Arria-formula Meeting on Small Arms and Light Weapons
Tomorrow (4 April), Sierra Leone will convene an Arria-formula meeting on “Small Arms Control and Weapons Management in UN Sanctions Regimes”. The meeting is being co-sponsored by Algeria, Guyana, and Somalia. The expected briefers are Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Adedeji Ebo; African Union (AU) High Representative for Silencing the Guns Mohamed Ibn Chambas; Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) Assistant Director for Policy, Innovation and Strategy Callixtus Joseph; and a UN sanctions committee arms expert.
The meeting will begin at 10 am EST and take place in Conference Room 2. It is expected to be broadcast on UNTV and will be open to representatives of all UN member states and permanent observers, UN entities, and civil society organisations.
The concept note that Sierra Leone has circulated for the meeting notes that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) poses a threat to international peace and security, particularly in conflict zones where UN sanctions apply. The note describes these weapons as “primary drivers of hostilities” that are often exploited by illegal armed groups, with severe consequences for conflict-affected countries and regions, undermining UN peacebuilding and stabilisation efforts and prolonging conflict. While the Security Council has imposed arms embargoes to restrict the flow of SALW in numerous sanctions regimes, the concept note outlines challenges in enforcing these measures, including illicit trafficking and market networks operating across porous borders.
According to the concept note, tomorrow’s meeting aims to facilitate a discussion on how to enhance the effectiveness of arms embargoes imposed by UN sanctions regimes to counter the illicit flow of SALW. The meeting will explore strategies for improving member states’ compliance and strengthening monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, as well as ensuring synergies between national, regional, and international efforts. The concept note suggests several guiding questions for the discussion, including:
- How can the UN strengthen compliance and enforcement mechanisms for arms embargoes imposed by the Security Council?
- What are the key challenges in preventing illicit cross-border arms flows to armed groups, and how can neighbouring states and international actors better cooperate to disrupt transnational trafficking networks?
- How can regional organisations—particularly the AU through its Silencing the Guns in Africa initiative—support arms control in sanctioned countries?
At tomorrow’s meeting, Ebo may cover measures that the Security Council has taken to address the issue of SALW over the past 25 years, both thematically and in country and region-specific contexts. Since the agenda item was first introduced in 1999, the Council has adopted several products on this issue, including resolution 2117 of 26 September 2013, resolution 2220 of 22 May 2015, and resolution 2616 of 22 December 2021. (For more information, see our 25 September 2013, 21 May 2015, and 21 December 2021 What’s in Blue stories.) In particular, Ebo may note that resolution 2616 recognised the significance of UN arms embargoes in preventing the illicit flow of SALW and encouraged member states to take several measures to enhance their effectiveness and address violations.
Resolution 2616 also requested the Secretary-General to include general trends regarding illicit arms trafficking in violation of arms embargoes in his biennial reports on SALW, submitted pursuant to resolution 2220. In this regard, Ebo may refer to the latest report, dated 1 November 2023, which described such trends based on previous reporting by panels of experts supporting UN sanctions committees. The Secretary-General’s report noted that armed groups continue to benefit from access to SALW in several conflict situations around the world, such as the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Libya, Mali, Somalia, and Yemen. The report made a number of recommendations to member states to address the issue, including the provision of capacity-building to affected countries, improved domestic arms marking and record-keeping systems, and enhanced cooperation with UN panels of experts.
Providing more detail on country-specific situations, Ebo may reference the Security Council’s adoption of resolution 2653 of 21 October 2022, which established a new sanctions regime on Haiti that included targeted arms embargo measures—later expanded into a territorial arms embargo through resolution 2699 of 2 October 2023—in response to concerns about the destabilising impact of illicit arms trafficking by gangs in the country. By contrast, he may also note the Council’s decisions to lift the arms embargoes on the Federal Government of Somalia and CAR in December 2023 and July 2024, respectively. (For more information, see our 1 December 2023 and 29 July 2024 What’s in Blue stories.)
Chambas may describe progress and challenges in implementing the AU’s Silencing the Gun initiative, which emphasises African-led efforts to end conflicts in the continent by curbing the flow of illicit weapons. The Security Council adopted resolution 2457 of 27 February 2019 to endorse this initiative, underscoring the need to stem the illicit flow of arms to achieve a “conflict-free” Africa. However, the implementation of the initiative has faced significant setbacks, as the AU has struggled to address intractable conflicts throughout the continent, including the war in Sudan and the ongoing crisis in eastern DRC, as well as the escalating situation in South Sudan. Various armed groups are also contributing to severe instability in several regions, including West Africa and the Sahel. Furthermore, several African countries have recently undergone unconstitutional changes of government, a trend that some analysts argue undermines the AU’s governance rules and norms. Heightened geopolitical rivalry among major and emerging powers has further intensified these challenges to peace and security on the continent.
The AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) received an update on the implementation of the Silencing the Guns initiative on 18 December 2024. It subsequently requested the AU Commission to convene a high-level forum this year to comprehensively assess and take stock of the implementation of the initiative. Nonetheless, the AUPSC’s persistent calls to end Security Council arms embargoes in conflict situations such as the CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan could be perceived to be in tension with the Silencing the Guns agenda, which emphasises arms embargoes as an important measure in efforts to prevent the proliferation of SALW.
Joseph may outline CARICOM’s efforts to address the cross-border flow of illicit arms, which remains a driver of violence in the Caribbean. He may underscore the importance of regional cooperation by shedding light on the work of CARICOM’s IMPAC, a mechanism intended to facilitate multilateral efforts to counter crime and security threats in the region. The UN sanctions expert may explain the work of panels of experts in assisting UN sanctions regimes—which includes monitoring the implementation of arms embargoes—and describe the exacerbating impact of SALW on conflict situations subject to sanctions.
In recent years, several elected Council members have focused on SALW as a priority issue during their terms. Kenya and Mexico—which served on the Council concurrently in 2021 and 2022—worked to integrate SALW-related issues into the Council’s consideration of country-specific situations and other thematic matters, culminating in the adoption of resolution 2616 penned by Mexico. Among current elected members, Sierra Leone has paid special attention to arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation due to its interest in and experience with these issues as a post-conflict country. At tomorrow’s meeting, Sierra Leone may highlight the role of its national Small Arms Commission in preventing the proliferation of SALW, while noting that the illicit flow of arms continues to fuel conflict and instability across West Africa and the Sahel.
Other Council members tend to underscore the primary role and responsibility of national governments in addressing SALW. Within international fora, Russia has maintained that the General Assembly is the most appropriate body for discussing SALW-related matters. Although the country has been amenable to considering SALW in the context of certain issues—such as peacekeeping, arms embargoes, security sector reform (SSR), and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)—Russia, along with China and then-Council member India, abstained on resolution 2616, which addressed SALW in relation to some of these topics. In its explanation of vote, Russia argued that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to SALW across all arms embargoes and peacekeeping missions “runs counter to the very nature of such regimes and missions, which are approved by separate decisions of the Council when considering country-specific situations with their own particularities”. China expressed similar sentiments, while India voiced concern about the resolution’s intention to consider requesting peace operations to support host countries in countering illicit arms trafficking, which it described as “a major addition” to existing mandates.
