Peacebuilding Architecture Review: Informal Interactive Dialogue of the General Assembly and Security Council with the Peacebuilding Commission
On Thursday morning (8 May), the General Assembly and the Security Council will hold an informal interactive dialogue (IID) with the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) on the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR). The dialogue will open with introductory remarks by Cameroon, Greece, and Germany in their capacities as President of the General Assembly, President of the Security Council, and Chair of the PBC, respectively. Subsequently, Egypt and Slovenia will make presentations in their capacities as the PBAR co-facilitators for the General Assembly and Security Council, respectively. This will be followed by an interactive dialogue open to all UN member states.
This is the fourth PBAR since the establishment in 2005 of the PBC, the Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), which together form the UN’s peacebuilding architecture. Following a year of informal consultations, the formal PBAR process—held every five years to strengthen peacebuilding efforts across the UN system—began in January. (For more information about the PBC and the PBAR process, see our 13 March research report titled “The Peacebuilding Commission at 20: Progress, Challenges, and the Road Ahead”.)
According to the terms of reference for the 2025 PBAR, Thursday’s IID is expected to help shape recommendations that will inform the twin resolutions that the General Assembly and Security Council are slated to adopt by the end of the year. The main input to the review is the Secretary-General’s report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, dated 25 November 2024, which synthesises findings from the informal phase, including contributions from member states, UN entities, civil society, and regional consultations. In the report, the Secretary-General urged a “paradigm shift” based on two principles: treating conflict prevention as a universal priority and advancing nationally led peacebuilding strategies anchored in human rights and inclusive governance. He also called for a stronger and better-resourced PBC, more predictable funding for the PBF, and greater coherence across the UN system.
Building on the Secretary-General’s report and other inputs from both the informal and formal phases of the review process, the PBAR co-facilitators circulated on 2 May a document to member states containing a preliminary set of proposals. The document—titled “Elements Paper”—stresses the need to move from rhetoric to implementation and impact, with particular emphasis on strengthening the role of the PBC. It outlines proposals across four main areas: reinforcing the PBC’s advisory, bridging, and convening functions; encouraging member states and partners to provide more predictable and diversified financing for peacebuilding; enhancing the capacity of the PBSO to improve coordination of UN peacebuilding activities; and improving UN system-wide coherence through better use of disaggregated data to track peacebuilding outcomes.
With national prevention strategies gaining traction as an emerging focus of the UN’s future peacebuilding efforts, a key issue likely to be raised during Thursday’s IID is how to balance national ownership with inclusive peacebuilding. Promoted by the Secretary-General in the New Agenda for Peace and reaffirmed in the Pact for the Future, national prevention strategies reflect growing interest in early action to tackle the roots of violence—with the PBC providing a platform for voluntary exchange on prevention approaches, and the PBF offering catalytic funding support. Still, tensions remain over how far the peacebuilding architecture—and the UN more broadly—should be involved in promoting such strategies. Many member states view national ownership primarily through the lens of sovereignty and non-interference, while others interpret it as a commitment to inclusive governance, calling for the meaningful participation of civil society, women, and youth. In the absence of an agreed framework or mandate to balance these concerns, disagreements persist over whether national prevention strategies represent a sovereign choice for member states or an expectation imposed by the international community. During the IID, member states may stress the universality of peacebuilding challenges, the importance of embedding prevention strategies in national planning, and the fact that such approaches are not intended as an extra burden on countries but rather as a tool to build on their existing national priorities.
Financing for peacebuilding is another key yet contentious issue in the 2025 review. Since taking office, Secretary-General António Guterres has repeatedly called for a “quantum leap” in support for the PBF, setting an annual budget target of $500 million. This call helped secure the General Assembly’s 2023 decision to approve $50 million in annual assessed contributions, which was the first such PBF allocation of its kind. That amount was intended to complement, not replace, voluntary funding. Yet amid rising global instability—with over 120 armed conflicts recorded in 2024, the highest number since the end of World War II—the PBF is far from reaching the $500 million target, reflecting a broader decline in peacebuilding aid, which dropped from $4.9 billion in 2014 to $3.1 billion in 2023. Further cuts are expected in 2025 due to reductions in member states’ official development assistance. In this context, speakers at Thursday’s IID are expected to underscore that investing in prevention and peacebuilding is not only a moral imperative but also a cost-effective way to reduce the long-term expenses of conflict response and recovery. Discussions are also expected to focus on strategies for maximising impact with fewer resources, shifting the emphasis from funding to results. Member states may stress the need for disaggregated, independently verifiable data and return-on-investment methodologies to demonstrate the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions and make the case for sustaining and expanding future UN peacebuilding support.
Another issue likely to arise during the IID is the role of the PBC and the PBF in the formation, renewal, transition, and drawdown of UN peace operations. The 2016 twin resolutions on the UN peacebuilding architecture—General Assembly resolution 70/262 and Security Council resolution 2282 of 27 April—called on the Security Council to seek the PBC’s advice at each of these stages. In practice, however, its involvement has been limited: the PBC has not been consulted during the initial formation of mandates, has provided inconsistent input during renewals, and has mostly supported transition and drawdown phases in countries where it is already involved through a standing arrangement (known as a “configuration”). The PBF has been more active, directing an estimated 26 percent of its financing in 2024 to UN transition settings, but it also faces growing constraints in the current funding climate.
The role of the peacebuilding architecture in UN transition settings was one of the topics discussed at a PBC retreat that the PBSO and the non-profit organisation Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation convened with Security Council members at Greentree on 1 and 2 May. In the context of recent and impending mission transitions, participants at the retreat noted that the 2025 PBAR is expected to test whether the UN system can deliver more consistent, timely, and trusted support to countries navigating the exit of peace operations. In this context, member states may use Thursday’s IID to call for linkages between the PBAR and the UN’s ongoing peace operations review, arguing for a clearer, more consistent role for the PBC in supporting the peacebuilding dimensions of mission mandates from formation to drawdown. (For more information about the forthcoming review of UN peace operations, see the In Hindsight in our April 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
Balancing the need for a more capable PBSO with demands for fiscal discipline is another key issue in the ongoing PBAR. The “Elements Paper” recommends strengthening the PBSO to more effectively support the PBC, manage the PBF, and foster strategic partnerships. However, this proposal comes at a time when the UN is facing significant financial strain, including mounting arrears from member states and expected budget cuts. These pressures have driven a broad push for consolidation and efficiency, chiefly under the Secretary-General’s UN80 initiative—a reform agenda aimed at streamlining the organisation in connection with its 80th anniversary this year. During the IID, member states may acknowledge that broader reforms and cost-saving measures are necessary while arguing that underinvesting in the PBSO would weaken the very architecture meant to deliver on prevention and peacebuilding. In this regard, some may call for targeted reinforcements that ensure impact without unnecessary expansion.
Looking ahead, negotiations on the 2025 PBAR are expected to pause for the summer and resume after the General Assembly’s high-level week in September. While many member states have begun coordinating positions within regional or like-minded groupings, it remains unclear what position the US—still the UN’s largest financial contributor—will adopt at this stage of the process under the administration of President Donald Trump. As negotiations move forward, the extent to which member states can converge on practical, adequately resourced reforms will shape whether the peacebuilding architecture can meet rising expectations in an increasingly fragile global landscape.
