Haiti: Vote on a Draft Resolution Renewing the Sanctions Regime*
Tomorrow afternoon (17 October), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing the sanctions regime on Haiti for one year.* An annex to the draft text in blue adds four individuals to the 2653 sanctions list. The draft resolution was authored by Panama and the US, the co-penholders on Haiti.
Background
On 21 October 2022, in response to the multidimensional crisis in Haiti, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2653, establishing a sanctions regime on Haiti that included targeted assets freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo measures. Resolution 2699 of 2 October 2023—which authorised member states to form and deploy a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to Haiti—later expanded the arms embargo from targeted measures applying to designated individuals to a territorial embargo covering the country as a whole. Subsequently, the entire sanctions regime was renewed twice, most recently through resolution 2752 of 18 October 2024.
The sanctions regime’s designation criteria include engaging in or supporting criminal activities and violence involving armed groups and criminal networks; supporting trafficking and diversion of arms and related materiel, or related illicit financial flows; acting in violation of the arms embargo; planning, directing, or committing violations or abuses of international human rights law (IHRL); planning, directing, or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV); obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and attacking UN personnel or their premises.
The 2653 Haiti Sanctions Committee most recently met on 15 September to discuss the final report of its Panel of Experts (PoE), which had yet to be made public at the time of writing. Nevertheless, according to the Secretary-General’s 18 September report on progress on key benchmarks established by the Council to assess the continuing appropriateness of the measures imposed under the Haiti sanctions regime, the situation has continued to deteriorate in relation to all benchmarks, with gang violence reaching “unprecedented levels” amid pervasive impunity and corruption. As most recently established by resolution 2752, the benchmarks concern the Haitian government’s judicial and rule of law capacity to address armed groups and criminal activities; reduction in violence by armed groups and criminal networks, including the number of intentional homicides, kidnappings, and incidents of SGBV; and reduction in incidents of trafficking and diversion of arms, as well as in illicit financial flows.
The Secretary-General’s report notes that the sanctions regime as a whole “continued to have a limited impact, with ongoing violations of its measures”. It stresses that “trafficking of weapons and other illicit goods continued unabated” with only “limited” enforcement of the arms embargo. The Secretary-General urged UN member states to “ensure the full implementation of the arms embargo” and called on the 2653 Haiti Sanctions Committee to “consider the expansion of the sanctions list to include the political and economic actors who support the gangs and continue to profit from their illegal activities”.
For background and more information, see the brief on Haiti in our September 2025 Monthly Forecast.
Negotiations on the Draft Resolution
Although there is general agreement among Council members on the need to renew the sanctions regime, negotiations on the draft resolution were apparently complicated. Panama and the US circulated an initial draft on 7 October and convened a read-through of the text on 8 October. Following the submission of written comments by Council members, the co-penholders circulated a revised draft on Tuesday (14 October) and put it under silence procedure until the following day. Silence was broken by China and Russia, after which other members sent comments. A second revised draft was put in blue on 16 October, to be voted on tomorrow. On 17 October, the vote, which was scheduled for the morning session, was postponed to the afternoon to allow more time for discussion among Council members. The draft in blue was subsequently amended to address some members’ concerns.
The draft resolution in blue renews the Haiti sanctions regime for one year—including the arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze—and the mandate of the PoE assisting the 2653 Haiti Sanctions Committee for 13 months. Some operative paragraphs have been updated to include references to the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) and the UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) which the Council authorised on 30 September through resolution 2793. For instance, the draft text in blue affirms that the exemptions to the arms embargo established under the sanctions regime also apply to the GSF and the UNSOH.
A key point of contention during the negotiations concerned new preambular language on the MSS mission, the GSF, and the UNSOH, including references “welcoming the establishment” of the UNSOH and the authorisation of the GSF, and recognising that the MSS mission “lacked the requisite resources and mandate” to address rising gang violence. It seems that China and Russia asked for this language to be removed, noting that, while they had abstained on resolution 2793, allowing that text to pass, they had raised several concerns regarding the GSF during the negotiations of the resolution and in their explanations of vote. Additionally, at least one of these members apparently maintained that the language introduced by the co-penholders was not strictly related to the sanctions regime.
It seems that the retention of these references in the first revised draft was the main issue that led China and Russia to break silence on 15 October. In an apparent compromise, the co-penholders removed the contentious preambular references in the draft resolution currently in blue.
It seems that the annex to the first version of the draft resolution contained the names of four individuals to be added to the sanctions list. While the 2653 Sanctions Committee process for adding new designations to the list requires any new listing to pass a written no-objection procedure, when designations are made through a Security Council resolution, the regular rules for adopting a resolution on substantive matters (nine affirmative votes and no vetoes) apply. This means that designations can potentially be made by the Council even in the absence of consensus.
It seems that Russia expressed reservations over some of the names proposed for designation. Consistent with the position it has taken in previous negotiations and citing the expected elections in Haiti in 2026, Russia apparently noted that it does not support the designation of political figures under the 2653 sanctions regime. Russia also apparently maintained that Council members had not been given sufficient time to consider the four proposed designations, and expressed a preference for taking a consensual approach to decisions on new listings. It seems that China shared some of these concerns, arguing in favour of adopting a consensus-based approach on adding new names to the sanctions list. On the other hand, France apparently expressed support for the new designations and proposed three additional names to be added to the list.
The draft resolution that was put in blue on 16 October retained the four names originally proposed by the co-penholders—Rony Célestin, Youri Latortue, Dimitri Herard, and Kempes Sanon. The four names were accompanied by the reasons for their listing. It seems that the co-penholders cited as a reason to retain the four names support for the listings of these individuals from a majority of Council members when meeting in their capacity as members of the 2653 Haiti Sanctions Committee. This issue apparently remained a sticking point. After additional discussions with Council members, the penholders revised the draft in blue on 17 October to only mention two of the names: Dimitri Herard and Kempes Sanon.**
It seems that during the negotiations, Guyana, on behalf of the “A3 Plus” grouping (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana), and China put forward several edits to strengthen language on the arms embargo. For instance, following a proposal by China, new language was apparently added calling on member states—including those planning to transfer to the Haitian authorities firearms, ammunition, and related materiel—to “support those authorities in strengthening their weapons and ammunition management capacities, in order to mitigate potential diversions” through measures such as enhanced stockpile management and post-delivery controls.
The A3 Plus apparently proposed adding language affirming that, in line with paragraph 1(e) of resolution 2793, the GSF and Haitian security forces “shall document and register all weapons, ammunition, and military equipment” seized as part of offensive operations or while carrying out their mandate. It seems that the language proposed by the A3 Plus detailed several measures to be undertaken as part of this task, such as recording the type, quantity, and serial number of weapons and ammunition seized; photographing all items and relevant markings and headstamps; and facilitating inspection by the PoE of all seized weapons, ammunition and military items before their redistribution or destruction.
While this language was not directly incorporated in the draft resolution currently in blue, in an apparent compromise, the co-penholders added language “confirm[ing] that” in line with paragraph 1(e) of resolution 2793, the GSF “should support” the Haitian National Police (HNP) and the Haitian armed forces to “record and dispose of illicit arms, ammunition, and other materiel, seized as part of offensive operations or in the course of carrying out its mandate, as appropriate”.
Compared to resolution 2752, it seems that the draft text in blue no longer refers to SGBV, but only to “sexual violence”. For instance, while resolution 2752 referred to the number of incidents of SGBV measured on an annual basis among other indicators to review the sanctions’ appropriateness, the draft currently in blue refers to the number of incidents of “sexual violence”. It appears that the Council’s European members—Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia, and the UK—as well as the Republic of Korea (ROK) requested that “gender-based” be reinserted in references to sexual violence. The US, however, apparently rejected such requests.
It seems that preambular language introduced in resolution 2752 by then-Council member Switzerland regarding due process and ensuring fair and clear procedures for delisting designated individuals and entities and welcoming the adoption of resolution 2744 of July 2024, which enhanced the mandate of the Focal Point for Delisting, did not appear in the first draft of the resolution. Following a request from the European members, supported by Pakistan as well as other members, such language was apparently reinstated. However, the draft currently in blue apparently notes the adoption of resolution 2744 instead of welcoming it.
_________________________________________________________________
*Post-script (17 October, 9:30 am): After the story’s publication, the vote was postponed from the morning session to the afternoon to allow more time for discussion among Council members. The story was amended to reflect the change in the timing of the vote.
**Post-script (17 October, 2 pm): After the story’s publication, the draft resolution in blue was amended. The story was revised to reflect the changes in the draft text.
***Post-script (17 October, 5 pm): On 17 October, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2794, renewing the 2653 Haiti sanctions regime for another year.
