Syria: Briefing and Consultations
Tomorrow morning (12 February), the Security Council will hold a briefing on the political and humanitarian situations in Syria. Special Envoy for Syria Geir O. Pedersen and Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya are expected to brief on political and humanitarian developments, respectively. Closed consultations are scheduled to follow the open briefing.
Recent weeks have seen several developments on the political front in Syria. On 29 January, military commanders of several armed groups that participated in the offensive that toppled former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 held a conference, where they declared Ahmed al-Sharaa—the leader of the Security Council-listed terrorist group Hay’at tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—as Syria’s transitional president. In his first address to the nation on 30 January, Sharaa pledged to form an inclusive transitional government that will reflect Syria’s diversity and will govern the country until it can hold free and fair elections. He further announced plans to unify all Syrian territories, build state institutions, and revive the country’s economy. In a 4 February interview for a Syrian media outlet, Sharaa estimated that the transitional period for organising elections would last between four to five years, and described his vision of a Syria that would be “a republic with a parliament and an executive government”.
For the past several weeks, Pedersen has been in Syria, where he has engaged with the Syrian caretaker authorities, including Sharaa and caretaker Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani. Briefing Council members in closed consultations on 30 January, Pedersen apparently said that discussions had been constructive and that his visit to Damascus had been conducive towards building a relationship between the UN and Syria’s transitional government. (For more information on the 30 January meeting, see our 29 January What’s in Blue story.) It seems that several Council members expressed a desire for the UN to play a more concrete role in Syria’s political transition but also showed an understanding that the process is in an early stage, and that time and space are necessary to build trust between the UN and the new authorities. At tomorrow’s meeting, Council members are likely to highlight their support for the Special Envoy’s efforts to that end.
In a 3 February statement, Pedersen welcomed the “clear assurances repeatedly given by the caretaker leadership” that the new Syria will be for all Syrians and built on inclusive and credible foundations, noting a convergence between these commitments and the key principles outlined in Security Council resolution 2254. (Adopted on 18 December 2015, resolution 2254 focused on a political solution to the Syria crisis.) During tomorrow’s meeting, Council members may reiterate some of the key principles of resolution 2254, underlining the importance of a Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process that establishes credible, inclusive, and non-sectarian governance. In this regard, some members may also stress the importance of the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in Syria’s future. Furthermore, some members may call on Sharaa to deliver on the pledge he made at his 30 January address to form an inclusive government as soon as possible.
Some Council members, including France, may refer to a high-level conference on Syria that will take place in Paris on Thursday (13 February). The conference reportedly aims to coordinate regional and international action to support a transitional process that would ensure the country’s sovereignty and security, to coordinate aid and economic support, and to discuss transitional justice. Shaibani and Pedersen are expected to attend the conference, together with representatives from Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and the US.
At tomorrow’s meeting, some members may emphasise the need to lift national and regional sanctions that are imposed on Syria, to allow the country to rebuild its economy. Since the overthrow of Assad’s government, Pedersen has repeatedly noted that the lifting of sanctions is necessary for the country to be able to pursue recovery and reconstruction, messages that he may reiterate tomorrow. On this point, European Union (EU) members of the Council may refer to the roadmap endorsed by the EU towards lifting specific sanctions on sectors essential for Syria’s reconstruction.
Regarding the security situation, Council members may raise concerns about ongoing hostilities in northeast Syria, where skirmishes between the US-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continue. (For more information, see the brief on Syria in our February 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
On 3 February, a car bomb detonated near the northern city of Manbij—a flashpoint for hostilities between the SNA and the SDF—killing more than 20 people, including at least 14 women and three girls, and wounding several others. No entity has claimed responsibility for the attack but it has reportedly caused the suspension of talks between the SDF and the authorities in Damascus. The UN condemned the attack, noting that it highlights Syria’s vulnerability. Tomorrow, Msuya is likely to raise concerns regarding the implications of ongoing hostilities on civilians, civilian infrastructure, and humanitarian access, while underlining the need for all parties to prioritise the protection of civilians.
Council members may also raise concerns regarding the potential resurgence of terrorist groups in Syria. In this regard, some members may refer to the Secretary-General’s 20th biannual strategic-level report on the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh), which was circulated to Council members on 31 January (S/2025/72) and notes the risk that ISIL may exploit the volatile situation in Syria to strengthen its position in the region. (For more information, see our 7 February What’s in Blue story.)
Pedersen and Council members may also refer to the security situation in southern Syria and the Golan Heights. Citing security risks, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have positioned forces within the buffer zone established between Israel and Syria—which was established by the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement—and within Syrian territory. According to media reports, Israel has built several military bases in the demilitarised buffer zone since December 2024. Although Israel had initially indicated that its incursions into the area would be temporary, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz stated on 28 January that the IDF would remain in the buffer zone “indefinitely”. Several Council members may call for respect for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and call on Israel to respect the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement.
In briefing on the humanitarian situation, Msuya is likely to welcome the fact that, on 6 February, the Syrian caretaker authorities extended the permission granted to the UN to deliver humanitarian assistance through the Bab al-Hawa crossing for an additional six months, until 7 August. Msuya may describe the priorities of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in addressing the multitude of challenges facing the Syrian population, which include displacement, ongoing armed conflict, economic decline, and uncertainty regarding Syria’s future. Msuya may appeal to member states to commit funding to Syria’s Humanitarian Response Plan, which was only 34.5 percent funded as at the end of January.
It appears that some members are concerned about the implications of the US government’s decision to freeze funding for all programmes covered by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Until recently, USAID has funded humanitarian support for detention camps in northeast Syria, which house tens of thousands of persons, including women and children associated with detained ISIL fighters. The expected funding cut has thrown the future of the camps’ detainees into question and has raised fears about life-threatening conditions for civilians and a potential resurgence of ISIL in the region.
