Haiti: Vote on a Draft Resolution Authorising a “Gang Suppression Force” and a UN Support Office*
This afternoon (30 September), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution authorising UN member states to transition the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti into a “Gang Suppression Force” (GSF) for an initial period of 12 months. The draft resolution also requests that the Secretary-General establish a UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH). Panama and the US—the co-penholders on Haiti—authored the draft text.
Ahead of the meeting, Panama—together with several other Council members, Haiti, and representatives from the region—is expected to deliver a joint statement at the stakeout urging the Security Council to adopt the draft resolution.
The authorisation of the MSS mission expires on 2 October.
Background
The Security Council has long grappled with how to address the situation in Haiti, which has steadily deteriorated amid rising gang violence, political instability, and worsening humanitarian conditions. With nearly 1.3 million people internally displaced due to armed violence, the UN continues to highlight widespread human rights abuses committed by gangs, including kidnappings, rising levels of sexual violence, and recruitment of children.
The MSS mission—a non-UN mission funded by voluntary contributions and led by Kenya—was first authorised by the Security Council in October 2023 for a period of 12 months. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in resolution 2699 the Council authorised member states participating in the MSS mission to “take all necessary measures” in fulfilment of the mission’s mandate, which included supporting the Haitian National Police (HNP) to “re-establish security” and build conditions conducive to the holding of elections.
The MSS mission has since consistently faced funding uncertainty and a lack of adequate equipment. Deployment levels have also remained far short of the 2,500 officers initially envisaged.
While resisting some attacks and re-establishing access to some areas and infrastructures, the HNP and the MSS mission have struggled to make significant headway against the gangs, which are estimated to have overrun most of Port-au-Prince.
At the 28 August Security Council briefing on Haiti, the US—after months of uncertainty over its position following President Donald Trump’s 20 January return to office—announced that, together with Panama, it would share a draft resolution to establish a “Gang Suppression Force” and create a UN Support Office to “provide logistical support to efforts on the ground”.
For background and more information, see the brief on Haiti in our September 2025 Monthly Forecast.
Negotiations on the Draft Resolution
The co-penholders circulated an initial draft of the text to Council members on 28 August. Negotiations took place in September on three revised drafts and through two silence procedures (18 and 26 September). Silence was broken on both occasions by China and Russia. Yesterday (29 September), Panama and the US put the third revised version of the draft resolution in blue unchanged, to be voted on this afternoon.
In the draft resolution in blue, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorises UN member states participating in the MSS mission to transition into the GSF and to “take all necessary measures” to carry out the new mission’s mandate. Among other tasks, the draft resolution authorises states participating in the GSF to:
- Conduct, either independently or in cooperation with the HNP and Haitian armed forces, “intelligence-led targeted, counter-gang operations to neutralize, isolate, and deter gangs”;
- Provide, in coordination with the HNP and Haitian armed forces, security for key infrastructure and transit locations such as the airport, ports, schools, orphanages, hospitals, detention centres, and key intersections;
- Support the HNP, the Haitian armed forces and national institutions to “ensure security conditions” conducive to holding elections, and “contribute” to the creation of conditions conducive to activities carried out by other actors, such as humanitarian assistance and efforts to facilitate “safe exit” of people who want to leave gangs, including children;
- Support to the HNP and the Haitian armed forces to “combat illicit trafficking and diversion of arms and related materiel, including to seize and collect, record and dispose of illicit arms, [and] ammunition” and enhance Haiti’s “management and control of its land, maritime and air borders and ports”.
The draft text in blue authorises a personnel ceiling of 5,550, consisting of 5,500 military and police personnel as well as 50 civilians.
Regarding the GSF’s leadership, on 27 August, Haiti sent a letter to the Security Council transmitting a letter from The Bahamas, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kenya, and the US announcing their intention to form a “standing group of partners” for the new force. The draft resolution in blue welcomes the letter and notes the standing group’s intention to select the GSF Force Commander, as well as a “Special Representative for the GSF”—a non-UN role—to provide “strategic representation and coordination for the force”.
It seems that China and Russia did not directly engage with the draft text circulated by Panama and the US. At the same time, early on in the negotiations, China and Russia, as well as other members, apparently requested additional specific information on the GSF from the co-penholders, including regarding key issues such as the new mission’s troop composition, chain of command, rules of engagement, concept of operations, total cost and sources of funding, accountability, decision-making, and success criteria.
It seems that during the negotiations, several Council members—including Denmark, Greece, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Slovenia—advocated for strengthening the text with language on compliance with international law, including international human rights law (IHRL). For instance, as a result of these members’ proposals, the draft resolution in blue specifies that members participating in the GSF are authorised to undertake the measures described above “in strict compliance with international law”, including IHRL. Although several of these requests were integrated in the draft text, the US apparently consistently supplemented these additions with the qualifier “as applicable”.
It seems that, following a request from Guyana on behalf of the “A3 Plus” grouping (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana), language emphasising full respect for the sovereignty and political independence of Haiti was added to the paragraph authorising the GSF to take “all necessary measures” to fulfil its mandate. It appears, however, that these members’ request to condition this authorisation on “ongoing consultation and coordination” with Haiti’s government on “all relevant aspects” of the mandate’s implementation was not accommodated by the US, which apparently cited Haiti’s endorsement of the draft resolution as part of the reasons for its rejection.
Several Council members—including Denmark, Greece, Slovenia, the UK, and the A3 Plus—apparently advocated for adding language on children and armed conflict, including references to child protection. This appears to have been informed by concerns regarding the forceful posture that the draft resolution authorises the GSF to take and the fact that, according to UN estimates, 30 to 50 percent of gang members are children. For instance, language has been added requesting the GSF to take child protection and the protection of “other vulnerable groups” fully into account in the planning and conduct of its operations. The draft resolution in blue also affirms the importance of the 2024 Handover Protocol agreement between the UN and the government of Haiti.
At the same time, during the negotiations the US apparently specified that although the GSF is mandated with contributing to creating the conditions for other actors to provide safe exit programmes—including in relation to the disengagement of children—the mission itself will not be mandated with such tasks. It seems that a proposal by Guyana (on behalf of the A3 Plus), supported by several members, to add language on referring children apprehended by the GSF to child protection actors and ensuring that they are not detained with adults was partially integrated in the draft resolution, albeit with qualifiers such as “where appropriate and feasible”.
Members such as Denmark, the UK, and Guyana (on behalf of the A3 Plus) apparently contributed to strengthening language on compliance and oversight mechanisms for violations and abuses related to the GSF. The draft resolution in blue requests member states participating in the GSF to establish a “robust compliance mechanism”—building on the existing MSS mission’s mechanism—to “prevent, investigate, address and publicly report violations or abuses of human rights, including tackling sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment”. It also requests the deployment of Child and Women’s Protection Advisers, and to ensure a “safe survivor-and-victim centered response” for any such incidents.
Compared to resolution 2699, it seems that the draft text in blue no longer refers to “sexual and gender-based violence” (SGBV), but only to “sexual violence”. Several members—including Denmark, Greece, Guyana, the ROK, and the UK—requested multiple times that “gender-based” be reinserted in references to sexual violence. It seems that Panama, too, supported the requests to restore SGBV language. The US, however, apparently rejected such requests, stating that this would have contravened the current US administration’s policies.
While the transition to the GSF is authorised “on the understanding that the cost of personnel will be borne by voluntary contributions”, the draft resolution in blue also mandates the establishment of a UNSOH to provide support to: the GSF, the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the HNP and the Haitian armed forces, and the Organization of American States (OAS).
For each of these entities, the draft resolution identifies what such support shall entail. For instance, regarding the GSF, it establishes that the support will include, among other elements, the provision of “rations, fuel, water, accommodation, and all necessary infrastructure to include the primary GSF base and any forward bases” as well as medical and mobility support, strategic communications, IT and Geographic Information Systems support. It will also include the “reimbursement of contingent owned equipment”, including “all categories of lethal equipment”.
Regarding the HNP and the Haitian armed forces, the draft resolution in blue establishes that the support will be limited to the provision of in-theatre medical evacuations on joint operations with the GSF and “where they are a part of the GSF’s overall strategic concept”.
The draft text in blue affirms that any support provided by the UNSOH shall be “in full compliance” with the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP). (The HRDDP requires UN entities to be consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and to comply with and promote international humanitarian law, IHRL and refugee law when providing support to non-UN security forces.)
It seems that another concern raised by some European members was around ensuring coordination between BINUH and the UNSOH, including through directly requesting the UNSOH to cooperate with BINUH. It appears that, although the co-penholders were apparently unable to fully accommodate these proposals, they added language requesting the UN Secretary-General to ensure coordination and cooperation among all UN actors in Haiti. Also, it seems that, following a proposal by Denmark, the text mandates the GSF to “coordinate, on a regular basis, activities, plans and results with BINUH and UN Country Team in Haiti to secure complementarity and synergy along peace and security interventions”.
The draft text in blue also includes some reporting requirements. For instance, it requests the UN Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution as part of his regular reports on Haiti. It also requests the GSF Special Representative, in coordination with the Haitian government and the UN, to develop a “strategy and metrics for measuring success of the mission and concrete timebound objectives, with benchmarks towards an end-state”, to be presented to the Council within nine months of the resolution’s adoption.
It seems that, upon breaking silence on 18 September, China and Russia expressed concern about not having received adequate information regarding the issues they had raised since the start of the negotiations, adding that, considering the chequered history of past international interventions in Haiti, clarity on matters such as rules of engagement, troop composition, costs and accountability would be essential for the Council to authorise the new force. In order to allow more time for discussion, China and Russia apparently suggested extending the mandate of the MSS mission through a short technical rollover and circulated a concise draft resolution with a proposed extension until 2 January 2026, inviting comments from Council members, particularly regarding the proposed length of the extension.
It seems that, while none of the other Council members substantively engaged with the draft technical rollover, the UK, supported by the European Council members, stated that they would only engage with the co-penholders’ draft and emphasised the need for the Council to act swiftly in support of Haiti.
When China and Russia broke silence on 26 September, these members apparently reiterated the concerns they had expressed during the negotiations and urged the other members to consider their proposal for a technical rollover of the MSS to allow more time for negotiations on the GSF. At the time of writing, the draft resolution put forward by China and Russia had not been put in blue.
The General Assembly’s high-level week provided an opportunity for several actors to publicly express their positions on the GSF, including China, Kenya, Russia, and the US. Haiti voiced support for the GSF in several public engagements throughout high-level week, including during the 25 September address to the General Assembly delivered by the current President of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC), Laurent Saint-Cyr, in which he stressed that Haiti is “a country at war”.
At the time of writing, it appears that Council members have yet to receive information from the US and Panama on several of the issues raised by China and Russia, as well as—more quietly—by other members, including regarding the troop composition for the expanded mission and sustainable funding.
On 24 September, responding to a question on whether Washington will continue to provide support for the MSS mission if the proposal for the GSF is not adopted by the Council, US chargé d’affaires in Haiti Henry Wooster reportedly said that US support for the MSS “will expire at the end of December”.
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**Post-script: On 30 September, the Security Council adopted resolution 2793, authorising UN member states to transition the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti into a “Gang Suppression Force” (GSF) for an initial period of 12 months. The text also requests that the Secretary-General establish a UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH). The resolution received 12 votes in favour and three abstentions (China, Pakistan, and Russia).