Non-proliferation: Private Meeting
On Monday afternoon (28 April), the Security Council will hold a private meeting on non-proliferation. France—the Council president for April—is convening the meeting, which will be chaired by French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi will brief the Council.
A concept note that France sent to Council members apparently says that the meeting is intended to provide a “comprehensive view” of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which is “facing increasingly serious challenges”. Recalling that preparations are underway for the next Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—expected to take place in the summer of 2026—the concept note emphasises the Council’s responsibility to address this security issue and to support the nuclear non-proliferation architecture, which is built on the NPT as its “cornerstone”.
The aim of the NPT is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to advance general disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, and to promote international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Since the treaty entered into force in 1970, NPT Review Conferences have typically been scheduled every five years, allowing state parties to review the treaty’s implementation, update its commitments, and provide recommendations to advance its objectives. The previous Review Conference was originally scheduled to be held in 2020, in line with the five-year cycle, but it was postponed to August 2022 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. It ended without consensus on an outcome document due to objections by Russia to proposed language concerning nuclear safety and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine. This marked the second consecutive time—following the 2015 Review Conference—that state parties failed to reach agreement on an outcome document.
Monday’s meeting coincides with the opening of the third and final Preparatory Committee session, which is scheduled take place from 28 April to 9 May at UN Headquarters in New York. The Preparatory Committee will set the groundwork for the 2026 Review Conference by assessing current non-proliferation progress and challenges and making recommendations that will steer the conference’s agenda and negotiations.
To help guide Monday’s discussion, the concept note for the meeting outlines the following objectives for the Council:
- Reflect on the current challenges facing the international non-proliferation regime;
- Recommit to supporting the NPT and the IAEA ahead of the upcoming NPT Review Conference; and
- Discuss ways for the Security Council to fulfill its mandate to address non-proliferation threats and to ensure the full and effective implementation of Security Council-imposed sanctions.
Against this backdrop, the concept note highlights the “ongoing proliferation crises” concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran, issues which several Council members are likely to raise at Monday’s meeting.
Many members are concerned about the DPRK’s nuclear weapons programme. Although the DPRK has been subject to extensive UN sanctions intended to curb this programme since 2006, the country is widely considered to have been able to continue successfully developing its nuclear capabilities. On 22 April, Grossi warned that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons programme has grown “exponentially” and called on the international community to resume high-level diplomacy with the country to address this threat.
The DPRK, for its part, has shown little willingness to take steps towards denuclearisation. In a mid-March statement, the DPRK’s foreign ministry vowed to “steadily update and strengthen” its nuclear capabilities. The statement appeared to be a response to a 14 March joint statement issued by the foreign ministers of the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US), which demanded that the DPRK “abandon all its nuclear weapons and any other weapons of mass destruction as well as ballistic missile programmes in accordance with all relevant [Security Council] resolutions”.
Despite the escalating threat posed by the DPRK, the Council has proven unable to take substantive action to address the problem since 2017, when it last updated the 1718 DPRK sanctions regime. China and Russia have repeatedly blocked efforts to increase pressure on the DPRK, including in May 2022, when they vetoed a draft resolution that was intended to strengthen UN sanctions against the country. Most recently, in March 2024, Russia vetoed a draft resolution extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK sanctions committee. (For more information, see our What’s in Blue stories dated 27 May 2022 and 22 March 2024.)
International concern about Iran’s nuclear programme has also intensified as the country has continued to increase its production of highly enriched uranium following the US’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 during President Donald Trump’s first term. After Trump’s return to office this year, the US re-initiated negotiations with Iran on a new agreement to curb its nuclear programme in exchange for the lifting of US sanctions. Following two high-level meetings in April, Oman—which has been mediating the negotiations—announced that the parties “have agreed to enter into the next phase of their discussions that aim to seal a fair, enduring and binding deal which will ensure Iran completely free of nuclear weapons and sanctions, and maintaining its ability to develop peaceful nuclear energy”. The parties are scheduled to hold technical-level talks over the coming weekend to discuss the parameters of such a deal.
Meanwhile, Security Council resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015—which endorsed the JCPOA—is set to expire in October. That resolution allows any party to the JCPOA to initiate a “snapback” mechanism that would reinstate the UN sanctions against Iran that were in place prior to the JCPOA. In a 6 December 2024 letter to the Council, France, Germany, and the UK—known within the context of the JCPOA as the “E3” countries—reiterated their “determination to use all diplomatic tools to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, including using snapback if necessary”. Iran has said that it would leave the NPT if the snapback is triggered. (For more information, see the Iran brief in our December 2024 Monthly Forecast and our 11 March What’s in Blue story.)
More broadly, the Secretary-General stressed in his 2023 policy brief A New Agenda for Peace that the “non-proliferation regime needs to be buttressed against a growing array of threats”, adding that non-proliferation and disarmament efforts are “two sides of the same coin” that are mutually dependent. At Monday’s meeting, some Council members may echo this point and express disappointment that the last two NPT Review Conferences failed to achieve an outcome document at the same time as international disarmament treaties are facing mounting challenges. Members may stress the need to develop new confidence-building measures and to re-engage in dialogue towards the reduction of nuclear arsenals.
In this regard, some members may note with concern that the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is set to expire in February 2026. New START is the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms control agreement between Russia and the US, limiting the number of nuclear warheads that the countries can deploy. In February 2023, Russia announced that it would suspend its participation in the treaty and negotiations for a successor for the treaty were abandoned, calling into question the future of arms control for the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals.
On Monday, several Council members are expected to express continued support for the work of the IAEA. This includes the implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreements—which every non-nuclear NPT state party is required to conclude with the IAEA to ensure that its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes—and the agreements’ Additional Protocol, which strengthens the IAEA’s ability to verify the peaceful use of nuclear materials and to detect undeclared nuclear activities. Similarly, members are expected to call for a recommitment to the NPT process in view of the upcoming Preparatory Committee session and Review Conference. All Council members except Pakistan are state parties to the NPT, and although the country is a member of the IAEA, it has not signed the Additional Protocol.
Council members may also express support for resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004, which aims to prevent non-state actors from obtaining weapons of mass destruction and established the 1540 Committee to support such efforts. Members may highlight the importance of the resolution’s implementation and stress the need to address new proliferation risks, including those arising from emerging technologies.
