Iran: Vote on a Draft Resolution to Delay the “Snapback” of UN Sanctions*
Tomorrow afternoon (26 September), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution to extend for six months, until 18 April, the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme and resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015 which endorsed it. China and Russia proposed the draft text in blue in response to the decision by the “E3” parties to the JCPOA (France, Germany, and the UK) to trigger the “snapback” mechanism to reimpose the UN sanctions against Iran that had been lifted under the JCPOA and resolution 2231. If adopted, the draft resolution would delay the activation of the snapback, which is currently set to take effect on 28 September.
For more information on the history of the JCPOA and the procedures governing the snapback mechanism, see our What’s in Blue stories of 28 August and 18 September.
Background
In a letter dated 28 August, the E3 foreign ministers notified the Council that they believe Iran is in “significant non-performance” of its commitments under the JCPOA, thereby triggering the 30-day countdown after which the snapback takes effect. The E3 argued that their decision to do so was based on “clear factual evidence” of Iran’s violations of its obligations, citing the country’s enriched uranium stockpile of more than 8,400 kilograms—over 40 times the JCPOA’s agreed limit—including the several hundred kilograms enriched up to 60 percent purity that remain unaccounted for following the Israeli-US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June. The letter also highlighted Iran’s operation of thousands of advanced centrifuges, the production of enriched material at prohibited facilities, and its rollback of monitoring measures by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has prevented the Agency from being able to provide assurances of the peaceful nature of Iran’s programme.
The E3 noted in their letter that they had offered Iran a temporary extension of the JCPOA and resolution 2231—both of which are set to expire on 18 October—should the country “take specific steps to address our most immediate concerns”, including restoring the IAEA’s access to its nuclear facilities; accounting for its stockpile of highly enriched uranium; and resuming bilateral negotiations with the US on a new nuclear deal. The E3 stated that Iran had not engaged on this offer, however, and that the country’s ongoing actions therefore left them with no credible alternative to invoking the snapback provision. At the same time, the E3 stressed that triggering the mechanism did not preclude diplomacy, signalling their readiness to continue talks with Iran and other stakeholders during the 30-day period before sanctions are restored, with the aim of reaching a negotiated outcome that could still avert the full reimposition of measures.
In a letter dated 2 September, China, Iran, and Russia rejected the E3’s grounds for triggering the snapback mechanism and disputed their legal and procedural standing to do so. The countries maintained that the E3’s alignment with the US after it withdrew from the JCPOA; their retention of certain national sanctions on Iran; and their alleged failure to exhaust remedial measures prior to their snapback notification rendered their invocation “null and void”. Separately, Iranian officials have warned that the reimposition of sanctions could prompt the country’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while some analysts have suggested that China and Russia may challenge the reconstitution of the Council’s lapsed 1737 Sanctions Committee and the appointment of a new panel of experts, complicating implementation even if the measures remain legally binding.
On 8 September—ten days after the E3’s snapback notification in accordance with the procedures stipulated by the JCPOA and resolution 2231—the Republic of Korea (ROK) in its capacity as Council president introduced a draft resolution to continue providing sanctions relief to Iran. The presidency did not schedule a vote, however, as negotiations on an interim deal continued between Iran, the E3, and the IAEA.
In a 10 September statement, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi announced that the Agency had reached an agreement with Iran on modalities to resume cooperation. While the text of the agreement was not made public, Grossi said that it “provides for a clear understanding of the procedures for inspection, notifications and their implementation”, aiming to “reconcile two equally important parameters”: Iran’s new law restricting cooperation with the Agency, and the country’s legal obligations under its safeguards agreement. The deal with the IAEA reportedly calls for Iran to submit a report clarifying the status of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, after which negotiations would take place on a new inspection mechanism for Iran’s nuclear facilities, apparently subject to approval by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.
As the agreement did not impose time-bound commitments on Iran, and its implementation would not be verifiable prior to the expiration of the 30-day snapback window, it seems that this did not alleviate the E3’s previously stated concerns. On 18 September, the ROK proceeded to schedule a vote on its draft resolution, which failed to be adopted due to insufficient votes: it received four votes in favour (Algeria, China, Pakistan, and Russia); nine against (Denmark, France, Greece, Panama, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, the UK, and the US); and two abstentions (Guyana and the ROK). As such, the snapback is set to take effect at the end of the 30-day period—that is, on 28 September—in the absence of further Council action.
Draft Resolution to Extend Resolution 2231
China and Russia have described their draft resolution as a measure intended to give more time for diplomatic efforts to address the Iranian nuclear issue. Russia circulated an initial draft on 24 August as the E3 signalled their intention to invoke the snapback. On 26 August, following comments from other Council members, Russia circulated a revised draft that was co-penned with China. After the E3 formally triggered the snapback on 28 August, China and Russia placed a second revised draft in blue but did not immediately request a vote on the text.
Russia’s initial draft resolution apparently decided to extend the JCPOA and resolution 2231 for six months, until 18 April 2026, with a possibility for a further extension. It also decided to suspend, for the extension period, any substantive Council consideration of any matters related to the implementation of the JCPOA or resolution 2231. It seems that several Council members, including European countries and the US, expressed their opposition to the draft on the grounds that it provided Iran with an unconditional extension and appeared to effectively dismantle resolution 2231 by preventing the Council from convening meetings or taking action on the Iranian nuclear file for the duration of the extension period, thereby precluding the E3’s ability to trigger the snapback. China and Russia consequently deleted this clause in the draft resolution in blue, but it seems that Western and other like-minded members remain opposed as the text still does not demand any concessions from Iran in exchange for the extension.
At the Council’s 18 September vote on the ROK’s draft resolution, China and Russia both reiterated their opposition to the E3’s snapback notification, restating their arguments that the Europeans had lost the standing to invoke resolution 2231 by failing to meet their own JCPOA obligations and re-imposing national sanctions. Russia reiterated its view that the snapback invocation was null and void, stressing that its participation at the meeting was not in recognition of the snapback’s validity but solely to vote in favour of preserving sanctions relief for Iran. China likewise warned that forcing a vote risked deepening divisions, maintained that the E3’s move was politically and legally untenable, and attributed the crisis to the US’ 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA and subsequent strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. Both countries advocated for their draft resolution as a more prudent course of action to allow continued negotiations on a diplomatic settlement.
This week, relevant parties held additional talks on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, including a meeting between the foreign ministers of the E3 and Iran and a meeting between French President Emmanuel Macron and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. It appears that the negotiations remain deadlocked, however, with both the Iranian and European sides issuing statements on Tuesday (23 September) that reiterated their respective positions. Today (25 September), the E3 on the one hand and China, Iran, and Russia on the other apparently convened separate informal briefings with the ten elected members of the Security Council (the E10) to discuss the latest diplomatic efforts. After the latter briefing, China and Russia requested the presidency to schedule a vote on their draft resolution in blue for tomorrow afternoon, updating the text with new language welcoming the agreement between Iran and the IAEA and encouraging further engagement between them.
Tomorrow’s voting pattern is expected to be similar to that of the president’s draft resolution on 18 September. In that case, the draft text in blue will not receive the nine favourable votes required for adoption and UN sanctions on Iran will go back into effect on 28 September as scheduled.
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**Post-script: On 26 September, the Security Council voted on the draft resolution submitted by China and Russia to extend for six months, until 18 April, the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme and resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015 which endorsed it. The draft text failed to be adopted because it did not garner the nine favourable votes required for adoption. It received four votes in favour (Algeria, China, Pakistan, and Russia); nine against (Denmark, France, Greece, Panama, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, the UK, and the US); and two abstentions (Guyana and ROK).
