Somalia: Private Meeting
Tomorrow morning (8 October), the Security Council will convene for a private meeting on Somalia. Special Representative for Somalia and Head of the UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS) James Swan will brief on the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2025/613) on the implementation of the mandates of UNTMIS and the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). The report was circulated to Council members on 30 September and covers developments from 24 March to 23 September.
Additionally, Special Representative of the African Union (AU) Commission Chairperson (SRCC) for Somalia and Head of the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) El Hadji Ibrahima Diene will update the Council on the implementation of the mission’s mandate, in accordance with resolution 2767 of 27 December 2024. The chair of the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Eloy Alfaro de Alba (Panama), is also expected to brief on the committee’s work.
Tomorrow, Swan is expected to update Council members on progress in UNTMIS’ transition process. The Secretary-General’s report notes that all UNTMIS tasks to be undertaken in the first phase of the transition had been fully handed over to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and/or the UN Country Team (UNCT). An FGS-UN joint technical committee convened a series of thematic workshops in July to inform the development of the roadmap for the final phase of the transition. These workshops brought together relevant stakeholders to prepare for the handover of the mission’s remaining tasks in the following groups: transformative governance, elections, human rights and protection, and security sector, rule of law, justice, and corrections. The outcomes informed an executive summary and operational roadmap, which set out modalities and timelines for the handover of all remaining tasks by October 2026, subject to and in line with relevant decisions of the Council.
In the last few months, there have been notable political developments amid ongoing tensions between the federal government and the federal member states of Puntland and Jubaland. In May, several key opposition figures and political leaders established a coalition, known as the “Somali Salvation Forum” (SSF), led by former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. After several rounds of talks without a breakthrough on constitutional reforms and upcoming elections, differences over the electoral framework and constitutional amendments led to the formation of a splinter faction. On 25 August, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the splinter faction of the SSF signed an electoral framework agreement, committing both sides to advancing the transition to universal suffrage (one person, one vote) elections for local councils, state assemblies, and the federal parliament. (For background and more information, see the brief on Somalia in our October 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
According to the Secretary-General’s report, Jubaland forces clashed with FGS forces in Beled Hawa, Gedo region, following the arrival of Abdirashid Janan, the regional intelligence chief newly appointed by the federal government and a known opponent of Jubaland’s president, Ahmed Madobe. The clashes, which began on 22 July, continued intermittently in Beled Hawa and Doollow until 11 August. By mid-August, federal security forces had taken full control of Beled Hawa.
In a bid to ease tensions, Mohamud travelled to Kismayo earlier this month to meet with Madobe. The meeting, reportedly facilitated by Kenya, was the first of its kind since tensions escalated following the indirect elections in Jubaland in November 2024, after which Jubaland withdrew from meetings of the National Consultative Council. However, media reports indicate that the talks ended without concrete outcomes, as key differences surrounding the November 2024 elections persist.
Tomorrow, speakers might address these developments in the context of the complex security landscape in Somalia. They are also likely to raise the persistent threat posed by Al-Shabaab (a terrorist group affiliated with Al-Qaida) and its continued ability to challenge state authority and destabilise key regions. Since launching an offensive earlier this year, Al-Shabaab has gained ground in the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions and parts of the Hiiraan region, reversing the progress made during the offensive led by Somali forces in 2022-23, with its reach extending to Mogadishu.
On 4 October, Al-Shabaab attacked a high-security prison in the central Mogadishu district of Bondhere, located near the Somali presidential palace. The facility, apparently manned by Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), holds Al-Shabaab militants and other high-profile detainees. The assault reportedly began with a suicide car bomb disguised as a NISA vehicle, followed by gunmen dressed as Somali security personnel who entered the facility, attacked guards, freed prisoners, and temporarily seized control of the premises. The attack occurred just hours after the federal government removed several long-standing roadblocks in Mogadishu, which had been in place for security reasons. Somali security forces regained control of the facility after a six-hour siege by the militants.
Members are also expected to express concern about the country’s deteriorating humanitarian situation, driven by ongoing conflict, mass displacement, recurrent climate shocks, and disease outbreaks. According to the latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) report, published on 23 September, between October and December, the food security situation is projected to worsen, with 4.4 million people expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity, including 3.4 million in “crisis” (IPC Phase 3) and 921,000 in “emergency” (IPC Phase 4). The report also projects that 1.85 million children are expected to suffer acute malnutrition between July and June 2026, including nearly 421,000 who may experience severe acute malnutrition (SAM).
The situation has been further compounded by a decline in funding for humanitarian operations. At the time of writing, Somalia’s 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, which requires $1.42 billion, is only 21.1 percent funded. In a 3 October press release, the World Food Programme (WFP) announced that, due to critical funding shortfalls, it will reduce the number of people receiving emergency food assistance to 350,000 in November, down from 1.1 million in August.
Diene is expected to brief on AUSSOM’s support for ongoing Somali-led operations against Al-Shabaab and provide an update on the mission’s mandate implementation and transition priorities. In June, AUSSOM and Somali forces launched a joint operation in Lower Shabelle, codenamed “Operation Silent Storm”, to reassert control over the villages of Sabiid and Anole and secure supply routes southwest of Mogadishu. In August, AUSSOM and Somali forces carried out a week-long operation to retake Bariire in Lower Shabelle, regaining control of the town and killing over 100 militants. In a 5 October press statement, AUSSOM announced that its troops, alongside Somali forces, have recaptured Awdheegle town in Lower Shabelle.
The Secretary-General’s report describes significant challenges posed by limited availability of funds in sustaining support for Somali forces. Due to financial constraints, UNSOS support for the additional 2,000 Somali security forces, authorised pursuant to Security Council resolution 2741 of 28 June 2024, remains on hold until adequate funding is mobilised for the UNSOS-administered trust fund.
On 25 September, the FGS, the AU, the UK, and the UN co-hosted a high-level event on AUSSOM financing on the sidelines of the General Debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in New York. The event aimed to mobilise support for the mission’s operational requirements, enable the FGS and AUSSOM to further degrade Al-Shabaab and support Somali security forces in assuming full security responsibilities, and secure sustainable and predictable financing for AUSSOM.
Pursuant to resolution 2767, the UN, jointly with the AU and the FGS, is mandated to undertake regular joint technical assessments of progress made, including against the benchmarks outlined in the AU-UN joint report of 26 November 2024, to inform the Council’s decision on the authorisation of AUSSOM’s subsequent phases. The Council requested a briefing on the matter by 30 September, including on an updated exit strategy for AUSSOM. In a 2 October letter, the Secretary-General noted that additional time is required to finalise the report and requested an extension until 30 October, which was subsequently granted by the Council.
