Bosnia and Herzegovina: Debate and EUFOR ALTHEA Reauthorisation*
Tomorrow morning (31 October), the Security Council will hold its semi-annual debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Council members are also expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing the authorisation of the European Union (EU)-led multinational stabilisation force (EUFOR ALTHEA) for an additional year. At the time of writing, there is no anticipated briefer for tomorrow’s debate. Željko Komšić, the Croat member of the rotating tripartite inter-ethnic Presidency of BiH and the incumbent Chairman of the Presidency, as well as representatives of Croatia and Serbia are expected to participate under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, while the EU will take part under rule 39.
Negotiations on the Draft Resolution
Council products on BiH are prepared by the Coordination and Drafting Group (CDG), which comprises France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK, the US, and elected Council members Denmark, Greece, and Slovenia. Each member chairs the group for one month, rotating in alphabetical order. Greece is the CDG chair in October.
The draft resolution in blue, which Greece prepared, extends EUFOR ALTHEA’s authorisation for one year through a straightforward renewal. The text consists of the same key operative paragraphs contained in resolution 2757 of 1 November 2024—which most recently renewed the force’s authorisation—without adding any new elements.
In the past several years, Council dynamics on BiH have been difficult, which has led to challenging negotiations on EUFOR ALTHEA’s authorisation. Republika Srpska (RS) and Security Council members China and Russia do not recognise the legitimacy and authority of Christian Schmidt as the High Representative for BiH.
These dynamics emerged during the negotiations on resolution 2604, which renewed EUFOR ALTHEA’s authorisation in November 2021. At that time, Russia apparently expressed support for EUFOR ALTHEA but insisted on excluding references to the High Representative from the draft resolution owing to disagreements over Schmidt’s appointment process. It seems that, ahead of the 3 November 2021 debate on BiH, Russia blocked Schmidt’s briefing, threatening to veto the Council’s renewal of EUFOR ALTHEA’s authorisation. As a result, the meeting did not have a briefer. Following the vote to adopt resolution 2604, several Council members expressed regret that the Security Council had failed to adopt a more substantive resolution. Russia also characterised support for EUFOR ALTHEA’s mandate renewal as the only “common denominator” among Council members on the issue of BiH. (For background and more information, see our 2 November 2021 What’s in Blue story.)
It seems that the penholder’s decision to pursue a straightforward renewal of EUFOR ALTHEA’s authorisation this year was motivated by a desire to minimise disagreements among Council members. The negotiations were therefore apparently smooth. Ahead of the negotiations, Greece engaged in informal discussions with the CDG. Following these discussions, the penholder circulated a zero draft of the resolution to Council members. Greece then placed the draft text under silence in mid-October after consultations with Council members. There were no comments on the text or silence breaks from Council members. After passing the silence procedure, the draft was put in blue on Monday (27 October), to be voted on tomorrow. Greece’s approach to this year’s negotiations, which involved extensive rounds of informal consultations with the CDG and Council members, apparently contributed to the smooth negotiation process.
Given the difficult Council dynamics on BiH, there appeared to be broad consensus in favour of a straightforward renewal of EUFOR ALTHEA’s mandate. Since 2021, it seems that Council members have adopted as a practice that there would not be a briefer at the second of each year’s semi-annual debates on the file, in the context of deliberations concerning the renewal of the force’s authorisation. Similar decisions had been made during the negotiations on EUFOR ALTHEA’s mandate renewals in previous years, namely resolution 2658 of 2 November 2022, resolution 2706 of 2 November 2023, and most recently resolution 2757.
Debate
Tomorrow’s debate takes place amid a fragile political situation in BiH. The latest report of the High Representative for BiH (S/2025/671), which was circulated to Council members on 27 October and covers developments from 16 April to 15 October, notes that “deliberate attempts to obstruct state-level institutions” by the RS continued during the reporting period. Moreover, it observes that “[p]ersistent challenges to institutional legitimacy undermine trust between political actors and constituent peoples, making compromise elusive”.
According to the report, on 21 May, former RS president Milorad Dodik addressed the National Assembly of RS (RSNA) on the 30th anniversary of the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH (also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement). The speech reportedly “reflected policies of the RS leadership”—particularly of the government, that is led by Dodik’s Alliance of Independent Social Democrats party (SNSD)—which “aimed at challenging [BiH’s] constitutional order and creating the conditions for [RS’] potential secession”.
In August, the Court of BiH announced that the Appellate Division Panel had dismissed the appeals filed by both the BiH Prosecutor’s Office and the defence, thereby upholding the 26 February trial judgment that sentenced Dodik to one year in prison and a six-year ban from holding office as president for knowingly defying the decisions of the High Representative. The BiH Central Election Commission (CEC) subsequently adopted a decision recognising the termination of Dodik’s mandate as RS president as of 12 June, the day the Court of BiH confirmed that its judgment became final. Dodik, however, refused to accept the rulings of the CEC and the Court, asserting that he would continue to fulfil his responsibilities as RS president.
Tensions heightened later in August when Dodik vowed to block elections in the RS and to convene a series of referendums—the first of which would be the vote on the Court’s ruling. With Dodik’s SNSD serving as the ruling coalition within parliament, the RSNA, without the votes of the opposition parties, subsequently adopted a series of conclusions challenging the legal competencies of the CEC, barring the RS authorities from cooperating with the state institution in organising early elections. In doing so, it proceeded on 22 August to adopt, among other things, the Decision to Call an Entity-Wide Referendum on 25 October to ask citizens through a public vote whether they accept Dodik’s conviction and the authority of the High Representative. Opposition parliamentary members had reportedly refused to cast their votes on the measure, with Nebojša Vukanović, President of the Justice and Order List, warning Dodik and other parliamentary members that they were “walking on a minefield” with the decision to hold a referendum. Following the move, the CEC announced on 28 August that early elections would be held to select Dodik’s successor, scheduled for 23 November.
After a months-long standoff with the state judiciary, Dodik officially acknowledged the loss of his presidential mandate by withdrawing from all official roles in the RS on 30 September, apparently owing to domestic and international pressures. In stepping down, Dodik reportedly registered his party for the November elections and nominated a new presidential candidate, proposing Siniša Karan, the current RS Minister of Scientific and Technological Development and Higher Education, as his successor. The planned 25 October referendum did not transpire as originally announced, in light of Dodik’s withdrawal from the RS presidency. Nonetheless, it appears that Dodik will remain engaged in RS politics regardless of his decision to step down, as he reportedly maintained that he would “continue to perform [his] duties in the interest of the people, representing SNSD and everything [we] have done”.
On 18 October, the RSNA appointed Ana Tršić-Babić as interim president until the 23 November elections. Forty-eight out of 83 deputies voted in favour of making Tršić-Babić acting president, while four voted against. The CEC also certified five political parties and two independent candidates for participation in the elections.
In response to Tršić-Babić’s appointment, Dodik reportedly maintained that the RS will not change its policies regardless of the RSNA’s decision, underscoring that secession remains his ultimate goal for the entity. Srđan Mazalica, the head of the SNSD, similarly expressed the party’s loyalty to Dodik, stating that he will “always be our president”.
At tomorrow’s debate, Council members are expected to express diverging views on Schmidt’s legitimacy as High Representative and on the role of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). China and Russia are likely to reiterate their previous concerns over Schmidt’s actions and calls for the OHR’s closure. These members are likely to accuse Schmidt of exacerbating tensions, interfering in BiH’s internal affairs, and harming the country’s stability. Deep divisions related to BiH’s Euro-Atlantic integration and possible accession to the EU and NATO—particularly between Russia, on the one hand, and the European Council members, on the other—are likely to colour tomorrow’s debate.
Some Council members—including the European members—may reference the recent developments regarding Dodik’s resignation from official roles and the CEC’s decision to hold early elections, urging all parties to engage in good faith in the upcoming elections in line with BiH’s constitutional standards. At the same time, some members may also express concern over the RS authorities’ rhetoric and threats of secession. In this regard, they may call on the authorities to cease secessionist actions that they believe could undermine BiH’s stability. The UK and several other European countries have levelled national sanctions on Dodik for actions that undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement. The US had previously sanctioned Dodik in 2022, during the administration of former president Joe Biden. However, the administration of US President Donald Trump decided on 29 October to remove sanctions imposed on Dodik and other RS officials.
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**Post-script: On 31 October, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2795, renewing the authorisation of the European Union (EU)-led multinational stabilisation force (EUFOR ALTHEA) for an additional year.
