Iran: Non-proliferation Briefing
Tomorrow afternoon (24 June), the Security Council will convene for its biannual briefing on the implementation of resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme. Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo is expected to brief on the Secretary-General’s latest report on the implementation of resolution 2231, which was circulated to Council members on 19 June (S/2025/397), as well as on more recent developments. The Council’s facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231, Ambassador Samuel Žbogar (Slovenia), will report on the Council’s work regarding resolution 2231. The head of the European Union (EU) delegation to the UN, Ambassador Stavros Lambrinidis, is expected to brief on the work of the JCPOA’s Joint Commission. The commission comprises the current parties to the JCPOA—China, France, Germany, Iran, Russia, and the UK—and the EU serves as its coordinator. The US was originally a party to the JCPOA but withdrew in 2018.
Tomorrow’s meeting is the last mandated briefing under resolution 2231, which expires on 18 October, and it comes at a critical inflection point in the international community’s efforts to address the Iranian nuclear issue. On 13 June, Israel launched a military offensive aimed at dismantling Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, conducting airstrikes against nuclear sites, missile production facilities, government institutions, and other targets across the country. Iran has retaliated with a series of ballistic missile and drone strikes against Israel. As at 21 June, the Israeli strikes had killed at least 400 people and injured over 3,000 in Iran, while the Iranian strikes had killed 24 Israelis and injured over 1,200, according to UN reports citing figures from state authorities.
On 21 June, the US entered the conflict, launching strikes against three Iranian nuclear facilities: Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow. Israel had previously targeted all three sites in its offensive, but only Natanz and Isfahan appeared to have sustained damage, as the Fordow enrichment plant—a heavily fortified site buried deep under a mountain in central Iran—is more difficult to breach. In its operation, the US targeted Fordow with a dozen “bunker-busting” bombs known as the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), a powerful 30,000-pound explosive that only the US has in its military arsenal. It also dropped two MOPs on Natanz, another enrichment facility, and fired cruise missiles at the Isfahan nuclear research complex, where most of the country’s highly enriched uranium was stored.
In a 21 June address, US President Donald Trump said that the operation had achieved its objective of destroying Iran’s nuclear enrichment capacity, having “completely and totally obliterated” the targeted facilities. In a press briefing the following day, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine said that the initial damage assessment indicated that all three sites had sustained “extremely severe damage and destruction”, although he cautioned that a final assessment would “take some time”. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that the sites had been hit but said that it could not yet verify the impact of the strikes on Fordow “in view of its underground location and the penetrating nature of the bombs used”. The Agency also confirmed that off-site radiation at all three facilities remained at normal levels. Notably, however, the status of Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium—which the country had previously taken “special measures” to protect—was unclear at the time of writing.
Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi described the US strikes as a “grave violation” of the UN Charter, international law, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), adding that Iran reserves “all options to defend its sovereignty, interest, and people”. Analysts suggest that possible Iranian reactions include conducting strikes on US military bases in the region, withdrawing from the NPT, or blocking access to the Strait of Hormuz, a maritime passage between Iran and Oman through which a large share of global oil exports travel. At the time of writing, media reports indicated that Iran had launched missiles against US bases in Iraq and Qatar.
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Iran and the US had been engaged in talks on a bilateral agreement to curb Iran’s nuclear programme—which it claims is for civilian purposes—in exchange for sanctions relief. Last month, the US proposed a framework under which Iran would give up its national enrichment capabilities and instead join a regional consortium that would enrich uranium for civilian nuclear purposes under monitoring by the US and the IAEA. Iran appeared poised to reject that proposal when Israel launched its offensive. The country subsequently cancelled the next round of talks with the US that was scheduled to take place on 15 June, but some of its officials maintained that Iran remained open to negotiations. It seemed that Trump had previously entertained this possibility as well, saying in a 19 June statement that he would give diplomatic efforts more time and decide “within the next two weeks” whether or not to take military action. Following the US operation two days later, Trump has not directly addressed the possibility of resuming negotiations and has expressed support for regime change in Iran.
The Security Council convened emergency meetings on 13 June and 20 June to discuss the latest hostilities between Iran and Israel. It met again yesterday (22 June) following the US strikes. In his remarks at the most recent meeting, Secretary-General António Guterres described the US operation as marking a “perilous turn” and reiterated his condemnation of “any military escalation in the Middle East”. He warned that the region risks entering a cycle of retaliation and called for an immediate halt to hostilities and a return to negotiations on a “credible, comprehensive and verifiable” solution to Iran’s nuclear programme. At tomorrow’s meeting, DiCarlo may reiterate these messages and urge Iran and the US to resume talks. Like the Secretary-General’s most recent report on the implementation of resolution 2231—which was issued after Israel launched its offensive but before the US assault—DiCarlo may also stress the increasing urgency of reaching a diplomatic solution in light of the recent developments and the approaching October expiry of the resolution, the objectives of which “have yet to be fully realized”, according to the report.
Council members are also likely to repeat their previous points on the recent escalation. Most are expected to call on the parties to exercise restraint, pursue de-escalation, and return to negotiations. Some members—such as Denmark, Greece, France, and the UK—may also stress that Iran must never obtain a nuclear weapon, referring to the country’s increased production of highly enriched uranium, the IAEA’s assertion in its most recent quarterly reports on Iran that it is unable to provide assurance that the country’s nuclear programme is “exclusively peaceful”, and to the subsequent decision of the IAEA Board of Governors to find Iran in breach of its non-proliferation obligations. In this regard, France and the UK—which together with Germany comprise the three European (E3) parties to the JCPOA—may reiterate their readiness to invoke the agreement’s “snapback” mechanism to reimpose the UN sanctions on Iran that were in place before that agreement. European members may also echo messaging from the joint statement that the E3 foreign ministers and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas issued following their 20 June meeting with Araghchi in Geneva.
By contrast, members such as Algeria, China, Pakistan, and Russia may repeat their condemnations of Israeli and US strikes on Iran as violations of international law and the UN Charter and denounce attacks on nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards as dangerous escalations that undermine the global non-proliferation regime. Russia may repeat its argument that France and the UK have not fulfilled the legal requirements or procedural steps outlined by the JCPOA as preconditions for initiating the snapback mechanism.
For its part, the US may refer to what it has described as the imminent threat of a nuclear-armed Iran and characterise its military operation as a collective act of self-defence in that context. It is also likely to invoke the findings of the IAEA’s recent reports on Iran to bolster this argument, and it may criticise the country for not accepting the framework agreement that it had proposed last month. Additionally, the US may reiterate its warnings to Iran not to further escalate the situation by attacking US bases or interests in the region.
At yesterday’s Council meeting, China, Pakistan, and Russia announced that they had introduced a draft resolution in response to recent developments. It seems that the draft text—which is open for comments by Council members until 6 pm today (23 June)—condemns strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities and calls for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire; the protection of civilians; and a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Some members may use tomorrow’s meeting to publicly signal their positions on the draft text.
