Syria: Briefing and Consultations
Tomorrow morning (25 March), the Security Council will hold a briefing on the political and humanitarian situations in Syria. Denmark’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, will chair the meeting. Special Envoy for Syria Geir O. Pedersen and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher are expected to brief on political and humanitarian developments, respectively. A civil society representative will also brief on the political process in the country, while also highlighting the importance of promoting Syrian women’s inclusion and participation as well as upholding their rights. Closed consultations are scheduled to follow the open briefing.
The meeting comes amid several significant developments on the political and security fronts in the country. Between 6 and 10 March, sectarian violence between the caretaker authorities and their affiliates on the one hand, and Alawite fighters on the other hand, reportedly left hundreds of civilians dead in Syria’s coastal governates of Latakia and Tartous, representing the most dangerous escalation of violence in Syria since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024. Council members discussed these developments in closed consultations on 10 March. Russia and the US requested the meeting and co-authored a presidential statement on the matter. Adopted on 14 March, the statement, among other things, condemned the violence; called on all parties to cease any further violence or inflammatory activities; and called for accountability and the protection of all Syrians, regardless of ethnicity or religion. (For more information, see our 14 March What’s in Blue story.)
Tomorrow, Council members are likely to reiterate their condemnation of the mass killings and call on the caretaker authorities to swiftly hold all perpetrators accountable by pursuing transparent, independent, and impartial investigations into the violence. Members may highlight concerns that another similar episode of sectarian violence could unfold and underscore the urgency of inclusive and transparent justice and reconciliation processes to mitigate this risk, including through concrete action from the fact-finding committee and the committee for civil peace set-up by the caretaker authorities in response to the recent violence. Pedersen might stress the critical need to subdue sectarian violence to facilitate an inclusive political process, while Fletcher may underscore the continued threat posed to civilians and civilian infrastructure by such violence and by hostilities in other parts of the country.
Another likely focus of tomorrow’s meeting is developments regarding Syria’s political transition. Following Assad’s rapid ousting in December 2024, the caretaker authorities have concentrated efforts on completely rebuilding Syria’s governance structures, with the aim of advancing Syrian national unity, consolidating the armed forces, and maintaining territorial integrity. Following the Syrian National Dialogue Conference, which took place on 25 February, Syrian interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa signed a constitutional declaration covering a five-year interim period. Sharaa had indicated that the declaration would be quickly followed by the formation of a new government to lead the interim period. Although the Syrian authorities had earlier indicated that the government would be formed by 1 March, its establishment has yet to be announced.
Tomorrow, Pedersen may stress that any upcoming steps—including the formation of the interim government—need to be fully inclusive of all diverse parts of Syrian society. He might underscore that commitments made by the caretaker authorities on the political process and transitional justice should be followed by tangible, systematic implementation, including through close cooperation with UN entities. Council members may echo some elements from the 14 March presidential statement, which called for “the implementation of an inclusive, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process, facilitated by the United Nations and based on the key principles of resolution 2254”. (Adopted on 18 December 2015, resolution 2254 focused on a political solution to the Syria crisis). They may also reaffirm the importance of the UN’s role in the political transition and their support for the Special Envoy’s efforts.
Some members may express concern that the constitutional declaration has been criticised and rejected by Kurdish political actors, who claimed that the declaration grants too much power to the executive and fails to guarantee the rights of Syria’s various national and religious groups. On 21 March, US State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce said that Washington has noted “concerns expressed around consolidation of power by al-Sharaa” and that it will continue to closely monitor whether actions taken by the caretaker authorities “guarantee equal rights and treatment for all Syrians and preserve individual freedoms”. Furthermore, some members may express hope that the authorities in Damascus will soon announce the formation of a diverse, representative interim government.
Security developments are another expected focus of tomorrow’s meeting. Some members may welcome the 10 March agreement between the caretaker authorities and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on the SDF’s integration of its military and civil institutions into those of the Syrian state. The SDF controls most of the territory in Syria’s northeast, a de facto autonomous region. Members may express concern, however, that military clashes between the SDF and Turkish-backed forces as well as Turkish airstrikes in northeast Syria have continued, raising questions about the implementation of the agreement. (Türkiye views the SDF as a terrorist organisation because of its close links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK], which has conducted a decades-long secessionist insurgency against Türkiye). Members are likely to call for immediate de-escalation and a ceasefire, in line with the announced agreement.
Council members may also raise concerns about Israeli military operations in Syrian territory. Since December 2024, Israel has launched hundreds of airstrikes on Syria and has expanded its military control over the Golan Heights, including within the demilitarised buffer zone established under the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria. On 22 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) carried out airstrikes targeting Syria’s Palmyra military airport and the nearby T-4 airbase, in what Israel described as part of its campaign to destroy weapons and military posts abandoned by Assad’s forces and to ensure that they are not recovered by forces hostile to Israel.
Several Council members may stress Israel’s obligation to adhere to international law and call on it to refrain from conducting further strikes in Syrian territory as well as to fully respect the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. Members may recall in this regard that the 14 March presidential statement reaffirms Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and “calls on all States to respect these principles and to refrain from any action or interference that may further destabilize Syria”.
Council members may also raise concerns regarding the resurgence of terrorism in Syria and the influence of foreign terrorist fighters as a significant obstacle to the country’s stability. Members may echo the presidential statement’s demand that Syria take decisive measures to address this threat.
Tomorrow, Pedersen may renew his plea for bolstering international support towards Syria during this transitional period. On 17 March, the European Union (EU) convened the 2025 Brussels IX Conference on “Supporting the future of Syria and the region” with the objectives of mobilising humanitarian and financial aid for Syria and rallying political support for a comprehensive, credible political solution. Donor countries pledged a total of $6.3 billion at the conference. Members may underline the importance of honouring the pledges announced during the conference, including those pertaining to accelerating Syria’s economic recovery, reconstruction, and resilience. In line with this, some members may stress the need for sanctions imposed on the country to be fully and urgently lifted, arguing that this would bring economic and humanitarian relief to the Syrian population.
Fletcher might emphasise that despite the scale of needs in Syria—which remains mired in a massive humanitarian crisis and is one of the largest displacement crises in the world—many gaps remain in funding for Syria’s Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP). In a 20 March press briefing, UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator in Syria Adam Abdelmoula said that despite funding gaps and challenges posed by ongoing hostilities, humanitarian access and the UN’s ability to coordinate the delivery of aid in Syrian territory has improved significantly since December 2024. Council members may call for enhanced funding from the international community, and some may express concerns regarding projected disruption to humanitarian efforts due to funding cuts for Syria’s HRP. Like in other country-specific humanitarian crises, the recent large-scale funding cuts to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) are likely to have a detrimental impact on the humanitarian situation in Syria, as the US funded just over 25 percent of the country’s 2024 HRP.
