Bosnia and Herzegovina: Debate
Tomorrow morning (6 May), the Security Council will hold its semi-annual debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). High Representative for BiH Christian Schmidt is scheduled to brief on the latest report of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which was circulated to Council members on 1 May and covers the period from 16 October 2024 to 15 April (S/2025/272). Željka Cvijanović, the Serb member of the rotating tripartite inter-ethnic Presidency of BiH and the incumbent Chairperson of the Presidency, is expected to participate under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
Background
The 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), also known as the Dayton Agreement, created two entities within BiH: the predominantly Bosniak and Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the predominantly Serb Republika Srpska (RS). The two entities are linked by a rotating tripartite inter-ethnic presidency and a two-chamber legislative branch with equal representation by the three major ethnic groups. Both entities also have their own executive and legislative branches.
The GFAP also established the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) to oversee implementation of the agreement’s civilian and military aspects, respectively. In 1996, IFOR was replaced by the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR), which in turn was replaced in 2004 by the EU-led Multidimensional Stabilisation Force (EUFOR), also known as Operation Althea. The current Council authorisation for EUFOR-Althea expires on 1 November.
In December 1995, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) was established to garner international support for the Dayton Agreement. In 1997, the PIC agreed to grant significant legislative powers to the High Representative, including the ability to make binding decisions and unseat elected officials who are found to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Dayton Agreement or the terms of its implementation.
Tomorrow’s Meeting
Tomorrow’s debate will take place amid what the latest OHR report describes as an “extraordinary crisis” in BiH “stemming from the actions set in motion by [RS] President Milorad Dodik”. On 26 February, the BiH state court sentenced Dodik to one year in prison and banned him from holding political office for six years for defying the decisions of the High Representative. The trial against Dodik began in February 2024 following the filing of charges in August 2023 by the BiH Prosecutor’s Office. (For more information, see the brief on BiH in our November 2024 Monthly Forecast.)
Dodik appealed the verdict on 11 April, and an appellate court ruling is expected by the end of this year. In response to the initial verdict, the RS National Assembly (RSNA) adopted a statement asserting that the court’s decision was “rendered on the basis of a decision imposed by a foreign national, contrary to the Constitution of [BiH], and as such, constitutes a breach of the constitutional order of [BiH]”. The RSNA also passed legislation to ban state-level judicial and law enforcement institutions from operating in the entity’s territory, a move that the latest OHR report says “hint[s] at de facto secession”.
In a 27 February statement, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that Dodik’s sentencing was politically motivated, expressed support for RS authorities, and noted that Russia was employing all “political means” to prevent the situation from “developing into a negative track”. At Russia’s request, Security Council members subsequently held closed consultations on BiH on 6 March, during which Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo briefed. In requesting the meeting, Russia apparently argued that the state court’s decision regarding Dodik had drastically worsened the internal situation in BiH, increased tensions, and posed a serious threat to the Dayton Agreement. (For more information, see our 6 March What’s In Blue story.)
On 12 March, the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH issued arrest warrants for Dodik, RS Prime Minister Radovan Višković, and RSNA Speaker Nenad Stevandić. The three officials faced accusations of undermining the constitutional order by enacting the legislation that barred state-level judicial and law enforcement institutions from operating within RS territory.
On 13 March, the RSNA adopted a new draft constitution along with a draft law on the “protection of the constitutional order of RS”, asserting the entity’s claimed right to form its own judiciary and army. The draft constitution also included provisions granting RS the authority to form alliances with other states. The OHR report describes the adoption of the draft constitution as a “particularly dangerous step”. At Slovenia’s request, Council members discussed these developments under “any other business” after closed consultations on 21 March. Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas Miroslav Jenča briefed.
In a 28 March press statement, Security Council members expressed deep concern about recent developments in BiH. The statement reaffirmed the Council’s full support for the GFAP and its annexes, urging all political actors to adhere to the Dayton Agreement and BiH’s constitution and to engage in sincere, open, and constructive dialogue aimed at preserving the country’s unity and political stability. Council members also emphasised the need to avoid “confrontational approaches” and refrain from “provocative and divisive rhetoric and actions”.
Tensions escalated further following the 8 April decision by Denis Bećirović and Željko Komšić—the Bosniak and Croat members of the rotating tripartite inter-ethnic Presidency of BiH, respectively—to adopt a set of conclusions calling on EUFOR-Althea to support domestic police agencies in enforcing judicial rulings, including the arrest of Dodik and other RS officials. Cvijanović opposed the move and announced that she would invoke the “vital entity interest” clause of the GFAP, which allows a majority of the Serb, Bosniak, or Croat delegates in the state legislature to block a proposed law or decision that they consider harmful to their “vital interests”. On 23 April, BiH State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) officers reportedly attempted to arrest Dodik in East Sarajevo, but were prevented from doing so by RS police.
At tomorrow’s debate, Schmidt is expected to underscore the main challenges to implementing the civilian provisions of the GFAP, as well as the 5+2 Agenda, which is a set of five objectives and two conditions defined by the PIC as prerequisites for the closure of the OHR. In this context, Schmidt is likely to criticise the continued efforts by the ruling coalition in RS to question and undermine the OHR’s legitimacy. He is also expected to reference the decrees issued by the OHR since his last briefing, including the 24 April decision to suspend all disbursements of budgetary funds to two ruling RS political parties, including Dodik’s Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD).
Council members broadly agree that BiH’s entrenched ethnic divisions and ongoing political polarisation pose risks to the country’s stability. There is a shared recognition of the urgent need for inter-ethnic dialogue, adherence to the constitution, and full respect for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in line with the Dayton Agreement. While there is also consensus on the importance of avoiding inflammatory actions, views diverge regarding the root causes of the rising tensions.
Most members are critical of the separatist rhetoric and recurring threats of dissolution from RS authorities, which they regard as undermining BiH’s sovereignty and constitutional framework. Russia, by contrast, continues to back Dodik’s positions and attributes the current crisis to what it considers illegitimate international oversight of BiH, particularly by the High Representative. China and Russia also dispute the legitimacy of Schmidt’s appointment by the PIC Steering Board in 2021, which they argue required formal Security Council endorsement. Other Council members, however, maintain that Schmidt’s appointment complied with the procedure laid out in Annex X of the Dayton Agreement and does not require Council confirmation. (For more information, see our 21 July 2021 What’s in Blue story.)
At tomorrow’s meeting, many Council members are expected to reaffirm their support for the GFAP, EUFOR-Althea, and the OHR. These members are likely to underscore the importance of upholding the rule of law and ensuring due process, including by supporting the implementation of decisions issued by state-level institutions such as the BiH state court and law enforcement agencies. Some may criticise recent actions perceived to violate the constitutional order and hinder BiH’s progress on its path toward EU membership.
Several members are also expected to invoke the 30th anniversary of the 1995 Srebrenica genocide—which occurred during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War—as a solemn reminder of the devastating consequences of sectarian animosity, stressing the need for national reconciliation.
Russia is anticipated to object to Schmidt’s participation in the meeting, accusing his office and its Western supporters of illegitimate interference in BiH and characterising the OHR as an outdated institution that should be dismantled. Moscow is also expected to draw attention to a report submitted by RS authorities to the Security Council today (5 May), which has not been made public at the time of writing. The report apparently blames BiH’s political crisis on Schmidt, accusing him of acting unlawfully and undermining BIH’s constitutional order by issuing binding decisions without Security Council appointment.
