Iran: Closed Consultations on the Invocation of the “Snapback” Mechanism
Tomorrow morning (29 August), Security Council members are expected to hold closed consultations on Iran. The session was requested by France and the UK after the two countries—along with Germany—circulated a letter today (28 August) notifying the Council that they believe Iran is in “significant non-performance” of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme, thereby triggering the “snapback” mechanism to re-impose UN sanctions against the country (S/2025/538). No briefer is expected at the meeting.
Separately, China and Russia have proposed a draft resolution that decides to extend for six months, until 18 April 2026, the ten-year term of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, both of which are scheduled to expire on 18 October. Although the draft text has been put in blue today, a vote has yet to be scheduled at the time of writing.
Background
The JCPOA was concluded in July 2015 between Iran and permanent Council members China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US, as well as Germany (collectively known as the P5+1), and unanimously endorsed by the Council through resolution 2231. The agreement placed significant restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for relief from UN sanctions, which the Council had imposed between 2006 and 2010. The restrictions were scheduled to progressively expire over time, culminating in the “termination day” of 18 October 2025, when the Council would end its consideration of the Iranian nuclear file.
The agreement also contained a provision—known as the “snapback” mechanism—allowing any JCPOA participant to reimpose UN sanctions in the event of “significant non-performance” by Iran. The snapback operates through a two-stage process anchored in both the JCPOA (articles 36–37) and resolution 2231 (operative paragraphs 11–13). If a participant considers another to be in “significant non-performance”, it may refer the matter to the JCPOA’s Joint Commission—which is coordinated by the European Union (EU)—and its Dispute Resolution Mechanism (DRM). That body has up to 35 days to resolve the disagreement, with the possibility of escalating the matter to foreign ministers and an advisory board. If still unresolved, the participant may notify the Security Council. Once such a notification is made, a 30-day clock begins; if no Council member has submitted a draft to continue sanctions relief within the first ten days of that period, the Council president must submit such a draft and put it to a vote. Any permanent member that opposes the draft could then veto it. If no resolution is adopted within the 30-day window, the previous UN sanctions resolutions automatically “snap back” into effect, without requiring further Council action. This would reinstate UN prohibitions against Iranian uranium enrichment, re-establish extensive restrictions on arms, finance, and shipping in relation to the country, and re-designate individuals and entities connected to Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes.
The JCPOA has faced challenges since May 2018, when the US under the first administration of President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the agreement and reimposed comprehensive national sanctions against Iran. In response, Iran began incrementally reducing its compliance with the JCPOA, including by enriching uranium to 60 percent purity—approaching the approximately 90 percent level considered weapons-grade and well above the 3.67 percent limit imposed by the JCPOA. In January 2020, France, Germany, and the UK—known within the context of the JCPOA as the “E3”—triggered the DRM in response to the Iranian actions, although they subsequently suspended the process. Parallel US efforts to invoke the snapback mechanism in August 2020 were widely dismissed by other Council members on the grounds that the country was no longer a JCPOA participant. Following the election of President Joe Biden in November 2020, the US and Iran began indirect talks aimed at restoring the deal, but those discussions collapsed in 2022 without agreement. Subsequent years saw the expiry of certain restrictions under the JCPOA, including on Iran’s missile programme in October 2023—a milestone known as “transition day”—but European countries maintained their national sanctions, citing Iran’s continued non-compliance with the deal.
Events in 2025 have further heightened tensions. After Trump’s return to office in January, the US resumed its “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, even as the two countries restarted bilateral talks on a new agreement. In June, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a resolution finding Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Following subsequent Israeli and US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, Tehran suspended its cooperation with the IAEA, leaving the Agency without access to Iranian nuclear sites. European officials have since argued that the absence of monitoring, combined with Iran’s stockpiles of highly enriched uranium—whose whereabouts remain unverified following the strikes—poses acute proliferation risks. The E3 therefore warned that unless Iran returns to serious negotiations over its nuclear programme, they would trigger the snapback mechanism by the end of August. This would ensure that the process concludes by October, when Russia—an ally of Iran—will assume the Council presidency.
Iran has rejected the E3’s grounds for invoking the snapback. In a 20 July letter to the Council, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi argued that the E3 have forfeited participant status in the JCPOA through “flagrant violations” of their own commitments, rendering any resort to the snapback “null and void”. Tehran maintains that European states failed to uphold the economic dividends promised under the accord after the US withdrawal, and that their alignment with the US, retention of certain national sanctions, and support for IAEA censure resolutions demonstrate bad faith. Iranian officials have further warned that triggering the snapback could prompt the country’s withdrawal from the NPT. China and Russia have echoed Iran’s objections, with Russia additionally arguing that the E3 failed to first exhaust the DRM process required to trigger the snapback. Some analysts have suggested that, if sanctions are restored, China and Russia may challenge the reconstitution of the Council’s lapsed 1737 Sanctions Committee and the appointment of a new panel of experts, complicating implementation even if the measures remain legally binding. They could also hold up the selection of a chair for the committee.
Snapback Invocation and Tomorrow’s Consultations
In their 28 August letter, the E3 foreign ministers argued that their decision to trigger the snapback mechanism was based on “clear factual evidence” of Iran’s non-performance of its JCPOA commitments. They cited the country’s enriched uranium stockpile of more than 8,400 kilograms—over 40 times the JCPOA’s agreed limit—including the several hundred kilograms enriched up to 60 percent purity that remain unaccounted for. The letter also highlighted Iran’s operation of thousands of advanced centrifuges, the production of enriched material at prohibited facilities, and its rollback of IAEA monitoring measures, which has deprived the Agency of the ability to provide assurances of the peaceful nature of Iran’s programme.
The E3 noted that they had recently offered Iran a temporary extension of resolution 2231 should the country “take specific steps to address our most immediate concerns”, including restoring the IAEA’s access to its nuclear facilities; accounting for its stockpile of highly enriched uranium; and resuming negotiations with the US on a new nuclear deal. The E3 stated that Iran had not engaged on this offer, however, and that the country’s ongoing actions therefore left them with no credible alternative to invoking the snapback provisions. At the same time, the E3 stressed that triggering the mechanism does not preclude diplomacy, signalling their readiness to continue talks with Iran and other stakeholders during the 30-day period before sanctions are automatically restored, with the aim of reaching a negotiated outcome that could still avert the full reimposition of measures. Similarly, in a 28 August statement, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed support for the E3’s decision to initiate the snapback but also affirmed that the US remains available for direct engagement with Iran “in furtherance of a peaceful, enduring resolution to the Iran nuclear issue”. At tomorrow’s consultations, these and other like-minded Council members may reiterate such points, criticising Iranian non-compliance measures while stressing their commitment to additional diplomacy.
China and Russia, for their part, are likely to denounce the move as an unwarranted escalation and repeat their arguments disputing the E3’s legal standing to invoke the snapback. They may reference their draft resolution in blue, which temporarily extends the provisions of the JCPOA and resolution 2231—an initiative that they have also described as an effort to give more time to diplomatic efforts. It seems that Russia circulated an initial draft of the resolution on 24 August. On Tuesday (26 August), following comments from other Council members, Russia circulated a revised draft that was co-penned with China. After additional comments, China and Russia circulated a second revised draft today and placed it in blue.
Russia’s initial draft apparently decided to extend the JCPOA and resolution 2231 for six months, until 18 April 2026, with a possibility for a further extension. It also decided to suspend, for the extension period, any substantive Council consideration of any matters related to the implementation of the JCPOA or resolution 2231. It seems that several Council members, including European countries and the US, expressed their opposition to the draft on the grounds that it provided Iran with an unconditional extension and appeared to effectively dismantle resolution 2231 by preventing the Council from convening meetings or taking action on the Iranian nuclear file for the duration of the extension period, thereby precluding the E3’s ability to trigger the snapback. China and Russia consequently deleted this clause in the draft resolution in blue, but other members may remain opposed as the text still does not demand any concessions from Iran in exchange for the extension.
