Kosovo Briefing
Tomorrow afternoon (8 April), the Security Council will convene for its first regular briefing this year on the situation in Kosovo. Special Representative and head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Caroline Ziadeh is expected to brief on the Secretary-General’s latest report on UNMIK (S/2025/200), which was circulated to Council members on 1 April and covers developments from 16 September 2024 to 15 March. Kosovo and Serbia are expected to participate under rule 39 and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, respectively.
Ziadeh is expected to highlight key political and security developments in Kosovo during the period covered by the Secretary-General’s report. She may note that despite some progress in implementing European Union (EU)-facilitated agreements, tensions between Belgrade and Pristina have persisted.
At tomorrow’s briefing, Ziadeh may stress the need for Kosovo and Serbia to reaffirm their commitment to the EU-facilitated dialogue and to fully implement existing agreements, including the Agreement on the path to normalisation of 27 February 2023 and its Implementation Annex of 18 March 2023. The 11-point Agreement stipulates that neither Kosovo nor Serbia can represent the other in “the international sphere” and that Serbia will not object to Kosovo’s membership in international organisations. In exchange, Kosovo committed to forming “specific arrangements and guarantees…to ensure an appropriate level of self-management” for the Serbian community in Kosovo. Diverging views on the sequencing of the implementation, however, have hindered concrete progress. (For more information, see the brief on Kosovo in our April 2024 Monthly Forecast.)
On 28 October 2024, the Serbian government adopted draft laws designating Kosovo as an “area of special social protection”, establishing a framework for providing financial assistance to certain groups in Kosovo. On the same day, the Serbian government adopted a separate bill on the organisation and jurisdiction of its judicial authorities, extending the competence of the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office and the High Court in Belgrade to include the prosecution of criminal offences committed in Kosovo. Pristina reportedly condemned the measures, viewing them as a violation of Kosovo’s sovereignty.
On 29 November 2024, Pristina approved a decision allowing residents who had registered marriage, birth, and death certificates with Serbia-administered institutions in Kosovo since 10 June 1999 to register these civil status documents with relevant Kosovo authorities. The registration process commenced on 1 February and is scheduled to conclude on 30 April, according to the Secretary-General’s report on UNMIK. Tomorrow, Ziadeh may encourage targeted outreach efforts aimed at engaging the affected communities to raise awareness of this process.
On 17 December 2024, then-EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue Miroslav Lajčák convened talks in Brussels with Kosovo and Serbian negotiators. During the meeting, the parties agreed on the terms of reference for the Joint Commission on Missing Persons, which is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the 2023 Declaration on Missing Persons and is expected to complement the work of the existing Working Group on Missing Persons in Kosovo, chaired by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
However, the Commission’s inaugural meeting, which was scheduled for 15 January, did not take place following Pristina’s decision to close several parallel institutions in Kosovo on the same day. (Parallel institutions refer to a network of administrative, educational, and healthcare structures in Kosovo administered and funded by Serbia that operate alongside structures affiliated with Pristina, often in areas with a significant ethnic Serbian population.) According to the Secretary-General’s report, Serbia’s chief negotiator Petar Petković said that the decision showed that Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti “did not want dialogue, but rather violence and a direct confrontation with Kosovo Serbs”. In turn, Kosovo’s representative Andin Hoti accused Belgrade of “lacking readiness to cooperate on the issue of missing persons”. Tomorrow, Ziadeh is likely to appeal to Belgrade and Pristina to capitalise on the establishment of the Joint Commission within the framework of the EU-facilitated dialogue and to support the activities of the Working Group on Missing Persons in the spirit of reconciliation, trust-building, and respect for human rights.
According to Kosovo police, the 15 January closures of parallel institutions—targeting post offices and social welfare centres—were carried out to establish “order and legality”. The Secretary-General’s report notes that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić described the operations as “acts of terror”, while representatives of the international community, including the Quint—comprising representatives from France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US—and China, expressed concerns about the closures. The EU criticised the move for being inconsistent with Kosovo’s obligations under the EU-facilitated dialogue and emphasised that the status of Serbia-supported structures should be resolved through dialogue.
The Secretary-General’s report notes that “Kosovo Serbs and other non-majority community members have continued to face difficulties in accessing salaries, pensions, child support and disability payments by Serbia” as a result of the closures, which “aggravated relations between Kosovo Serbs and the Kosovo government and threatened the livelihoods of the most vulnerable”. In a 16 January statement, Ziadeh expressed similar concerns and urged a renewed commitment to the EU-facilitated dialogue.
Tomorrow, Ziadeh is likely to echo these messages, noting that concerns raised by non-majority communities—in particular, the Kosovo Serb community—regarding the closure of institutions providing essential services need to be addressed. She is also likely to stress the importance of safeguarding the economic and social rights of non-majority communities. In this regard, she may call on the parties to refrain from actions that deepen mistrust between communities and institutions.
Ziadeh is also expected to emphasise that the security situation in northern Kosovo remains fragile. On 29 November 2024, a powerful explosion severely damaged the Ibar-Lepenac/Ibër-Lepenc water canal in the northern municipality of Zubin Potok. In the immediate aftermath, Kurti reportedly accused Belgrade of orchestrating the attack, which Vučić dismissed as baseless. In response, the Kosovo Security Council approved emergency measures to increase security around strategic infrastructure while police announced arrests connected to the attack.
Ziadeh strongly condemned the attack, noting that it caused significant damage to critical civilian infrastructure and interrupted the water supply. She described the incident as “deeply concerning” and warned that it “risks undermining stability”. Ziadeh also underscored the need for a comprehensive and transparent investigation to hold those responsible for the attack accountable. She is likely to reiterate this message at tomorrow’s briefing.
On 9 February, Kosovo held parliamentary elections, which the Secretary-General’s report describes as having “proceeded peacefully without major incidents”. According to the report, the incumbent Vetёvendosje party obtained 41.63 percent of votes (48 of the 120 seats in the Assembly), ahead of the Democratic Party of Kosovo and the Democratic League of Kosovo, which secured 20.95 percent (24 seats) and 18.27 percent (20 seats), respectively. Despite securing a plurality, Vetёvendosje fell short of an outright majority—which it previously held—and will need to form a coalition to govern. In Serb-majority areas, Srpska Lista (Serbian List) secured nine out of the ten seats guaranteed for Kosovo Serbs. The Secretary-General’s report notes, however, that “opposition parties representing Kosovo Serbs reported alleged pressure on Kosovo Serbs to vote for the Serbian List”.
At tomorrow’s meeting, Council members are expected to express concern about the fragile security situation in northern Kosovo and urge the parties to prioritise de-escalation, avoid any unilateral actions, and return to the EU-facilitated dialogue. Some members may express support for the newly appointed EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, Peter Sørensen, who assumed his position on 1 February.
Council members are expected to underscore the importance of UNMIK’s work in fostering trust between communities, promoting human rights and the rule of law, and supporting progress towards normalising the relations between Belgrade and Pristina. However, some members may highlight that the situation in Kosovo has changed considerably since UNMIK’s establishment in 1999. These members may call for a strategic review of the mission. By contrast, Russia is likely to oppose any changes to UNMIK’s mandate, staffing, or budget, arguing that the mission’s current configuration remains fit for purpose.
