Haiti: Closed Consultations*
On Monday afternoon (30 June), Security Council members are expected to hold closed consultations on Haiti. The meeting was requested by Panama and the “A3 Plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) to formally begin deliberations on the Secretary-General’s 24 February letter containing recommendations on options for UN support for Haiti. Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas Miroslav Jenča and a UN Department of Operational Support (DOS) official are the requested briefers.
The Security Council has yet to respond to the proposals contained in the Secretary-General’s 24 February letter. The letter was issued pursuant to a 29 November 2024 request from the Security Council for the Secretary-General’s recommendations on the full range of options for UN support for Haiti. The Council made this request after failing to agree on a draft resolution proposed by the US and then-Council member Ecuador—the Council’s co-penholders on Haiti at the time—that would have directed the Secretary-General to initiate plans to transform the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission into a UN peacekeeping operation. The draft resolution was ultimately abandoned following opposition from China and Russia, which cited the difficult history of past UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti, among other reservations. (For more information, see the brief on Haiti in our April 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
In his 24 February letter, the Secretary-General said that transforming the MSS mission into a peacekeeping operation was “not assessed as a feasible option”, adding that “[s]uch a transition could be considered once significant progress has been made in substantially reducing gang territorial control”. Instead, he recommended, among other things, the establishment of a UN Support Office to provide logistic and operational support to the MSS mission, such as accommodation, medical capability, and support for mobility and information technology. Assessed contributions from the UN’s peacekeeping budget would cover this support, while scaled-up voluntary contributions from UN member states would cover forms of support for the MSS mission that the UN cannot provide, such as stipends, military-grade capabilities, and lethal equipment. The letter also proposed that the UN Support Office provide “a limited, non-lethal support package” to the Haitian National Police that would be funded mostly through voluntary contributions. It further recommended several options for the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), such as focusing on tasks including supporting the Haitian authorities in handling the detention of “high-risk individuals” and enabling the authorities to implement UN sanctions, “notably the arms embargo”.
In requesting Monday’s closed consultations, Panama—which is the Council’s co-penholder on Haiti, together with the US—and the A3 Plus cited the deteriorating security situation in the country. The request follows a 19 June letter from Kenya to the Security Council (S/2025/402), which requested “expeditious consideration” by the Council of the Secretary-General’s proposals. Kenya’s letter said that 991 officers are currently deployed in Haiti—amounting to only 39.6 percent of the 2,500 originally planned—and that the mission remains underequipped and without adequate operational support to effectively carry out its tasks, notably preventing the establishment of several Forward Operating Bases which would be critical for the mission’s success.
The letter said that Kenya supports the establishment of a UN Support Office in Haiti. It stated that the Council’s delay in deliberating on the Secretary-General’s proposals “is especially worrying” considering the looming expiration of the Council’s authorisation of the MSS mission, which ends on 2 October. It described several factors that are generating uncertainties regarding the future of the MSS mission, such as the underfunding of the UN-administered trust fund for the mission, and the fact that current contracts for the mission’s Life Support Area (LSA), which are funded by the US, will expire on 30 September. (The LSA is a training area and support hub for MSS personnel.) Suggesting the possibility of Kenya’s future disengagement, the letter noted that, due to these uncertainties, Kenya feels “duty bound to review” its engagement in Haiti and “take the necessary decisions”.
Monday’s closed consultations follow a similar meeting on 28 May, which had been requested by the ten elected members of the Council (E10) to prompt active consideration of the Secretary-General’s proposals. That meeting, however, did not result in the substantive discussion of the options outlined in the Secretary-General’s letter. This appeared to be largely due to the lack of clarity regarding the US position on the proposals, and more generally, on its approach to addressing the security situation in Haiti. With the US remaining the principal provider of financial support to the MSS mission, Council members have thus far been waiting for the US to clarify its position before advancing proposals on the next steps for Haiti.
In recent public meetings, US officials have generally restated their country’s commitment to support Haiti, while also stressing that the US is no longer willing to take on a heavy financial burden. They have also urged states from the region—particularly from the Organization of American States (OAS)—to assume a more prominent role in responding to the security crisis in Haiti. For instance, addressing the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 20 May, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that he would like to see the OAS “provide a mission” of member countries to “deal with the issue of Haiti”; a proposal that does not appear to enjoy the support of states from the region. More recently, speaking at the OAS General Assembly on 26 June, the US said that it “cannot continue to carry this heavy financial burden” on Haiti, adding that, if the OAS is “unwilling or unable to play a constructive role in Haiti, then we must seriously ask ourselves why the OAS exists”.
Monday’s closed consultations are expected to be followed on 2 July by the Council’s regular 90-day briefing on the situation in Haiti. Jenča is expected to brief the Council on recent developments and on the Secretary-General’s latest report on BINUH. UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Executive Director Ghada Fathi Waly is also expected to brief. Closed consultations are scheduled to follow the briefing.
Haiti remains gripped by a multifaceted crisis as armed violence continues. The Secretary-General’s report, which was circulated to Council members on 26 June, and covers developments from 15 April until 20 June, says that armed gangs have tightened their grip around the areas of the country’s capital, Port-au-Prince, that remain under state control, and increased their capacity to carry out attacks in the Central and Artibonite departments (S/2025/418). Among other issues, the report describes an increase in levels of sexual violence committed by gangs during the reporting period, the dire impact of the violence on children—with children, as young as eight, comprising 30 to 50 percent of the gangs’ ranks—as well as concerning levels of internal displacement and acute food insecurity.
While noting some progress in Haitian efforts to advance the political process, particularly regarding the constitutional review and electoral preparations, the Secretary-General notes in his report that “sustained political progress will only be achieved through concerted efforts to address and significantly improve the security environment”. In this respect, he calls on UN member states to “take action” on his February 2024 proposals, notably regarding the provision of logistical and operational support to the MSS mission through the establishment of a UN Support Office.
Security Council members are also expected to soon begin negotiations on BINUH’s mandate renewal prior to its 15 July expiration. In this regard, the Secretary-General’s report underscores the essential role of BINUH in addressing the root causes of the protracted political and security crisis in Haiti and recommends the extension of BINUH’s mandate for another year “with the logistical and security resources needed to operate in the current environment”.
Noting the difficult operating environment for BINUH and significant political and security developments since the establishment of the mission, the report says that the Secretariat, in coordination with BINUH, conducted a review of BINUH’s mission concept. It says that, based on this review, “several strategic measures have been identified to prioritize mission tasks, reduce staffing and rationalize resources to enable mandate implementation under the prevailing security conditions”. It adds that the “revised mission concept will be completed in July following the Security Council’s decision on the mandate”.
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*Post-script (1 July): The story was amended to reflect that UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Executive Director Ghada Fathi Waly was also expected to brief at the 2 July meeting.
