Syria: Briefing and Consultations
Tomorrow morning (22 October), the Security Council will hold its monthly open briefing and closed consultations on the political and humanitarian situations in Syria. Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Najat Rochdi and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Director of Coordination Ramesh Rajasingham are the anticipated briefers.
Despite several positive developments, including Syria’s restoration of ties with the international community—demonstrated by Syrian interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa’s historic participation in the General Debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in September—tensions within the country remain high, as various armed groups struggle for political representation and territorial control during Syria’s political transition.
At tomorrow’s meeting, Council members are likely to discuss recent developments and escalations between the Syrian interim authorities and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led group that controls a large portion of Syria’s resource-rich northeast territory. On 10 March, the two parties signed an agreement seeking to integrate the SDF into interim government-run institutions by the end of the year, in line with Damascus’ priority to pursue disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) efforts and extend its authority over all of Syria’s territory. Implementation of the agreement has been lacking, however, and clashes between the two sides have occurred. A core issue is that the SDF has called for a secular and decentralised state and maintains that the 14 March transitional constitutional declaration does not represent Syria’s diversity and concentrates too much authority with the interim president.
Most recently, on 6 October, clashes broke out between the interim government’s forces and SDF fighters in Aleppo, reportedly resulting in the deaths of at least one government soldier and one civilian. The next day, Syria’s defence minister, Murhaf Abu Qasra, announced a “comprehensive ceasefire across all fronts” between the two parties, following talks which were reportedly brokered by the US and included Sharaa and the SDF’s commander, Mazloum Abdi. In a 12 October interview, Abdi said that the two sides had reached a “preliminary agreement” on integrating the SDF into Syria’s defence and interior ministries.
At tomorrow’s meeting, Rochdi and Council members are likely to emphasise the need for the parties to prioritise further de-escalation and to advance the implementation of the 10 March agreement, with a view to strengthening Syrian national unity. The US and France, in particular, have been engaged on this issue as part of their diplomatic efforts to mediate between the two parties.
Council members are likely to echo similar messages regarding the situation in Suweida—a governorate in south-west Syria which experienced deadly clashes between Druze militias and Bedouin tribes in July. The situation escalated that month following the deployment of the Syrian interim authorities’ security forces to Suweida and Israel’s subsequent airstrikes targeting Syrian security forces and buildings, including in Damascus. Following a ceasefire brokered by the US, the situation on the ground has relatively calmed down. Tensions remain high, however, as some Druze groups believe the new Syrian government has neglected to sufficiently include minorities in the political transition and are reportedly calling for self-determination and autonomy. Druze leaders have also rejected a roadmap aimed at resolving the crisis, which was agreed upon by the Syrian interim government, Jordan, and the US on 16 September.
Rajasingham may brief Council members on the humanitarian effects of the continued tensions in southern Syria. He might note that, although OCHA has successfully led several humanitarian missions to the region, the volatile security situation continues to impact humanitarian access and the protection of affected populations. Rajasingham may further speak about the disruptions to essential services in the region across food, health, agriculture, and education sectors and about how funding shortages are impeding efforts to provide humanitarian assistance.
Against the backdrop of sectarian tensions in the country, speakers at tomorrow’s meeting are expected to reiterate that advancing full inclusion, transitional justice, and reconciliation efforts and making progress on the issue of missing persons are central to the success of the political transition in Syria. They may also underline the need for Damascus to pursue credible, transparent, and comprehensive accountability efforts, echoing the Council’s 10 August presidential statement adopted in response to the crisis in Suweida.
The situation has been further complicated due to actions taken by Israel since Sharaa took power in December 2024. Israel has expanded its control of territory in the Golan, conducted hundreds of airstrikes and incursions into Syrian territory, and demanded the de-militarisation of southern Syria, actions which Israel claims are aimed at ensuring its national security and protecting the Druze community from sectarian violence. The US is reportedly brokering talks between the Israelis and Syrians on establishing a new security pact. (For more information, see the briefs on Syria and the UN Disengagement Observer Force [UNDOF] in our October 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
Council members may refer positively to these discussions, encouraging diplomatic solutions to security issues in southern Syria, based on the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between the two parties, that would ensure full respect for Syrian sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. Some members may voice stronger criticism of Israeli actions—the “A3 Plus” grouping (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana), China, Pakistan, Russia, and Slovenia have all condemned Israel’s interventions in Syria in recent months—and demand that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) immediately retreat to the lines established by the 1974 agreement.
Speakers may also raise concerns regarding the threat of terrorism and the resurgence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) in Syria. Most recently, according to Syria’s state news agency SANA, a 16 October terrorist attack on a Ministry of Energy transport bus in Deir ez-Zor killed four people and injured nine others. At the time of writing, no group has claimed responsibility for the attack. Council members may express concern that terrorist groups are emboldened by the fragile security situation in Syria and pose a threat to the stability of the political transition, while calling on the interim government to prioritise and intensify its counterterrorism efforts.
Some members may refer to Council negotiations which are currently underway on a draft resolution that seeks to apply carve-outs to the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida sanctions regime aimed at facilitating economic engagement with the Syrian interim government. The US, the penholder on the file, proposed the draft text. While some members, such as the UK and the US, have in previous Syria meetings emphasised the need for the Security Council to take steps to support Syria’s political transition, other members, such as China, have cautioned the Council to carefully consider the implications of adjustments to UN sanctions related to Syria.
Another expected main focus of tomorrow’s meeting is the elections held on 5 October for the People’s Assembly of Syria, during which 119 representatives were elected indirectly through electoral colleges. According to the Higher Committee for People’s Assembly Elections, voting was postponed in Suweida, al-Hasakah, and Raqqa due to security and political issues, leaving vacant 21 seats, which will be filled once conditions permit. The remaining one third of the 210 planned seats are to be chosen directly by Sharaa.
Council members might welcome the holding of elections—which are the first to take place since Sharaa took power—and frame them as a positive step in the political transition process. At the same time, some members might raise concerns about the lack of diversity of the elected representatives—the majority of elected members are Sunni Muslims and male, with only 13 percent of seats won by women and minorities—and about the fact that elections did not take place in three governorates. These Council members may also call for more inclusivity in the candidate selection for the remaining vacant seats.
Rochdi is likely to focus part of her briefing on the crucial role of Syrian women in an inclusive political transition process, framed within the context of the 25th anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1325 of 31 October 2000, the first Security Council resolution on women, peace and security (WPS). She may brief about the outreach conducted by the Special Envoy’s Office with Syrian women’s groups throughout the recent months of transition. Some Council members are also expected to focus on this issue and stress the importance of women enjoying full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation to ensure a successful political transition in the country.
Speakers are also likely to make broader statements on the need to support Syria in achieving security, national unity, and in advancing its economic recovery and reconstruction. Members are also likely to underline the importance for the UN to have a key role in the political transition.
