Vote on a Draft Resolution Renewing the Al-Shabaab Sanctions Regime*
Tomorrow afternoon (3 March), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution extending the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime and renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee. The draft text, which was authored by the UK (the penholder on Somalia), also renews until 13 December the authorisation for maritime interdiction to enforce the embargo on illicit arms imports, the charcoal exports ban, and the improvised explosive device (IED) components ban. (Other measures of the regime—including general and targeted arms embargo measures, travel ban, and assets freeze—are open-ended.)
Background
The PoE assisting the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee submitted its final report on 15 October 2024. The report said that Al-Shabaab remains the most significant threat to the peace and security of Somalia, with the capacity to carry out complex attacks against the Somali government, African Union (AU) forces, and international forces. The report also acknowledged a significant shift in the “strength and disposition” of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) faction in Somalia (ISIL-Somalia). Additionally, the report highlighted an increase in piracy incidents, with more than 25 attacks, including hijackings, reported on commercial vessels and dhows since 24 November 2023. (For more information, see our 12 December 2024 What’s in Blue story.)
On 15 October 2024, the Secretary-General submitted a report on progress in Somalia’s weapons and ammunition capacity, which indicated that progress had been incremental at the federal government level. It also noted that an urgent challenge is extending the weapons and ammunition management frameworks, processes, and structures to the federal member state level, considering the different needs, priorities, and perspectives of each state. The report added that countering the illicit flow of arms and ammunition into Somalia also remains a critical issue.
On 13 December 2024, the Security Council adopted resolution 2762, a short technical rollover of the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime until 28 February and of the mandate of the PoE assisting the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee until 31 March. Council members decided to pursue a technical rollover in light of the parallel negotiations at the time on post-AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) security arrangements in Somalia. (The term “technical rollover” is commonly used by diplomats to describe a concise resolution extending a peace operation’s mandate without altering its core mandate or tasks. It traditionally denotes an extension for a shorter period than is customary.)
Negotiations on the Draft Resolution
The negotiations on the draft text were apparently difficult. The UK circulated an initial draft of the resolution on 11 February and convened two rounds of negotiations, on 14 and 20 February. The penholder shared a revised draft on 24 February and placed it under silence procedure until 25 February. However, the “A3 plus” grouping (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) broke silence, arguing that several issues that they had raised during the negotiations had not been addressed. Following further consultations with the “A3 plus”, the penholder placed a revised text under another silence procedure until the morning of 27 February. However, Russia, followed by China and Pakistan, broke silence over language relating to maritime security.
On 28 February, the Council adopted resolution 2775, a technical rollover until 3 March of the sanctions measures and other relevant provisions under the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime. This short extension was agreed to allow more time for consultations on the maritime security language. After a compromise was reached among the concerned Council members, the penholder made the necessary revisions and placed the draft text in blue on the afternoon of 28 February.
Somalia participated in negotiations on the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime for the first time as an elected Security Council member. It seems that the position of the “A3 plus” grouping was informed by Somalia’s desire for the Security Council to seriously consider the utility and effectiveness of the sanctions regime. The group’s position was apparently supported by China, Pakistan, and Russia.
During the negotiations, the “A3 plus” members proposed language requesting the Secretary-General to conduct a comprehensive technical assessment, in cooperation with the Somali government and the PoE, on the regime’s effectiveness in assisting the Somali government in countering the threat posed by Al-Shabaab. While other Council members apparently agreed with the proposal, they felt that it would be beyond the competence of the UN Secretariat to conduct a comprehensive technical assessment. Typically, the Secretariat carries out assessments of progress in implementing benchmarks for the gradual modification, suspension, or lifting of sanctions measures. These members therefore preferred that the PoE conduct the comprehensive technical assessment requested by the “A3 plus”, but the group apparently argued that would be asking the panel to evaluate its own work. It seems that the penholder proposed language based on text from resolution 2444 of 14 November 2018, which requested the Secretary-General to conduct a technical assessment regarding the arms embargo, while also suggesting that the PoE provide specific recommendations in its mid-term report on improving the sanctions regime. Eventually, it seems that Council members reached a compromise, deciding to include the former suggestion but to remove the latter proposal from the draft text.
Another contentious issue during the negotiations was the duration of the sanctions regime’s extension. The “A3 plus” proposed a six-month renewal of both the sanctions regime and the PoE’s mandate, pending the conduct of a technical assessment. However, other Council members felt that this would be too short of a timeframe for the panel to fully carry out its mandate and provide a comprehensive report to the sanctions committee. These members were also concerned about setting a precedent, with requests for a six-month extension of sanctions regimes becoming a trend. There was a similar push for a six-month renewal of the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime, which was eventually renewed for one year through resolution 2772 of 17 February. While maintaining the 12-month extension, the penholder proposed language expressing the Council’s intention to review the outcome of the technical assessment promptly upon receipt and make any necessary adjustments to the sanctions regime and the PoE’s mandate. Following the penholder’s consultations with the “A3 plus”, it appears that an understanding was reached to extend the sanctions regime until 13 December and renew the mandate of the PoE until 13 January 2026, a period of 12 months from the adoption of resolution 2762. The draft resolution in blue also retains the language conveying the Council’s intention to promptly consider the technical assessment upon receipt.
Another contentious issue during the negotiations was a reference to the federal member states and regional administrations of Somalia. It seems that Somalia wants to tighten control over the supply of weapons and ammunition to federal member states and licensed private security companies. The “A3 plus” apparently supported the Somali federal government’s desire to assert its role as the primary focal point for weapons and ammunition management. In this regard, the group apparently proposed removing from the draft text all references to federal member states and regional administrations as well as licensed private companies operating in Somalia that are allowed to import weapons, ammunition, and military equipment required for static and mobile protection.
It seems that other Council members felt uneasy about removing such references, given the role of federal member states and regional administrations in the fight against Al-Shabaab and the implementation of the sanctions regime. Additionally, it appears that some of these Council members, which have embassies in Mogadishu, rely on licensed private security companies for protection. The US apparently engaged bilaterally with Somalia on this issue, which seems to have helped in reaching a compromise. The draft resolution in blue maintains a reference to federal member states, but a footnote which lists the names of the federal member states as well as all other references to regional administrations were removed. The draft text in blue also states that deliveries of items covered in the resolution’s annex to federal member states or licensed private security companies operating in Somalia may only be provided in coordination with the Somali federal government and will be subject to a non-objection procedure by the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee. Other items not covered by the annex may also be provided in coordination with the Somali federal government but are subject to notification to the committee for information purposes only.
Finally, the issue of maritime security prolonged the negotiations, with disagreements on the issue forcing the Council to adopt a short technical extension. It seems that the US sought to strengthen a preambular paragraph on maritime security in the text, pointing to the resurgence of piracy in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean, as well as the links between Al-Shabaab and the Houthi rebel group in Yemen described in the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee. However, the “A3 plus” grouping apparently maintained that the PoE assisting the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee did not provide evidence of a direct link between Al-Shabaab and the Houthis in its final report and proposed removing the paragraph. The US apparently engaged with Somalia to address the issue, and it seems that an understanding was reached with the “A3 plus” after some amendments were made by removing the word “grave” in expressing concern about the situation and replacing “piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia” with “maritime security”. Nonetheless, China, Pakistan, and Russia broke silence, insisting on removing the reference to linkages between Al-Shabaab and the Houthis. Eventually, a compromise was achieved by removing the reference to the Houthis. Instead, the draft resolution in blue expresses concern about the flow of weapons and ammunition from Yemen to Somalia and emphasises the importance of preventing Al-Shabaab from developing relationships with “listed groups in the region”.
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**Post-script: On 3 March, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2776, extending the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime until 13 December and renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee until 13 January 2026. The resolution, among other things, requests the Secretary-General to submit a technical assessment regarding the arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab by 1 November. It also expresses the Security Council’s intention to make any necessary adjustments following receipt of the technical assessment.
