Democratic Republic of the Congo: Briefing and Consultations
Tomorrow morning (27 March), the Security Council will convene for an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), including the work of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the DRC and Head of MONUSCO Bintou Keita will brief based on the Secretary-General’s latest report on the mission, which was circulated to Council members on 20 March and covers developments since 29 November 2024 (S/2025/176). A civil society representative is also expected to brief. Angola, the DRC, and Rwanda, represented by Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Olivier J.P. Nduhungirehe, are expected to participate in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
Although tomorrow’s session is the regular quarterly meeting on general developments in the country, the escalation in eastern DRC is likely to be a key focus of the meeting. Since January, Council members have been following closely the situation in the area, which has deteriorated significantly as the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group expanded its control over territory in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. Council members last discussed the situation in closed consultations on 11 March, which followed the adoption on 21 February of resolution 2773 that condemned the ongoing offensive by the M23 and called on the group to immediately cease hostilities.
Keita may address broader political developments in the DRC, particularly the constitutional revision announced by President Félix Tshisekedi in October 2024. In a 26 December 2024 joint statement, former president Joseph Kabila and Moïse Katumbi, a prominent opposition leader, expressed their intention to form an alliance against the proposed constitutional reform. Kabila has apparently been vocal recently about his desire to return to domestic politics. The discussion on the constitutional review appears to have been overshadowed by the dramatic deterioration of the security situation in eastern DRC, however.
Keita may refer to Tshisekedi’s intention to reshuffle his cabinet with a view to forming a government of national unity amid the security crisis in eastern DRC. In this regard, on 22 March, the government announced plans to initiate consultations on the matter with the involvement of the Sacred Union, the ruling parliamentary coalition, as well as with opposition parties, civil society representatives, and other prominent figures, including former presidential candidates.
Regarding the situation in eastern DRC, Keita might note that the M23 has more than doubled its control of territory in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, capturing strategic cities such as Goma and Bukavu, the respective capitals of these provinces. On 19 March, the M23 captured Walikale, a mining town along a major highway leading to Kisangani, the capital of Tshopo province. However, on 22 March, the group announced its decision to “reposition” its forces from the town and its surrounding areas to foster conditions favourable for dialogue.
Another likely focus of tomorrow’s meeting is the ongoing diplomatic efforts to address the crisis in eastern DRC. Keita may refer to the 18 March meeting between Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Doha, Qatar, under the facilitation of the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. According to a joint statement released after the meeting, the two leaders “reaffirmed the commitment of all parties to an immediate and unconditional ceasefire” as decided by a joint summit of the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on 8 February. (For more information, see our 19 February What’s in Blue story.)
The DRC and the M23 had apparently agreed to send delegations to Luanda for direct talks on 18 March under the auspices of Angolan President João Lourenço, who had been facilitating a regional mediation initiative known as the Luanda process. Announced following Tshisekedi’s meeting with Lourenço in Luanda on 11 March, the talks would have marked an encouraging step forward, as the DRC has not engaged directly with the M23, preferring instead to talk to Rwanda, which has been accused of supporting the rebel group. However, the M23 reportedly pulled out of the talks following a 17 March decision by the European Union (EU) to impose restrictive measures on nine individuals and one entity, including M23 President Bertrand Bisimwa, who was supposed to lead the group’s delegation to Luanda.
Angola appears to have not had prior knowledge of the Doha meeting, with Angolan Foreign Minister Tete António reportedly saying on 18 March that his country would continue its efforts to convene direct talks between the DRC and the M23. However, on 24 March, Lourenço announced his intention to step down from his mediation role in order to focus on his new responsibilities as the current Chair of the African Union (AU), a role that he assumed in February.
Keita may elaborate on MONUSCO’s support to the regional efforts and mention the series of regional meetings that took place recently, especially the second joint EAC/SADC summit which was held virtually on 24 March. This was preceded by meetings of technical experts and chiefs of defence from the EAC and SADC in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 23 and 24 February, respectively, as well as the EAC and SADC Council of Ministers meeting on 17 March in Harare, Zimbabwe. These meetings focused on the implementation of the decisions of the first joint EAC/SADC summit held on 8 February, one of which was to merge the two regional mediation efforts (the Luanda and Nairobi processes), whose aim has been to facilitate dialogue between the DRC and various armed groups in eastern DRC, including the M23, and ease diplomatic tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. Keita may mention the outcome of the second summit, including the appointment of five co-facilitators for the merged process: former presidents Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria), Uhuru Kenyatta (Kenya), Kgalema Motlanthe (South Africa), Catherine Samba-Panza (the Central African Republic), and Sahle-Work Zewde (Ethiopia).
Council members are likely to reiterate their continued support for ongoing regional efforts to find a lasting solution to the crisis in eastern DRC, as expressed in resolution 2733. They may welcome the reaffirmation of commitments by Tshisekedi and Kagame to these efforts and note the appointment of the five co-facilitators.
At tomorrow’s meeting, Keita may highlight the challenges facing MONUSCO in carrying out its mandated tasks, including the increasing threats to the safety and security of its peacekeepers and the restrictions imposed by the M23 on the mission’s freedom of movement. The Secretary-General’s report notes that this situation has forced the mission to “carefully balance its mandated priority to protect civilians with the need to ensure the security of its personnel”. It also describes “growing M23 hostility” towards the mission, noting that protests were staged at several MONUSCO bases around Goma in February, during which civilians echoed demands of the M23 for the handover of disarmed security forces under the mission’s protection.
The implementation of MONUSCO’s disengagement plan, which was agreed with the Congolese government in November 2023, has been a major issue for Council members. In line with resolution 2765 of 20 December 2024, which last renewed the mission’s mandate, MONUSCO and the Congolese government are expected to submit a tailored strategy to the Council by 31 March for a gradual, responsible, and sustainable withdrawal, considering the evolving conflict dynamics and protection risks. Tomorrow, Keita may explain the challenges to complying with this decision. The Secretary-General’s report says in this regard that the development of a tailored strategy is now “severely compromised by the M23’s advances in North and South Kivu, raising questions about the continued feasibility of the exercise in a radically changed context”.
Keita may also describe the logistical and operational support provided by MONUSCO to the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC)—which has been deployed in eastern DRC since December 2023—in line with resolution 2746 of 6 August 2024. SAMIDRC has faced significant challenges in implementing its mandate following the M23 offensive in North Kivu, in which several of its soldiers have been killed and others wounded. A SADC summit held virtually on 13 March decided to terminate SAMIDRC’s mandate, directing the mission’s troops to begin a phased withdrawal from the DRC.
Council members are likely to reiterate their support for MONUSCO, noting that the mission is operating under extremely difficult circumstances. Some members might also raise issues related to the future of the mission. In this regard, during the 11 March closed consultations on the DRC, the US apparently advocated for a strategic review of options for MONUSCO.
Some members may also express continued concerns about the humanitarian and human rights situations in eastern DRC. The ongoing conflict has resulted in the massive displacement of people and has involved crimes committed against civilians, including conflict-related sexual violence against women and girls. Today (26 March), the Informal Experts Group (IEG) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) held a meeting on the DRC, at which Keita briefed.
