Cooperation between the UN and the European Union: Annual Briefing
Tomorrow morning (11 March), the Security Council will hold its annual briefing on cooperation between the UN and the European Union (EU) under the agenda item “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas is expected to provide her first briefing to the Council since assuming her role in December 2024.
The Security Council has held annual briefings on EU-UN cooperation since 2010, except for the years 2012 and 2018. This practice is in line with the Council’s efforts to strengthen cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations, as envisioned in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In this vein, Council members have held annual consultative meetings with the members of the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) since 2007. In addition, the Council has convened debates and briefings on cooperation with other organisations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
At tomorrow’s meeting, Kallas and several Council members are expected to stress that strengthening the UN’s cooperation with regional organisations is essential to promoting multilateralism and addressing global threats, including emerging threats like climate change and cybersecurity. It appears that some speakers feel that such messages are particularly important at this moment, given the rising geopolitical tensions among the major powers and the scepticism expressed by US President Donald Trump about multilateral cooperation and efforts by his administration to curtail US foreign aid. In this regard, Kallas may restate the EU’s support to the UN, both in terms of political commitments, such as to upholding the UN Charter and supporting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and through its financial contributions. Kallas may note that the EU and its member states are the largest financial contributors to the UN system, adding that the EU has pledged a €1.9 billion budget for humanitarian assistance across the globe in 2025. She might also emphasise the importance of timely payment of dues to the UN, especially considering the liquidity crisis faced by the world body.
As in previous years, tomorrow’s meeting is likely to centre on areas of common concern between the EU and the UN, focusing on current crises that overlap on the EU and Security Council agendas. A likely key area of discussion in this regard is the Russia-Ukraine war. Tomorrow’s meeting comes against the backdrop of a dramatic pivot in US policy on Ukraine, which has also strained the relationship between the EU and the US, as the Trump administration has moved to shift responsibility for Ukraine’s security onto Europe.
The new dynamics came to a head at the UN on 24 February, the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when the US tabled two nearly identical texts at the Security Council and at the General Assembly, calling for a swift end to the Russia-Ukraine war and urging a lasting peace between the countries. The US-proposed General Assembly resolution competed with another draft authored by EU member states in cooperation with Ukraine, omitting references to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, thus triggering a diplomatic standoff with Kyiv and its European allies. European-proposed amendments to re-insert such references were adopted by the General Assembly, leading the US to abstain on its own resolution, which was adopted with 93 votes in favour, eight against, and 73 abstentions. Later that day, the Security Council’s five European members (E5)—Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia, and the UK—proposed similar amendments to the US-authored Security Council resolution. Two of the amendments were vetoed by Russia, while the third did not receive sufficient votes to be adopted. The resolution in its original form was adopted as resolution 2774 with ten votes in favour and five abstentions from the E5 members. (For background and more information, see the In Hindsight in our March 2025 Monthly Forecast and 23 February What’s in Blue story.)
At tomorrow’s meeting, the US may urge the swift commencement of dialogue to resolve the Russia-Ukraine war. The Council’s European members are likely to emphasise that a lasting solution to the conflict can only be achieved if Ukraine is sitting at the table and its security concerns are taken into account. Russia for its part is likely to criticise the EU for fomenting conflict on the continent by supporting Ukraine militarily.
The discussion is also likely to touch on several files in the Middle East. Kallas may emphasise the importance of promoting a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and of achieving a negotiated solution to the Israel-Hamas war that will bring a permanent end to hostilities. She may also express concern about the situation of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) following the entry into force on 30 January of legislation restricting UNRWA’s operations passed by the Israeli Knesset (parliament). In a 2 February statement, Kallas condemned any attempt “to obstruct UNRWA’s capacity to operate its mandate”, while also calling for “decisive action” by the UN to ensure the Agency’s neutrality and accountability.
Regarding developments in Syria since the ouster of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Kallas may emphasise the need for a Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process that establishes credible, inclusive, and non-sectarian governance. She may note that, on 24 February, the EU lifted sanctions impacting Syria’s oil, gas, electricity and transport sectors as part of its effort to support Syria’s transition, economic recovery, and reconstruction. In a statement to the press on that day, Kallas emphasised that the lifting is “immediate and open-ended, but can be reversed if Syria’s new rulers backtrack their commitments”. In the same statement, she noted that a conference will be held in Brussels on 17 March to further mobilise support for Syria.
Kallas and several Council members are also likely to express concern about the escalation of conflict in several contexts in Africa, including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan. Kallas may also welcome the strong partnership between the EU and the African Union (AU), noting that 2025 marks the 25th anniversary of cooperation between the two organisations. She might highlight that the EU has been a major financial partner in supporting AU Peace Support Operations (AUPSOs) and welcome the adoption of Security Council resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023 which outlines conditions for the financing of specific AUPSOs through UN assessed contributions. The EU, a key financial contributor to the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), has expressed support for applying the 2719 model to ATMIS’ successor mission, the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). (For background and more information, see our 26 December 2024 What’s in Blue story.) Some members may also welcome the financial support provided by the EU to efforts such as organising local elections in the Central African Republic (CAR).
Kallas may also note that, in addition to the contribution of troops and police from EU member states to UN peacekeeping missions, the EU fields its own missions through the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), some of which are mandated by the Security Council. In this regard, Kallas and some members may reference Operation Aspides (EUNAVFOR Aspides), a defensive operation headquartered in Greece launched on 19 February 2024 in response to Houthi attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea since October 2023. The aim of ASPIDES is to restore and safeguard the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024. There may also be reference to the EU naval force in the Mediterranean (Operation EUNAVFOR Med IRINI), which operates under the authorisation established by resolution 2292 of 14 June 2016 to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya, bound to or from Libya, that they have reasonable grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo on the country. With Operation IRINI, the EU is the only regional organisation operating under this authorisation.
