Haiti: Vote on BINUH Mandate Renewal*
On Monday morning (14 July), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing the mandate of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) for another six and a half months, until 31 January 2026. Panama and the US, the co-penholders on Haiti, authored the text.
Background
Since the July 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, the situation in Haiti has steadily deteriorated amid rising gang violence, political instability, and worsening humanitarian conditions. Armed gangs control most of the country’s capital, Port-au-Prince, and have expanded their reach into other regions. The Haitian National Police (HNP) and the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission have struggled to make significant headway against the gangs and continue to face substantial funding and equipment challenges.
The UN continues to highlight widespread human rights abuses committed by gangs, including kidnappings, grave violations against children, and rising levels of sexual violence, with the possession of trafficked firearms and ammunition by gangs identified as a key enabling factor. The UN has also reported abuses by “self-defence groups” and extrajudicial executions by Haitian law enforcement officials. The worsening humanitarian situation—with nearly 1.3 million people internally displaced due to armed violence—has not been accompanied by a corresponding increase in funding for relief efforts from the international community. The future of the political transition in the country remains uncertain due to the deteriorating security situation and fraught domestic political dynamics.
In his latest report on BINUH, which was issued on 27 June, the Secretary-General recommended the extension of the mission’s mandate for another year “with the logistical and security resources needed to operate in the current environment”. (For more information, see the brief on Haiti in our July 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
Negotiations on the Draft Resolution
It seems that the negotiations on BINUH’s mandate renewal were relatively smooth. Panama and the US circulated the first draft of the resolution to Council members on 27 June and convened an informal reading of the text on 30 June, inviting written comments by 2 July. The co-penholders then circulated a revised draft on 3 July and placed it under silence procedure until 8 July. Silence was subsequently broken by the “A3 Plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana). On 9 July, the co-penholders circulated a second revised draft, placing it directly in blue without an additional silence procedure.
Panama and the US opted for a short text, which diplomats have been referring to as a technical rollover. (The term “technical rollover” is used to describe a concise resolution extending a peace operation’s mandate without altering its core mandate or tasks. It traditionally denotes an extension for a shorter period than is customary.)
The draft resolution in blue renews BINUH’s mandate until 31 January 2026. It maintains the mission’s core mandate and tasks, as most recently outlined in resolution 2743, which in July 2024 renewed BINUH’s mandate for one year.
It seems that the co-penholders’ decision to extend BINUH’s mandate by six and a half months—rather than one year as in the mission’s three previous mandate renewals—was taken because several elements of the prospective UN response to the crisis in Haiti remain unclear. The proposed shorter extension is apparently intended to allow the Council to revisit BINUH’s mandate once there is greater clarity.
One key area of uncertainty concerns the Security Council’s response to the recommendations contained in the Secretary-General’s 24 February letter on options for additional UN support to Haiti, notably regarding the establishment of a UN Support Office to provide logistical and operational support to the MSS mission. The letter was issued pursuant to a 29 November 2024 request from the Security Council for the Secretary-General to provide recommendations on the full range of options for UN support for Haiti.
Council members have discussed the options proposed by the Secretary-General—most recently during closed consultations on 30 June—but have yet to deliberate on a response. This appears to be largely due to the lack of clarity regarding the US position on the Secretary-General’s proposals and, more generally, on its approach to addressing the security situation in Haiti. With the US remaining the principal provider of financial support to the MSS mission, Council members have been waiting for the US to determine its position before advancing proposals on the next steps for Haiti.
Other factors that could allow members to have a clearer picture in January 2026 include the Council’s possible re-authorisation of the MSS mission, which ends on 2 October, and the finalisation of an ongoing internal review of BINUH’s mission concept. This review process is being carried out by the UN Secretariat in coordination with BINUH in light of the difficult operating environment faced by the mission—including limited air extraction capacity—and significant political and security developments since the establishment of BINUH in 2019. The internal review is taking place against the backdrop of the broader UN80 initiative, a reform agenda aimed at streamlining the organisation in response to persistent funding challenges faced by the UN. According to the latest Secretary-General’s report on BINUH, the revised mission concept will be completed this month (July) following the Council’s decision on BINUH’s mandate.
A point of friction during the negotiations was how to appropriately reflect the need for the Council to address the Secretary-General’s 24 February letter. The initial draft apparently expressed the Council’s “willingness” to consider the Secretary-General’s recommendations. It appears that, during the negotiations, the “A3 Plus” members proposed strengthening this language through the addition of “without further delay” in order to better reflect the urgency of considering the Secretary-General’s proposals. It seems that this request was supported by Denmark, France, Greece, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Slovenia, and the UK. In response, the co-penholders apparently replaced “willingness” with “intention” in the first revised draft.
It seems that the change did not satisfy the “A3 Plus” members, which broke silence on this issue and reiterated their request that “without further delay” be added to the text. This request, which was again supported by several Council members, was partially reflected in the draft in blue, which expresses the Council’s intention to consider the Secretary-General’s recommendations “without delay”.
During the negotiations, the co-penholders also added an operative paragraph reaffirming the Council’s commitment to support “a comprehensive, Haitian-owned and Haitian-led solution that addresses the root causes of the current multidimensional crises in Haiti”. It seems that this paragraph was added following a request from China and is consistent with its position that Haitian authorities hold the primary responsibility for addressing the country’s challenges.
While a compromise was eventually reached on how to refer to the need for the Council to address the Secretary-General’s letter, it seems that several members do not yet see a clear path for the Council to move forward on the letter’s options, particularly regarding the proposed UN Support Office. According to the Secretary-General’s proposal, the Support Office would be funded through peacekeeping assessed contributions. The US, a major financial contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget, has been increasingly critical of UN peacekeeping operations and has indicated its intention to withhold funding for UN peacekeeping missions. On Haiti, although the US has generally restated its commitment to support the country, it has also stressed that it is no longer willing to shoulder a significant financial burden to do so. Conversely, China has argued that the US, having spearheaded the establishment of, and pledged support to, the MSS mission, should follow through on its commitments.
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**Post-script: On 14 July, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2785, renewing the mandate of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) for another six and a half months, until 31 January 2026.
