Democratic Republic of the Congo: Briefing and Consultations
This afternoon (27 June), the Security Council will convene for an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), including the work of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the DRC and Head of MONUSCO Bintou Keita will brief based on the Secretary-General’s latest report on the mission, which was circulated to Council members on 20 June and covers developments since 29 March (S/2025/403). The chair of the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Michael Imran Kanu (Sierra Leone), is also expected to brief on the work of the committee. The DRC and Rwanda are expected to participate in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
Prior to the meeting, nine signatories to the Shared Commitments on Women, Peace and Security (WPS)—Denmark, France, Greece, Guyana, Panama, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Sierra Leone, Slovenia, and the UK—are expected to deliver a joint statement on WPS in the DRC. The US, although a signatory to the Shared Commitments, is not expected to participate in the joint statement.
At this afternoon’s meeting, Council members are likely to focus on the ongoing mediation efforts aimed at addressing the security situation in eastern DRC. Today’s meeting coincides with the signing of a peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda under US auspices in Washington, DC. The two countries exchanged recriminations over alleged support for their proxies in the conflict in eastern DRC. The DRC accuses Rwanda of supporting the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23), a rebel group which has been fighting the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and allied militias in eastern DRC. On the other hand, Rwanda asserts that the DRC supports the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), an ethnic Hutu armed group active in eastern DRC that was implicated in the 1994 genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda. The accusations of both sides have been corroborated by reports of the Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee.
On 25 April, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosted the DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and La Francophonie, Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, and Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Olivier Nduhungirehe, in Washington, DC. During the meeting, he facilitated the signing of a Declaration of Principles between the two countries, aimed at supporting a “pathway to peace, stability, and integrated economic development in the eastern DRC region and the resumption of normal bilateral relations”.
Since then, the two countries have been negotiating a draft peace agreement with the US’ facilitation. According to an 18 June joint statement released by the DRC, Rwanda, and the US, technical teams from both countries have initialled the text of the peace agreement, which was scheduled at the time of writing to be signed this morning in Washington, DC, by the foreign ministers of the DRC and Rwanda, at a ceremony to be attended by Rubio. This afternoon, Council members are expected to welcome the signing of the peace agreement, which could contribute to normalising relations between the two countries and easing tensions in eastern DRC and the wider Great Lakes region.
Qatar has also played a mediation role aimed at facilitating dialogue between the Congolese government and the M23. Following an initial direct meeting between representatives of both parties in Doha under Qatari facilitation, the Congolese government and the M23 issued a joint declaration on 23 April, reaffirming their commitment to an immediate cessation of hostilities and their categorical rejection of hate speech and intimidation, and calling on local communities to uphold these commitments. It appears that Qatar has proposed a separate draft peace agreement currently under negotiation between the DRC and M23; however, progress on this draft appears to be limited at this stage.
Council members have been underscoring the need to harmonise and streamline the various mediation efforts. In April, they held an informal interactive dialogue (IID), which was meant to help them gain a clearer understanding of the coordination and complementarity among these ongoing mediation efforts. Keita may address this issue today by elaborating on her recent engagements with relevant interlocutors who have been involved in these mediation efforts. She may particularly refer to her meeting in Lome in early June with Togolese President Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé, who was appointed as the African Union (AU) mediator in April. On 17 May, Gnassingbé convened a meeting with the five co-facilitators appointed by the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). (For more information on the co-facilitators, see our 11 April What’s in Blue story.) According to the communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, the discussion was focused on adopting a coherent approach in the African-led mediation efforts and ensuring the necessary coordination with other external actors, such as the US and Qatar. Keita might also mention the coordination meeting among the various mediation efforts held in Doha on 30 April, in which representatives from the DRC, France, Rwanda, Togo, and the US participated.
This afternoon, Council members are also likely to be interested in hearing from Keita about the challenges facing MONUSCO in light of developments in the security situation in eastern DRC since January, including restrictions on its freedom of movement and troop rotation. Keita may brief Council members about her 12-15 June visit to Goma and her meeting with the leadership of the M23. According to the Secretary-General’s report, the discussions focused on establishing a framework between MONUSCO and the M23 to ensure the safety and freedom of movement of UN personnel. Council members may take note of this development and reiterate their call for the lifting of all restrictions.
The presence of disarmed Congolese defence and security forces sheltered at MONUSCO bases following the capture by the M23 of Goma, the capital of North Kivu province, was one of the contentious issues between the mission and the rebel group, which had been demanding their handover. Keita may refer to the completion in May of an operation to transfer these forces and their families from Goma to Kinshasa with MONUSCO’s support. The agreement on the relocation resulted from negotiations facilitated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with the Congolese government and the M23.
Another issue that Keita may address in her briefing is the implementation of MONUSCO’s disengagement plan, which was agreed with the Congolese government in November 2023. In line with resolution 2765 of 20 December 2024, which most recently renewed MONUSCO’s mandate, the mission and the Congolese government were expected to submit to the Security Council, by 31 March, a tailored strategy for a gradual, responsible, and sustainable withdrawal. However, the escalation of the security situation in the eastern DRC since January significantly altered the context and affected the development of the strategy.
Keita might reference the joint note that the mission sent together with the Congolese government to the Security Council on 2 May titled “On the Transition in South Kivu and the Disengagement of MONUSCO” (S/2025/274). The letter, among other things, recommends that MONUSCO be entrusted with the task of supervising a ceasefire in line with resolution 2773 of 21 February and the decisions of the AU and its regional mechanisms. The resolution encouraged the EAC and the SADC to cooperate closely with MONUSCO, given the mission’s potential role in monitoring and implementing any future ceasefire agreement.
In the context of the negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda in Washington, DC, the two parties appear to have acknowledged the need for multilateral peacekeeping, inter-positional forces, and verification forces and mechanisms. However, there is no indication so far that they have requested MONUSCO to be involved in supervising a ceasefire. Following the Council’s inability to apply resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023—which addresses the financing of AU-led peace support operations—to support the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) through UN assessed contributions, there appears to be some interest in the DRC potentially serving as another test case under this resolution, but it seems too early to say whether this will get any traction in the Council.
