Great Lakes Region: Briefing and Consultations
This afternoon (16 April), the Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on the Great Lakes region. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region Huang Xia will brief on the Secretary-General’s latest biannual report on the implementation of the 2013 Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework (PSC-F) for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the region, which is dated 1 April and covers the period from 16 September 2024 to 27 March. UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell is also expected to brief. The DRC, Kenya, and Rwanda will participate under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, as will Angola in its capacity as chair of the African Union (AU).
Before the meeting, Council members that are supporters of the joint pledges related to climate, peace and security—Denmark, France, Greece, Guyana, Panama, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Sierra Leone, Slovenia, and the UK—will hold a stakeout on the security implications of climate change in the Great Lakes region.
Xia is expected to focus his briefing on the security situation in eastern DRC, which has deteriorated significantly since the Council’s last meeting on the Great Lakes in October 2024. The Council has met six times on the situation since the beginning of the year, including most recently on 27 March. The Council also adopted resolution 2773 on 21 February, which condemned the ongoing offensive by the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces and called on the group to immediately cease hostilities, withdraw from areas it controls, and fully reverse the establishment of illegitimate parallel administrations. (For more information, see our 21 February What’s in Blue story.)
At today’s meeting, Xia may describe the latest security developments, including the M23’s capture on 19 March of Walikale, a mining town along a major highway leading to Kisangani, the capital of Tshopo province. This is the furthest west that the rebel group has advanced as part of its latest offensive operations. On 22 March, however, the M23 announced its decision to “reposition” its forces from the town and surrounding areas to “foster conditions conducive to peace initiatives and political dialogue”. The Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) also reportedly announced a suspension of military operations in the area. However, the Congolese government and the M23 traded accusations about responsibility for an attack that took place on 11 and 12 April in Goma—the capital of North Kivu province—in which at least 50 people were reportedly killed.
Additionally, Xia may describe the military activities of other armed groups operating in eastern DRC, which remain a major factor fueling regional tensions. According to the Secretary-General’s report, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—a Ugandan armed group affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh)—was responsible for 150 security incidents in North Kivu and Ituri provinces during the reporting period, resulting in 498 civilian casualties. Another foreign armed group that remains active in eastern DRC is the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), an ethnic Hutu armed group implicated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsis. The Secretary-General’s report says that the FDLR were responsible for several attacks against civilians during the reporting period, resulting in at least 35 casualties, while intensifying their collaboration with other armed groups.
Xia may also refer to clashes in the South Kivu province between the Burundi National Defense Force (FDNB) and the Résistance pour un État de Droit au Burundi (RED Tabara), a Burundian armed group active in eastern DRC. The FDNB operates in the DRC under a bilateral agreement with the Congolese government. In addition to targeting Burundian armed groups, the FDNB has supported the FARDC in its fight against the M23.
Another security development mentioned in the Secretary-General’s report is the repatriation of “elements” of foreign private security companies previously operating in eastern DRC. Nearly 300 of these mercenaries—who were apparently contracted by the Congolese government to counter the M23 offensive—surrendered in January following the M23’s capture of Goma. Russia has previously been criticised by some Council members over the role of the Africa Corps—a Russian private security company formerly known as the Wagner Group that is involved in various conflict situations across Africa—and has, in turn, criticised those members for their silence on the role of foreign combatants in eastern DRC.
Russell may highlight the grave violations of children’s rights that have been committed in eastern DRC during the ongoing violence. (The six grave violations, as determined by the Security Council, are child recruitment and use; killing and maiming; rape and other forms of sexual violence; attacks on schools and hospitals; abductions; and the denial of humanitarian access.) The Secretary-General’s latest report on the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), dated 20 March and covering developments since 29 November 2024, verified 472 grave violations during the reporting period, the majority of which were attributed to the M23, in addition to other local and foreign armed groups as well as the FARDC. The report notes efforts by the mission and UNICEF to engage the Congolese government to adopt a “Charter against the instrumentalization of children for political, electoral and conflict purposes”.
At today’s meeting, some Council members may address the ongoing tensions between countries of the region in light of the escalating security situation in eastern DRC. The exchange of recriminations between the DRC and Rwanda has continued, with the DRC accusing Rwanda of supporting the M23 and Rwanda criticising the DRC for allegedly supporting the FDLR. Xia may refer to the meeting between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Doha on 18 March, which some Council members welcomed during the Council’s 27 March meeting. (For more information, see our 26 March What’s in Blue story.)
Relations between Burundi and Rwanda have also been strained. In January 2024, Burundi closed its border with Rwanda, accusing it of supporting Burundian armed groups, which Rwanda has denied. For its part, Rwanda has accused Burundi of collaborating with the FDLR, a claim that Burundi has similarly rejected. At today’s meeting, Xia may note recent contacts between the countries’ military and intelligence officials, potentially indicating a mutual interest in mending ties. Nonetheless, Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye accused Rwanda of planning to attack Burundi in a 25 March interview, complicating efforts between the two countries to de-escalate tensions.
In more positive developments, Xia might mention the continued cooperation between the DRC and Uganda under Operation Shujaa, a joint military offensive targeting the ADF, the mandate of which was recently extended by the two countries until September 2025. According to the Secretary-General’s report, more than 3,000 Ugandan Peoples’ Defense Forces (UPDF) troops were deployed between 31 January and 2 March to North Kivu and Ituri provinces to fight the ADF as well as the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo (CODECO), another local armed group active in these two provinces. The cooperation between the two countries has continued despite findings by the Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee that Uganda has supported the M23, an allegation Uganda denies.
Council members have previously underscored the need to find a political solution to the crisis in eastern DRC through dialogue and negotiation. In this regard, they have expressed support for regional mediation efforts, which they apparently reiterated in their most recent meeting with regional actors on 11 April in the informal interactive dialogue (IID) format. (For more information, see our 11 April What’s in Blue story.) At today’s meeting, Angola is likely to highlight its engagement in regional mediation efforts—particularly through what was known as the Luanda Process aimed at easing tensions between the DRC and Rwanda—and its continued role in support of these efforts as the current AU chair. While Council members have been generally supportive of the Luanda Process, some seem to be disappointed by Angola’s withdrawal from its mediator role in it following the election of Angolan President João Lourenço as the rotating Chairperson of the AU in February.
Council members may also wish to be updated on the discussions on the revitalisation of the PSC-F, in line with the decision of the 11th Regional Oversight Mechanism (ROM) held in Burundi in May 2023. The next ROM summit, to be hosted by Uganda this year, is expected to consider the recommendations of an independent assessment report to be submitted by the Technical Support Committee (TSC)—a structure under the ROM—on the revitalisation of the PSC-F. Xia might inform Council members of his visit to Uganda in March, including his meeting with President Yoweri Museveni to discuss the convening of the 12th ROM summit in Kampala.
Council members have consistently underscored the need to address the root causes of the conflict in the DRC, including through the promotion of sustainable and transparent natural resource management. At today’s meeting, this issue may draw renewed attention in light of recent media reports that the DRC has offered the US access to its critical minerals in exchange for US support in its fight against the M23. In a 19 March interview with US media, Tshisekedi explained the reasoning behind this offer, which he argued “will give strategic advantage to both countries”. Earlier this month, newly appointed US Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Massad Boulos visited the Great Lakes region, including the DRC, where he met with Tsishekedi and other Congolese officials. Following his meeting with Tsishekedi, Boulos reportedly said that he had reviewed the DRC’s mineral proposal and “agreed with the president on a path forward for its development”.
