Ukraine: Briefing
Tomorrow morning (25 July), the Security Council will hold an open briefing on Ukraine. Council members Denmark, France, Greece, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Slovenia, and the UK requested the meeting to receive an update on political and humanitarian developments in the country. Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas Miroslav Jenča and Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya are the anticipated briefers. Ukraine and several regional states are expected to participate in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
The Council last convened to discuss Ukraine on 20 June. Since then, conditions on the ground have deteriorated as Russian forces have continued to advance in the east. At the same time, Moscow has intensified its aerial campaign, launching massive drone and missile attacks across the country.
Following a 3 July call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, US President Donald Trump told reporters that he was unable to make “any progress” with Putin on Ukraine. Just hours later, Russia launched its largest aerial assault on Ukraine since the war began more than three years ago. The attack caused dozens of civilian casualties and drew condemnation from UN Secretary-General António Guterres and other international interlocutors.
There appeared to be a shift in US policy in the following days. In a 7 July statement, the US Department of Defense announced that, at Trump’s direction, additional defensive weapons would be sent to Ukraine to help it protect itself while Washington pursued what it called a “lasting peace”. A week later, during a 14 July meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Trump unveiled plans for large-scale military aid to Ukraine through NATO and warned that Russia would face “severe” tariffs if there is no peace deal within 50 days. These would include 100 percent secondary tariffs on countries continuing to trade with Russia. In 2024, Russia earned $192 billion from global oil and oil products exports, much of it from sales to China and India.
While several media outlets framed the move as a major shift in US policy on Ukraine—suggesting that Trump now views Putin as the main obstacle to peace and that achieving a resolution will require greater economic pressure on Russia along with stronger Western military support to Ukraine—other analysts expressed skepticism. They pointed out that in the hours that followed, Moscow’s stock exchange rose by 2.7 percent, indicating investor confidence that Trump’s actions might not significantly harm the Russian economy.
Moreover, some US lawmakers have raised concerns that the 50-day deadline gives Russia time to consolidate its gains on the battlefield and has effectively postponed a US Senate vote on a bipartisan bill that would impose new penalties on Moscow, including 500 percent tariffs on imports from countries that trade with Russia. Media reports suggest that such a delay could provide Russia with an opening to acquire critical components—such as computer chips and military equipment—that would otherwise be restricted under new export controls.
Following the announcement, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy thanked Trump for his “readiness to help protect our people’s lives” and emphasised that Russia must be “forced” to take steps toward lasting peace. Russian officials denounced the proposed measures and insisted that Russia would not withdraw from the battlefield in response to economic threats. Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova argued that Trump’s decision to increase arms shipments to Ukraine could signal to Kyiv that it no longer needs to pursue peace efforts.
Despite the charged rhetoric, diplomatic engagement between Kyiv and Moscow resumed this month. On 23 July, delegations from both sides met in Istanbul, Türkiye, for a third round of direct talks. The meeting, which lasted less than an hour, saw Ukraine propose a summit between Zelenskyy and Putin before the end of August. Russia responded that a high-level meeting would first require agreement on the topics to be discussed and instead suggested that three working groups meet virtually to address political, military, and humanitarian issues. While the parties reportedly agreed to continue prisoner of war (POW) exchanges, they remain divided over the terms of a ceasefire.
At tomorrow’s meeting, Jenča is expected to highlight that, according to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), June was the deadliest month for civilians in three years, with 232 people killed and 1,343 injured, and that attacks using missiles and loitering munitions were ten times higher than in June 2024. He may also underscore that while most casualties occurred in Ukrainian government-controlled areas as a result of long-range explosive weapons used by Russian forces in populated areas, short-range drones near the front lines have driven a sharp rise in deaths and injuries.
In a 17 July report titled “Deadly drones: Civilians at risk from short-range drones in frontline areas of Ukraine, 24 February 2022—30 April 2025”, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) noted that targeting practices by drone operators appear to breach core international humanitarian law principles of distinction and precaution. Msuya may also describe the UN’s humanitarian response against the backdrop of intensifying strikes and growing winter needs, stressing that sustained, flexible funding is essential to maintain current operations and scale up life-saving winter assistance.
Tomorrow, Council members are expected to express concern about the ongoing hostilities and emphasise the urgent need for a comprehensive ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. They are also likely to welcome the continued direct diplomatic engagement between the two sides as a positive step towards de-escalation.
Differing views are expected to emerge, however, over what constitutes the greatest obstacle to peace in Ukraine. Several Council members—including those that requested the meeting—are likely to argue that Russia is not genuinely committed to peace, condemning its continued strikes on civilian infrastructure. They may stress that such attacks erode trust, undermine the prospects for a ceasefire, and reflect a lack of good faith in the negotiation process. These members may call on Russia to agree to an immediate, unconditional, and comprehensive ceasefire.
The US is likely to underscore the need to implement Security Council resolution 2774 of 24 February, which urged a swift end to the conflict and a lasting peace, and reiterate calls for Russia to negotiate in good faith. It is also expected to urge all countries, including China, to halt the export of dual-use materials that bolster Russia’s war industrial base and enable its drone and missile strikes.
China, for its part, is expected to emphasise that dialogue and negotiation remain the only viable path out of the crisis. Beijing is likely to reiterate its opposition to “unilateral sanctions” and what it calls “long-arm jurisdiction”, warning that tariff wars benefit no one. In this regard, it may call on all parties to create conditions conducive to talks rather than increase coercive measures.
Russia is expected to argue that the actions of certain Western countries—particularly arms deliveries to Ukraine—are the main barrier to progress in the peace process. It has requested a Council meeting on this issue for 31 July. Russia may also contend that recent US measures were driven by what Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has called “immense” and “improper” pressure from the European Union (EU) and NATO leadership, and that European allies are dragging Washington into a damaging “sanctions vortex”.
Russia is likely to accuse Kyiv of using Western-supplied weapons to conduct what it describes as terrorist attacks against civilians and infrastructure inside Russia, while claiming that widespread corruption in Ukraine makes effective oversight of these arms transfers impossible. In this context, it may refer to the outcome document from the 6-7 July BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, which refrained from criticising Moscow and condemned attacks on Russian territory. Russia may also cite Kyiv’s new law limiting the independence of anti-corruption agencies and the subsequent eruption of protests against the law as evidence of internal instability.
