Briefing: Peace Consolidation in West Africa
Tomorrow morning (18 November), the Security Council will hold a briefing on “Enhancing Regional Counter-Terrorism Cooperation in West Africa and the Sahel”, under the agenda item “Peace consolidation in West Africa”. Sierra Leone, November’s Council president, has chosen to convene this meeting. Sierra Leonean President Julius Maada Bio, who is also currently the Chairperson of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), will chair the meeting. Secretary-General António Guterres and ECOWAS Commission President Omar Alieu Touray are expected to brief.
One of Sierra Leone’s aims in holding this meeting is to build on the informal interactive dialogue (IID) that it convened on 15 July on enhancing regional counter-terrorism cooperation in West Africa and the Sahel. (For more information, see our 14 July What’s in Blue story.) According to a concept note circulated by Sierra Leone, tomorrow’s meeting seeks to mobilise international support for regional initiatives that promote long-term stabilisation by addressing the root causes of insecurity. Sierra Leone, which assumed the rotating ECOWAS presidency in June, has made the situation in West Africa and the Sahel a key priority of its engagement at the Security Council, where it serves as co-penholder on the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) together with Denmark.
The security situation in several countries in West Africa and the Sahel has significantly deteriorated in recent months. Armed and terrorist groups have intensified their attacks, displaying greater sophistication through the use of advanced weaponry. In Mali, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaida affiliate, has been carrying out attacks near the capital, Bamako, and blocking fuel supplies to the capital and other regions of the country. This has further undermined security, leading to a severe fuel crisis and school closures, among other things. The situation appears to have placed mounting pressure on the military government led by Assimi Goïta in Bamako and raised concerns about the capital’s growing vulnerability. Several Western countries—including Canada, France, and the US—have reportedly issued travel advisories urging their citizens to avoid all travel to Mali and for those already in the country to leave. Côte d’Ivoire has reportedly strengthened security along its border with Mali following an influx of refugees from the country.
There are apparently growing concerns that the situation in Mali could have a domino effect on other Sahelian states, particularly Burkina Faso and Niger. Since the beginning of the year, Burkina Faso has faced a worsening security environment marked by frequent attacks from militant Islamist groups, resulting in high civilian and military casualties as well as massive population displacement. Reports indicate that terrorist groups continue to regularly raid towns such as Djibo in northern Burkina Faso, imposing blockades that deprive residents of food and other essential supplies. In neighbouring Niger, the Tillabéri region bordering Mali and Burkina Faso has experienced a sharp increase in terrorist attacks. For instance, in September, 22 people—most of whom were attending a baptism ceremony in Tillabéri—were killed by unidentified gunmen.
Sierra Leone’s concept note says that these developments have turned the Sahel into the “global epicentre of terrorism”, with the threat increasingly spreading to coastal West Africa. The concept note highlights several normative frameworks developed over the years to address terrorism and organised crime, as well as ongoing cooperation between the UN and the African Union (AU) in this area. It also references Security Council resolution 2719 of 21 February 2023 on the financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs). Efforts to activate this framework in the case of Somalia faced a setback in May. Sierra Leone appears to be interested in exploring UN support for other regional initiatives within the framework of this resolution, but discussions on applying it to support counter-terrorism operations in West Africa and the Sahel have so far gained little traction at the Security Council.
Nonetheless, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel and Head of UNOWAS Leonardo Santos Simão has previously raised this possibility in his briefings to the Council. In this connection, ECOWAS is exploring the operationalisation of its standby force to address the growing threat of terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel. On 7 July 2024, the ECOWAS summit in Abuja directed Touray to consult with the AU on resource mobilisation opportunities, particularly within the framework of resolution 2719. In their second joint consultative meeting on 16 May, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and ECOWAS’ Mediation and Security Council agreed to expedite the operationalisation of the AU standby force and the ECOWAS standby force.
Several countries in the region—Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo—also launched the Accra Initiative in 2017, a security cooperation mechanism aimed at combating terrorism, violent extremism, and transnational organised crime. Ghana, which led the efforts of the three African members of the Security Council known as the A3 (then Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique) in facilitating the adoption of resolution 2719, was apparently keen to mobilise support for the Accra Initiative. It appears that the mechanism is facing challenges not only because of funding gaps but also due to strained relations among its member states.
In addition, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)—a regional security coalition comprising forces from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria—has been operating since 2015 with a mandate to combat Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad Basin. However, the MNJTF faced a setback after Niger announced its withdrawal from the force in March. AUPSC members have apparently raised concerns that this development has exposed the force’s northern flank, thus increasing the risk of arms proliferation and the unchecked movement of terrorist groups into the area.
In October, Security Council members had an opportunity to exchange views with the AUPSC on the situations in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin during their 19th annual joint consultative meeting, held in Addis Ababa. (For more information, see our 20 October What’s in Blue story.) The issue was also raised during the ninth annual UN-AU conference, held in New York on 12 November. This annual meeting, which alternates between New York and Addis Ababa, brings together senior leadership from both organisations—including the UN Secretary-General and the AU Chairperson—to review progress in implementing the various cooperation frameworks between the two institutions. Following the meeting, Guterres stated at a press briefing that “[t]he developments in Mali, including the fuel blockade, make a dire situation even worse, posing new risks to the wider region and the entire continent”. It seems that Guterres also briefed on the situation in the country during his monthly lunch with Council members on 14 November.
In a 9 November press statement, AU Commission Chairperson Mahamoud Ali Youssouf also expressed deep concern over the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Mali. He called for a robust, coordinated, and coherent international response to counter terrorism and violent extremism in the Sahel, emphasising the need for enhanced cooperation, intelligence sharing, and sustained support to affected states.
Sierra Leone’s concept note suggests several questions to help guide the discussion at tomorrow’s meeting, including:
- what practical steps are needed to strengthen operational and intelligence coordination among Sahelian and West African states?
- how can resolution 2719 be operationalised to provide support for counter-terrorism and stabilisation operations?
- what are the mechanisms that can effectively link security operations to immediate stabilisation, rapid-impact projects, restoration of governance and justice services, to prevent terrorist re-infiltration and recruitment?
- what further actions are needed to disrupt terrorist financing and logistics, including illicit natural minerals, drugs, arms and human smuggling?
At tomorrow’s meeting, Guterres may focus on the latest developments in West Africa and the Sahel since the Council last held a meeting on the issue in August. Touray may take the opportunity to reflect on the achievements and challenges of ECOWAS, which is marking its 50th anniversary this year. He may also highlight ongoing efforts by ECOWAS to fight terrorism and other security threats. Additionally, Touray might refer to diplomatic engagements with the three Sahelian states—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—which decided to withdraw their membership from the regional bloc.
While Council members are concerned about the growing terrorist threat in West Africa and the Sahel, they appear to have differing views on the geopolitical context. The US and European members tend to voice concern over Russia’s expanding influence in the region, while Russia maintains that the current security challenges in West Africa and the Sahel are rooted in Western interference. In recent years, Moscow has enlarged its footprint in the region through bilateral defence agreements with the Sahelian states. In light of the recent escalation of the situation in Mali, a delegation led by Russian Deputy Minister of Defence Yunus-Bek Yevkurov was reportedly in Mali last week to discuss military-technical cooperation and exchange views on regional security in the Sahel.
