensive Plan, the parties are to advance from the completion of the first stage to a second stage that calls for the decommissioning of Hamas’ weapons; the further withdrawal of the IDF, which will progressively hand over security responsibility for Gaza to the ISF; and the establishment of an interim technocratic government in Gaza comprising Palestinian and international experts under the oversight of the BoP, which will be chaired by Trump. This body is to eventually cede control of Gaza to a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA), at which point “the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood”.
According to media reports, the US aims to deploy the first contingents of the ISF by January 2026, envisioning a peace enforcement mission—rather than a peacekeeping presence—with a total troop size of approximately 20,000. The US is apparently in talks with several countries including Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Qatar, and Türkiye about contributing personnel to the force, which would not be a UN operation. These countries have reportedly conveyed the need for a Security Council mandate for the ISF to allow them to contribute troops, although some analysts have expressed reservations concerning the terms and legal foundation of the force even if formally authorised by the Council. Meanwhile, the status of negotiations on several other provisions of the second phase of the Comprehensive Plan—which include demands that both Hamas and Israel have publicly rejected in the past—were unclear at the time of writing.
Negotiations on the Draft Resolution
It seems that the negotiations on the draft resolution were challenging, although they proceeded relatively quickly. The US apparently indicated that it sought a swift adoption and could only consider limited revisions to the text since its overall scope was already determined by the Comprehensive Plan. On 5 November, the US formally briefed all elected Council members as well as Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on its initial draft text. The US then convened all Council members for one round of negotiations on the text on 6 November, inviting written comments until the following day. On 10 November, the penholder circulated a revised draft and put it under silence procedure until 11 November. Algeria, China, and Russia broke silence, and several other members submitted additional comments. On 12 November, the US put a second revised draft under silence procedure, which China and Russia again broke.
On 13 November, Russia introduced an alternative draft text and convened consultations on its draft on the following day. Russia then requested written comments from Council members by Monday (17 November). Concurrently, the US put its second revised draft in blue without changes and requested a vote by Monday as well.
The US-authored draft text in blue endorses the Comprehensive Plan and welcomes the establishment of the BoP as a transitional governance administration “with international legal personality”, responsible for setting the framework for the redevelopment of Gaza pursuant to the Comprehensive Plan until the PA has “satisfactorily” completed its reform programme. The draft text in blue describes the BoP’s governance and reconstruction responsibilities, mandating it to oversee a technocratic Palestinian committee responsible for day-to-day administration; coordinate public services and humanitarian assistance; and implement economic recovery and redevelopment programmes. It also encourages international financial support for reconstruction, requesting the World Bank and other institutions to establish a donor-governed trust fund dedicated to Gaza’s redevelopment.
On the security track, the draft text in blue authorises the BoP to establish the ISF under a unified command acceptable to the BoP, with forces contributed by participating states, in close consultation and cooperation with Egypt and Israel, and to use all necessary measures to carry out its mandate consistent with international law, including international humanitarian law. The draft resolution in blue mandates the ISF to assist in monitoring the ceasefire in Gaza; secure border areas; protect civilians, including humanitarian operations; support the demilitarisation process, including the destruction of military infrastructure and the permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups; train and support vetted Palestinian police units; and to undertake “such additional tasks as may be necessary” in support of the Comprehensive Plan. The draft text in blue states that both the BoP and the ISF will be funded through voluntary contributions and remain authorised until 31 December 2027, with any extension of the ISF requiring full cooperation and coordination with Egypt, Israel, and other participating states.
During the negotiations on the draft resolution, it seems that Council members had several questions and concerns about the transitional framework that it outlined. Among other issues, many members apparently sought more information about the powers and composition of the BoP, expressing reservations about endowing the entity with such broad authority without robust oversight mechanisms, agreed membership, and a clearly benchmarked transitional period. Many members also requested a stronger role for the PA during the transition, stressing the importance of its consent as a condition for the establishment of the BoP and deployment of the ISF, as well as defined and verifiable conditions for the “satisfactory completion” of its reform programme. In addition, members apparently requested language reaffirming the two-state solution as the guiding principle for the international community’s efforts to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Regarding the ISF, it seems that several members requested more detailed information about its proposed terms of engagement, including whether it would be mandated to forcibly disarm Hamas if the group did not agree to do so voluntarily. Relatedly, some members apparently suggested language explicitly stating that the Security Council was acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which concerns the use of force. It appears that some members also sought language specifying clearer steps for the IDF’s withdrawal and hand-over of security responsibility to the ISF.
It seems that the US made some limited changes in the first revised draft in response to these concerns. It added language specifying that the BoP would operate in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles and requested it to submit a written report to the Security Council every six months. With regard to PA reform, the penholder included in the revised draft a reference to the New York Declaration on the two-state solution, which was adopted following a 28-30 July high-level conference co-chaired by France and Saudi Arabia and specifies certain areas of reform to which the PA has committed. On the topic of the IDF’s withdrawal, the revised draft incorporated language from the Comprehensive Plan—which was already annexed to the text—stating that the IDF would “withdraw from the Gaza Strip based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors, and the United States, save for a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat”. Additionally, the US deleted language in a paragraph on humanitarian aid stating that any organisation found to have misused aid would be ineligible to provide continued or future assistance—a provision that was perceived to target the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which Israel has accused of complicity with Hamas, although the Agency strongly denies that charge. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) presented an advisory opinion on 22 October rejecting the allegation and reminding Israel of its obligation to cooperate in good faith with the UN.
Algeria, China, and Russia broke silence on the first revised draft, contending that it did not sufficiently address their concerns. These apparently included continued ambiguity regarding the powers, composition, and mandate of the BoP and the ISF, as well as the lack of an empowered role for the PA and of references to the two-state solution. In its second revised draft, it seems that the main change made by the US sought to address the latter objection, as it added new language—also from the Comprehensive Plan—stating that “conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood” after the PA has completed its reform programme and Gaza’s redevelopment has advanced.
China and Russia broke silence on the second revised draft too, maintaining their objections, and Russia then circulated its alternative text. The Russian draft resolution does not mention the BoP and requests the Secretary-General to submit a report with options for the deployment of the ISF. In response, the US issued a joint statement with Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and the UAE expressing support for the US draft—a position also echoed by the PA. Russia issued its own statement contending that the objective of its text was to “amend the US concept so as to bring it into full conformity with long-standing and previously agreed decisions” of the Security Council, adding that “our document does not contradict the American initiative”.
During the informal consultations on that draft held on 14 November, certain Council members—such as Algeria and China—apparently expressed some support for the Russian text, but it seems that most other Council members argued that efforts should remain focused on the US-penned draft. The US subsequently placed its second revised draft in blue and requested a vote by 17 November. Russia requested written comments on its draft by the same day but has not requested a vote at the time of writing.
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**Post-script: On 17 November, the Security Council adopted resolution 2803, welcoming the establishment of a Board of Peace (BoP) and authorising the BoP to establish a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza. It received 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia).
In their explanations of vote, China and Russia reiterated several of the concerns that they had previously expressed during negotiations on the draft text. Despite these objections, however, Russia said that it had chosen not to table its alternative draft due to the positions that the Palestinian Authority (PA) and several Arab-Muslim countries had expressed in support of the US text “so as to avoid renewed bloodshed in the enclave”.
