Yemen: Monthly Briefing and Consultations
Tomorrow morning (9 July), the Security Council will hold its monthly open briefing and closed consultations on Yemen. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher will brief. A civil society representative will also brief on humanitarian challenges in Yemen.
Tomorrow’s meeting is expected to cover the crises Yemen faces on the political, humanitarian, and economic fronts. Both the UN-mediated truce agreed in April 2022 between the Yemeni government and the Houthi rebel group, and the ceasefire agreement struck in May between the US and the Houthis, continue to hold. Regional tensions, however, have mired progress on securing a roadmap to peace in Yemen, which would include a comprehensive ceasefire, economic measures, and an inclusive political process under UN auspices.
The Houthis continue to wage a military campaign against Israel, which they say is in solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza. During the 12-day war between Israel and Iran which started on 13 June, the group reportedly launched two separate attacks targeting Israel—on 13 and 16 June—and has said that one of the attacks was coordinated with Iran.
A ceasefire between Israel and Iran went into effect on 24 June. Houthi attacks against Israel have not ceased, however, and continue to be a source of regional tensions. After a 1 July Houthi-claimed missile was intercepted by Israel, the country’s Defence Minister, Israel Katz, vowed retaliation against the group, saying that “the fate of Yemen is the same as that of Tehran”. Earlier in June, Israel had threatened to impose a naval and air blockade on the Houthis should they continue to attack Israel. Yesterday (7 July), Israel conducted strikes against the Houthi-controlled ports of Hodeidah, Ras Isa, and Salif, as well as the Ras Qantib power plant and the MV Galaxy Leader—a ship seized by the Houthis in April 2023, which Israel claims was being used by the group to track vessels in the Red Sea. The Houthis retaliated on the same day by firing two ballistic missiles at Israel, with no impacts or injuries reported.
The Houthis have also resumed targeting commercial vessels in the Red Sea for the first time since late 2024, with the rebel group claiming responsibility for a 6 July attack that sunk the Liberian-flagged, Greek-operated MV Magic Seas, forcing its crew to abandon the vessel. Overnight between yesterday and today (8 July), an attack on the Liberian-flagged, Greek-operated MV Eternity C reportedly resulted in the killing of two crew members and injury of at least two others. The European Union (EU) and the Yemeni government have blamed the Houthis for the attack, although the group had not claimed responsibility at the time of writing.
At tomorrow’s meeting, Council members are likely to condemn the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and call on the group to cease any further actions that undermine the safety of navigation and shipping. Some Council members may underscore the need to maintain the monthly reporting requirement on Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, originally established by resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024, and express support for the extension of this requirement, which is due to expire on 15 July.
Speakers are likely to call for an immediate de-escalation of hostilities by all parties, with some highlighting it as a prerequisite for restoring maritime security in the Red Sea and promoting peace in Yemen. Some Council members—including the “A3 Plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana), China, and Russia—may highlight the war in Gaza as a destabilising factor for the situation in Yemen and call on Israel to cease its strikes in the country, while other members—such as the P3 (France, the UK, and the US)—may condemn Houthi strikes on Israel and underline the country’s right to defend itself.
The briefers and Council members are likely to call on parties to abide by international humanitarian law and to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. In this regard, some Council members may raise concerns that continued strikes on Yemen’s Red Sea ports could risk undermining their operational capacity, which would lead to further deterioration of the already dire humanitarian situation in the country. According to the Secretary-General’s most recent annual review of the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), transmitted in a 10 June letter, Hodeidah Port alone facilitates around 70 percent of Yemen’s commercial imports and 80 percent of humanitarian assistance.
In view of UNMHA’s upcoming mandate expiry on 14 July, and ongoing Council negotiations on a text to renew it, some Council members may take the opportunity to publicly support the mission, which has a mandate to monitor the ceasefire in Hodeidah governorate in line with the December 2018 Stockholm Agreement. These members might also underline UNMHA’s important role in promoting de-escalation and cooperation in a region critical to Yemen’s stability.
In his briefing, Grundberg may provide an update on his recent visit to Aden, including the 2 July meeting with Yemeni Prime Minister Salem Bin Buraik, during which they discussed the implications of the latest developments in the region, the dire economic situation in the country, and the urgent need to advance a political process. According to a statement issued by the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, during the meeting Grundberg encouraged the formation of a joint inclusive negotiation delegation by the Yemeni government to prepare for future negotiations regarding a political settlement to the conflict. Council members may express their support for Grundberg’s efforts to advance a Yemeni-owned and Yemeni-led inclusive political settlement, while affirming that this is the only viable way to achieve lasting peace in the country.
Speakers are also expected to reiterate their calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all personnel from the UN, national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and diplomatic missions who have been arbitrarily detained by the Houthis since June 2024.
Briefing on the humanitarian context in Yemen, Fletcher is expected to focus on the country’s worsening food insecurity crisis. He may refer to the 27 June Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis, which says that Yemen is facing alarming levels of food insecurity, “with pockets of the population projected to face IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) by September”, and warn that the situation is projected to worsen between September and February 2026, with an estimated 18.1 million people—around 52 percent of the population—likely to face IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse).
Fletcher might note that the deteriorating situation is driven by several factors—including conflict, economic issues, poverty, and contracting humanitarian funding—and stress that immediate action and financial support is required to prevent a total collapse in the country. He is likely to appeal to the international community and donors to urgently mobilise contributions towards the 2025 Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) and the May 2025 HNRP addendum, which presents “the most urgent funding requirements for life-saving activities from the 2025 HNRP”, totalling $1.42 billion to assist 8.8 million people until the end of December. Food security is the largest cluster presented in the HNRP addendum, with a total urgent requirement of $589.6 million as at 13 May.
Fletcher may also mention some positive steps taken by the Yemeni parties, including their agreement to reopen vital roads linking Houthi-controlled and government-held governorates, which has improved access and travel times for several communities. He is also likely to refer to a 1 July agreement between two local water authorities in Taiz governorate—Taiz City and Al-Hawban, which are respectively controlled by Yemeni government-aligned forces and the Houthis—to jointly manage the water supply systems and sewage networks, thus restoring essential services that had been disrupted for nearly a decade due to conflict and institutional fragmentation. Council members may commend these agreements as important confidence-building measures and call for increased support to advance similar initiatives that could help assuage some of the humanitarian challenges in Yemen, including the healthcare crisis, the spread of disease, and the presence of unexploded ordnance.
