Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution Extending the Sanctions Regime*
Tomorrow morning (12 September), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime—including targeted sanctions (asset freezes and travel bans) and an arms embargo—for another year, until 12 September 2026.
The negotiations were apparently not controversial. Council members generally supported the approach of the US, the penholder on Sudan sanctions, to pursue a straightforward renewal of the sanctions regime. There were, however, some different perspectives related to specific proposals made by some members as well as to the broader question of whether the draft should be opened for additions. While certain members—including Slovenia and the UK—advocated incorporating references to the worsening situation in the country, others—such as China, Pakistan, and the “A3 Plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana)—preferred limiting amendments only to those necessary for a technical extension of the sanctions regime.
The US circulated an initial draft of the text to all Council members on 28 August after having first discussed it with the other permanent members. The only round of negotiations among all 15 members was held on 2 September. After receiving written comments from some members, the US shared a revised draft of the text on 5 September and placed it under silence until 1 pm on Monday (8 September), which was later extended to 3 pm at China’s request. China and Pakistan nonetheless broke silence, after which some other members reiterated their proposed edits. The US subsequently engaged bilaterally with some Council members and put a revised text in blue on Tuesday (9 September).
A recurring point of contention in recent negotiations on the Sudan sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee has been the duration of the respective mandates. (The PoE’s mandate was most recently renewed through resolution 2772 of 17 February for one year, until 12 March 2026, while the sanctions regime was extended until 12 September by resolution 2750 of 11 September 2024.) The “A3 Plus” members, as well as China, Pakistan, and Russia have advocated for shorter renewals, arguing that aligning the timeframes of both mandates would avoid a situation in which the Panel’s reporting period extends beyond the lifespan of the sanctions regime. These members contend that such a scenario effectively presupposes the renewal of the regime and maintain that aligning mandates is consistent with Council practice in other sanctions contexts. On the other hand, the penholder and other like-minded members have favoured longer mandates to ensure continuity and predictability in the implementation of the sanctions regime and the Panel’s work. (For more information, see the brief on Sudan in our September 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
The penholder sought to address this issue during the negotiations by aligning the timelines of both mandate cycles. In the initial draft, the US proposed that the Council extend the PoE’s mandate beyond 12 March, until October 2026, and express its intention to review the mandate and take further action on a possible extension no later than 12 September 2026. In this context, the initial draft also included language adjusting the PoE’s reporting cycle to align with the revised mandate period. It requested the Panel to submit an interim report to the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee by 12 March 2026, and to provide to the Council, by 13 July 2026, a final report containing its findings and recommendations, following discussion with the Committee. This proposal appeared to receive broad support among Council members, who largely converged around this point. These changes have been reflected in the draft resolution in blue.
The idea of expanding the geographical scope of the sanctions measures beyond Darfur to other parts of the country was raised during the negotiations. Since the outbreak of hostilities in April 2023, fighting has spread across several regions of the country, amid reports that external actors are supplying the parties with weapons, ammunition, and mercenaries. In its 5 September report, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, established by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in October 2023, recommended that the international community “respect, enforce and expand the Security Council arms embargo and halt all material support to the parties, including via private actors and transit routes”.
During the negotiations on the draft resolution, it seems that the UK proposed language extending the sanctions measures to the Kordofan region, which in recent months has become a key flashpoint in the conflict due to its importance in shaping the balance of power in Sudan’s civil war. While other like-minded Council members appeared to support this proposal, others—namely, the “A3 Plus”, China, and Russia—strongly objected. In its explanation of vote following the adoption of resolution 2772, Russia stated that it considered “unacceptable even any hint of expanding the sanctions regime beyond Darfur”. A similar proposal was advanced during the negotiations on resolution 2750 by France, which suggested language expressing the Council’s intention to consider the relevance of extending sanctions to other regions of Sudan. However, similar objections prevented that proposal from being taken forward. Therefore, in the draft resolution in blue, the sanctions regime continues to be solely applicable to Darfur.
Several members suggested additions to the preambular section aimed at reflecting the situation in Sudan. For instance, the UK sought to add language expressing concern about incidents of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) perpetrated by armed actors and emphasising the importance of accountability for those responsible for such violations. Another UK proposal condemned the use of mercenaries and violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) as well as human rights violations and abuses perpetrated by them. Slovenia similarly proposed language condemning attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, acts of sexual and gender-based violence, and the recruitment and use of children. It also suggested text expressing concern about the impact of Sudan’s crisis on the humanitarian and security situation in neighbouring countries and emphasising obligations under IHL, particularly the need to facilitate the rapid, safe, and unhindered passage of humanitarian relief.
It seems that several members—including Denmark, France, and the Republic of Korea (ROK)—supported the proposals by the UK and Slovenia. On the other hand, China and Pakistan apparently advocated for a straightforward technical extension without additional language contextualising the situation in the country—a position apparently consistent with Sudan’s national stance.
China, for its part, made suggestions to the draft text related to the sanctions regime. It apparently proposed including language indicating that the decision to extend the PoE’s mandate beyond 12 March 2026 was being taken to align the timelines for the renewal of the sanctions measures and the PoE’s mandate on an exceptional basis, without setting a precedent. This suggestion was supported by some members, including Pakistan and Russia.
In the first revised draft, the penholder incorporated the UK’s proposal expressing concern about incidents of CRSV in the preambular paragraphs, and in the operative section took on board China’s suggestion, albeit with a modification that omitted the reference to the “exceptional basis” and “without setting a precedent”. However, it seems that China and Pakistan broke silence, expressing their view that the text should only include technical references related to the sanctions regime.
The penholder then engaged in bilateral consultations with the relevant members, and discussions appear to have continued behind the scenes to find common ground. Some members apparently underscored the importance of differentiating among perpetrators and called for more nuanced language. It seems that the UK suggested alternative wording that would have expressed concern about incidents of CRSV, as reported in the Secretary-General’s latest annual report on CRSV, which was published on 14 August, while deleting reference to “armed actors”. However, this formulation was apparently still unacceptable to some members, including China and Pakistan. In the end, the reference to CRSV was retained in the draft resolution in blue; however, at the request of China, Pakistan, and the “A3 Plus” members, the attribution to “armed actors” was removed.
The draft resolution in blue does not include the language proposed by Slovenia or the UK’s suggested text on mercenaries. The issue of mercenaries has drawn increased attention from member states in recent months, amid media reports suggesting the presence of Colombian mercenaries in Darfur. On 5 May, the Permanent Representative of Sudan to the UN, Ambassador Al-Harith Idriss Al-Harith, sent a letter to the Council (S/2025/555) accusing the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of directly intervening in Sudan’s ongoing conflict, including through recruitment, financing, and deployment of foreign mercenaries, particularly from Colombia, to fight alongside the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The UAE has denied these allegations on multiple occasions, most recently describing them as “fabricated”, according to media reports citing Emirati officials.
Composition of the Panel of Experts
Although the Council extended the PoE’s mandate until 12 March 2026 through resolution 2772, members had not been able to agree on its composition. In late February, the UN Secretariat proposed five experts to serve on the Panel, but some Council members subsequently placed holds on the appointments. As a result, the Panel was not constituted and was unable to carry out its work, including the submission of its interim report, which was due on 12 August, and the quarterly updates mandated by resolution 2772.
It appears that all holds were lifted last week for three of the proposed experts. Two appointments remain outstanding, as Algeria objected to the appointment of the expert nominated to cover the subject of armed groups, while China and Pakistan objected to the appointment of the expert proposed to cover the subject of arms.
_________________________________________________________________
**Post-script: On 12 September, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2791, renewing the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime—including targeted sanctions (asset freezes and travel bans) and an arms embargo—for another year, until 12 September 2026. It also renews the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee until October 2026, expressing the Council’s intention to review the mandate and decide on a further extension by 12 September 2026.